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Europe Before and After Munich: Random Notes on Recent Publications
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
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Munich marks the end of an epoch, a “turning point in history,” as Arnold J. Toynbee recently states in a most suggestive article. In fact, these decisive events were foreshadowed long before September 1938, by actions almost necessarily leading the road to Munich. If one can speak of the end of a period, one might better say: Hitler's march into the Rhineland, March 7, 1936, was the real water-shed between two political continents. Indeed what had been said about the World War, that it merely precipitated a development of political and social forces which were moulding the twentieth century, could be repeated of this greatest diplomatic upset of our time too. It had its roots in the history of post-War Europe, and it may be that even the more we win distance from this “water-shed of Munich” the clearer it will become that the currents of history are running in the same old beds and in the same directions as before September, 1938.
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References
1 Toynbee, Arnold: A Turning Point in History. Foreign Affairs, 03. 1939Google Scholar.
2 Churchill, Winston: While England Slept, Putnam's Sons, New York, 1938, XII, (404 pp., $3.00)Google Scholar
3 Mussolini in his speech at Trieste—Sept. 18, 1938.
3a Cf. Survey of International Affairs, 1936, pp. 486–501 (London, 1937)Google ScholarPubMed, and Survey of International Affairs, 1937, Vol. I, pp. 448–459Google Scholar.
4 Cf. Osusky, Stefan: Why Czechoslovakia? Foreign Affairs, 04, 1937Google Scholar.
5 Cf. Seymour, Charles: Czechoslovak Frontiers. Yale Review, Winter, 1939Google Scholar. This very timely article discusses Czechoslovakia at the Peace Conference, esp. the work of the Czechoslovak Commission. It also reports on the interesting American proposals. But even these rectifications which would have given the Grosse Schütt and the salients of Rumburg and Eger to Germany, could not have changed the basically multi-national structure of the new state.
6 Cf. Friedrich's, C. J. excellent portrait of Eduard Benes, Atlantic Monthly, 09, 1938Google Scholar. Even his pre-War writings prove how much thought Benes had given to the crucial problem of minorities. Cf. Benes, : Gedanke und Tat. Aus den Schriften and Reden (Prag, 1937)Google Scholar, and his first book: Le problème autrichien et la question Tchèque (1908).
For a discussion of the national minorities, esp. the Sudeten-German grievances see Karl Falk, Strife in Czechoslovakia. The German Minority Question. Foreign Policy Reports. Mar. 15, 1938., and the comprehensive study of Wiskemann, Elizabeth: Czechs and Germans (New York, 1938)Google Scholar; for the post-Munich development cf. her article: Czechs and Germans after Munich. Foreign Affairs. 03, 1939Google Scholar; see also Görgen, H. M.: Tschechen und Deutsche, Mass und Wert (Zürich, 1938, pp. 215–226)Google Scholar and Henlein, Konrad: Rede in Karlsbad, 04 24, 1938Google Scholar; Memorandum der Sudetendeutschen Partei Juni 7, 1938 (Berlin, 1938).
6a For a factual evaluation of Czechoslovak foreign policy cf. Vondracek, Felix John: The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918–1935 (New York, 1937)Google Scholar. Papousek, Jaroslav: Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia and Germany (Prague, 1936)Google Scholar; Morawu, Emmanuel: Die strategische Bedeutung der tschechoslovakischen Republik für West-europa (Prague, 1936)Google Scholar; de Quirielle, Pierre: La politique extérieure de la Tschecho-Slovaquie et sa position dans l'Europe centrale, L'esprit international, Paris, 1937, pp. 506–523Google Scholar.
That the Czechoslovak Republic was far from being an “outpost of Bolshevism” can be seen in the influential part which the Catholic Populist Party under the leadership of Jan Sramek played in Czechoslovak politics.
A conflict between the Holy See and Czechoslovak Republic which had been broken out late in 1925 was successfully settled by 1927, under the prudent direction of Benes; see J. Papousek: Dr. Eduard Benes (Prag. 1937), pp. 131, 138, 180, 266–67.
7 A collection of the most important official documents on the Czech crisis can be found in International Conciliation, November 12, 1938. German texts in Kurzbericht. Dokumente und Berichte zur Deutschen Zeitgeschichte. (Berlin. 10 20, 1938.)Google Scholar
8 Schuman, Frederick L.: The Tory Dialectic. The New Republic, 12. 28, 1938 and Jan. 4, 1939Google Scholar; see also his regular contributions to Events, a monthly review of World Affairs and his forthcoming book: Europe on the Eve (A. A. Knopf, New York, 1939.)Google ScholarPubMed; for a similar interpretation by a Czech authority cf. Pergler, Charles: Czechoslovakia: A Symbol and a Lesson. The Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter, 1939Google Scholar. Also the great German novelist and exile Thomas Mann stresses such a view in his forthright booklet: This Peace (New York, 1938). The earnestness and full meaning of his arguments will only be felt when placed against the background of his weighty contributions on the crisis of contemporary Europe, published during recent years. For a good collection see his: Europa, Achtung, Aufsätze zur Zeit (New York, 1938)Google Scholar. The same view has been upheld and powerfully represented in the moving story of Gedye, G. E. R., Betrayed in Central Europe, New York, 1939Google Scholar. This first-hand account of the Austrian and Czech crises, by one of the most astute observers of the European scene, certainly deserves a comprehensive evaluation.
9 Within the conservative camp such ideas were, indeed, openly propounded by the Daily Mail's Continental Correspondent, Price, G. Ward: I Knew These Dictators (New York, 1938)Google Scholar and similarly by the Marquis of Londonderry, : Ourselves and Germany (New York, 1938.)Google Scholar
10 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish: We or They, Two Worlds in Conflict (N.Y. 1937)Google Scholar.
11 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish: When There Is No Peace (Macmillan Co., N. Y., 193,9 236 pp., $1.75)Google ScholarPubMed. “Armistice at Munich” is the significant title of a pre-print of this study, published in Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1939. The book adds—apart from a more detailed analysis—some general observations and conclusions as well as a most valuable day-by-day chronology of 73 pages. An Appendix gives the hitherto unpublished note of the Czechoslovak Government of Sept. 20, commenting on the Anglo-French demands of Sept. 19—a pathetic document significantly omitted from the British “White Paper.”
For a similar interpretation see numerous articles in The Economist (London) cf. After Rome (Jan. 21, 1939); and the arresting sketch by Gooch, G. P.: Twenty Years of Europe, The Contemporary Review, London, 02, 1939 pp. 129–139Google Scholar.
12 Cf. Seton-Watson, R. W.: Munich and After, Fortnightly, 12, 1938Google Scholar; see also Beuve-Méry, Hubert: La Vérité sur la pression franco-britannique exercée a Prague le 20 Septembre. L'Europe Nouvelle, 10 29, 1938Google Scholar; compare the different interpretation by Fabre-Luce, Alfred: Hittoire Secrète de la conciliation de Munich (Paris, 1938)Google Scholar.
13 Armstrong is right in discounting the widely used and confusing phrase that “in war there are no winners.” More serious, however, is the actual dilemma of a peace settlement felt in a World which had gone through the disheartening experiences of twenty years armistice. “The Peace settlement is the acid test of a War,” as A. J. Toynbee clearly states. “The moral impasse with which the British and French peoples were confronted when they had to face the prospect of War with Germany comes to light in the question of the peace settlement.”
In the light of the prevailing criticism of the Paris Treaty System it is of special interest to recall the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the forerunner of Versailles. Fortunately, such a timely study has pust been published by Wheeler-Bennett, John W.. The Forgotten Peace. Brest-Litovsk, 03 1918 (New York 1939)—a masterpiece of contemporary historyGoogle Scholar.
14 Dean, Vera Micheles: Europe in Retreat, (A. A. Knopf, New York 1939, 254 pp. $2.00)Google Scholar.
15 Toynbee, Arnold J.: After Munich: The World Outlook. International Affairs, 01,02. 1939Google Scholar. As “pros” for German domination he enumerates the following facts: First, the Rome-Berlin axis now insulates France and England from everything on the continent as far as Vladiwostok. Second, the only chance of security for the small states is to keep on good terms with Germany. Third, Germany can set her neighbors against one another through her championship of the principle of national self-determination. Fourth, there are common causes between Germany and the ruling classes of the Danubian nations. Anti-semitism is a useful article of exportation in these areas and Germany can guarantee to the rulers security from civilian movements. Finally, Germany will make use of all technical facilities in these countries. A German railway system and propaganda machinery will control them.
Against these bright prospects, however, Toynbee points at important elements of resistance: First, the superiority in numbers of the German nation is dwindling in Central Europe. The high birth rate in eastern countries and in a similar way their social and economic development will change the German preponderance in time. Second, the rising political maturity in the small nations is a factor not to be overlooked. Nationalism has been a demonic force in the resurrection of Germany, the small nations are just awakening to their nationalism. Third, there is still a possibility of a counter-group headed by Italy and Poland (even if Colonel Beck's idea of a “Third Europe” has not met with success during the last years). The Carpatho conflict already showed such an alignment, though Germany finally was successful in the re-drawing of the Czech-Hungarian frontier. Fourth, the governing elements in some countries, unpopular not least because they are inclined to play the German game, may lose. There is even the possibility of a re-appearance of Russia in European affairs. Toynbee rightly reminds us of the important role Soviet Russia played in the resurrection of Kemalist Turkey. Finally, there is common dislike and fear of Germany. German-Prussian temperament and national tradition are not reputed to be tactful and moderate—the most important elements in an appeasement of the European powder keg. This psychological factor indeed is the chief “con” against Germany's prospect. In spite of that, Toynbee believes that Germany will succeed in building up a Mitteleuropa and that the Rome-Berlin axis will not break.
16 Toynbee, Arnold J.: The Issues in British Foreign Policy. International Affairs 05–06 1938Google Scholar.
17 Cf. Harold Nicolson's Trilogy: Lord Carnock: A Study in Old Diplomacy; Peacemaking 1919; and Lord Curzon, esp. his terminal essay: “Some Remarks on the Practice of Diplomacay,” furthermore his illuminating article on “British Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Jan. 1937.
18 Friedrich, Carl Joachim: Foreign Policy in the Making. The Search for a New Balance of Power (W. W. Norton, New York 1938, 296 pp. $3.00)Google Scholar.
19 A slogan often used by “Die Schwarze Front,” organ of the National Socialist S. S. (Schutzstaffel: the special black guard troop of Nationalsocialism)—a newspaper which takes the lead in the anti-religious agitation in National-Socialist Germnay.
20 Hodgson, Stuart: The Man Who Made the Peace: Neville Chamberlain (New York 1938)Google Scholar SirPetrie, Charles: The Chamberlain Tradition (New York 1938).Google Scholar
Hodgson's slim volume is a fair appraisal of life and character of Neville Chamberlain. Short and factual—not all laurels, even criticizing his hero,—it stresses the “Lincoln-like simplicity” of Chamberlain. So far as his role at Munich is concerned, Hodgson sees in the British Premier the mouthpiece of the horror with which millions all over the world regard modern warfare. Even if one may argue with the author that numerous other motives may have influenced Chamberlain, there is no doubt that the European crisis in the Fall of 1938 brought out the enormous peace sentiment of the world. As a bringer of peace, the head of each government in Europe could be sure of a warmer welcome than if he brought victory to mourners.
More doubtful, however, is Hodgson's analysis of the lasting effects of Munich. “The real victory which Chamberlain won at Munich was the definite assertion of the form of international laws as against the claims of any nation to assert its rights by naked force…. The criticism of Nazi foreign policy ever since Hitler took office has not been that its aims were wrong, but that its methods were inconsistent with the mere existence of international law.” Here again Hodgson points at a very important feature of international relations in post-War times. Perhaps the basic problem and decisive difference between nations has been the question of means, not ends. Force and threats of violence have prevailed over the orderly processes of justice, such as the policy started by Japan at Manchukuo, taken up by Italy in Ethiopia, and developed in an even more spectacular way by Germany in Central Europe. Such a policy is contagious. It is comically imitated by the smaller nations. Poland always followed in the big brother's footsteps, after Germany's march into Austria—with her ultimatum and mobilization against Lithuania, and after Munich—in her “conquest” of Teschen.
The more ambitious attempt of Petrie is a very informative study of the three Chamberlains, but its main thesis of the basic similarity between father and sons will be doubted, especially so far as Neville Chamberlain is concerned. What runs through their careers, according to Petrie, and justifies one in speaking of a “Chamberlain tradition” are their basically democratic conceptions, their championship of a united Empire, in international affairs, their fight for the preservation of peace of the world as a leading object of British policy, and finally, courage and willingness to face facts, however unpleasant. Petrie admits that there are basic differences between the three which he ascribes to contrasted up-bringing and circumstances. It may be doubted, however, whether Joseph Chamberlain was not a totally different character. The “directness of purpose and freshness of outlook” characteristic of this resolute fighter certainly differs from the vacillating and uncertain attitude, half-monitory, half-defeatist which Neville Chamberlain showed throughout the on-coming crisis of 1938.
21 Even as a business man he was characterized by a colleague as “a fellow with a retail mind in a wholesale line,” quoted from Armstrong, H. F., p. 22Google Scholar.
22 Abel, Theodore: Why Hitler Came into Power. (Prentice-Hall, N. Y. 1938, 322 pp., $2.75.)Google Scholar
23 Cf. the inaccurate statements on: Walter Rathenau (p. 159), the origin of the inflation (p. 209), Tirpitz and the submarine warfare (p. 232), etc.
The biographies transmit almost nothing of the spiritual conflicts and disputes of the young war and post-war generation. How much they fall short of a real feel of the atmosphere can be seen for instance in a comparison of the meaningless “story of a soldier” with war books like Ernst Jünger's, Renn's, Schauwecker's, Dwinger's and even Remarque's novels (so much defamed by nationalistic Germany) or Hotzel's, Curt Deutscher Aufstand, die Revolution des Nachkriegs. (Stuttgart 1934)Google Scholar and Uhse's, Bodo Söldner and Soldal (Paris 1935)Google Scholar.
24 von Salomon, Ernst: Die Geächteten (Berlin 1930)Google Scholar and Die Sladt (Berlin 1932)Google Scholar.
25 Dean, Vera M.: Europe in Retreat, p. 254Google Scholar.
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