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Eros and Moderation in Plutarch's Life of Solon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2008

Andrew Hertzoff
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Abstract

Plutarch is generally not considered a philosopher in his own right. However, a careful reading of his life of Solon, the Athenian lawgiver, in conjunction with an examination of his philosophical essays, shows that Plutarch is engaged in a debate with Epicureans and Stoics whose misjudgments of the worth and limits of human passions lead them knowingly or unknowingly to draw lines between the happy philosophical life and the life of politics. Through the life of Solon, Plutarch demonstrates how a philosopher would actually engage in politics, and with his proper understanding of human nature, educate that society through wise laws that encourage a moderate and healthy form of erotic life in the city. In doing so, Plutarch makes a case for a substantive contribution of Platonic philosophy to the guidance of the statesman.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 70 , Issue 3 , Summer 2008 , pp. 339 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2008

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References

1 I have generally made my own translations or slightly altered the translations prepared in the Babbitt and Perrin edited Loeb collections of Plutarch's works. Babbitt, Frank C. et al. , trans., Moralia, 15 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927)Google Scholar; Perrin, Bernadotte, trans., The Parallel Lives, 11 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914–1926)Google Scholar. I have also consulted the editions of Dryden, , Waterfield, , Hadas, , and Scott-Kilvert, . Clough, A.H., ed., The Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans: The Dryden Translation, Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago, IL, 1952)Google Scholar; Hadas, Moses, Plutarch: Selected Essays on Love, the Family, and the Good Life (New York: Mentor Books, 1957)Google Scholar; Scott-Kilvert, Ian, The Rise and Fall of Athens (New York: Penguin Books, 1960)Google Scholar; Waterfield, Robin, trans., Greek Lives, with introduction and notes by Stadter, Philip A. (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1998)Google Scholar; and Plutarch's Essays, introduced and annotated by Ian Kidd (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

2 See, for instance, Duff, Tim, Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 90Google Scholar; and Stadter, Philip, “Plutarch and Trajanic Ideology,” in Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan, ed. Stadter, Philip A. and Van der Stockt, Luc (Symbolae Facultatis Litterarum Lovaniensis Ser. A, 29: Leuven 2002), 227–41, 237 for NumaGoogle Scholar; Russell, D.A., “On Reading Plutarch's Lives,” in Scardigli, Barbara, ed., Essays on Plutarch's Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1995), 75–94, 80 for EpaminondasGoogle Scholar; G. Roskam, “A Пαιδεία for the Ruler,” in Stadter and Van der Stockt, 175–89, 182 for Lycurgus. Zecchini, in the same volume, suggests Alexander served the same role at one point in Plutarch's development. “Plutarch as a Political Theorist,” 191–96 (fn. 2). Meanwhile, Schettino (“Best Ruler,”201–9) claims that Phocion serves as Plutarch's “ideal political ruler” (fn. 40). Plutarch himself claims Numa “provides evidence of what Plato would say … about the combination of the power of a king with the understanding of a philosopher” (Numa 20.7). Plutarch provides similar testimonies for many of his other heroes, particularly Alexander, Pericles, and Dion.

3 (Comparison of Solon and Publicola 3–4). Plutarch's synkriseis (comparisons) are generally accepted to favor neither life, but to open up specific questions between them. See Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 244–86; and Pelling, Christopher, “Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives,” 349–64 in Pelling, Plutarch and History (Classical Press of Wales, Swansea 2002)Google Scholar. The Solon/Publicola judgment stands as a particular exception. (Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 260; Stadter's introduction to Stadter and Van der Stockt, Sage and Emperor 17.

4 Notably in Pelling, Christopher, “Do Plutarch's Politicians Never Learn?” in The Statesman in Plutarch's Works, ed. de Blois, Lukas, Bons, Jeroen, Kessels, Ton, and Schenkeveld, Dirk M., vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87–103Google Scholar; and in Philip A. Statder's introduction and “Plutarch and Trajanic Ideology” in Stadter and Van der Stockt, 17 and 235.

5 Progress in Virtue 78C; Letter to Appolodorus 106B. Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 147C, 151F, 152A, 152C–D, 155B, 159B; Dialogue on Love 751E; Should the Elderly be Political? 794F; Precepts of Politics 805E, 814A; Reply to Colotes 1127B–C. See also Wardman, Alan, Plutarch's Lives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974)Google Scholar; and Jackson P. Hershbell, “Plutarch's Political Philosophy: Platonic and Peripatetic,” in De Blois, Statesman in Plutarch's Lives, 198 and 155, fn. 29.

6 Erotikos 763E.

7 On Plutarch and erōs, see Martin, H.M. Jr., “Plutarch, Plato, and Eros,” Classical Bulletin 60 (1984): 82–88Google Scholar and Rist, J.M. “Plutarch's Amatorius: A Commentary on Plato's Theories of Love,” Classical Quarterly 51 (2001): 557–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Cf. Nicias 1: “[T]hose details which escaped many writers … I have attempted to bring together, not gathering useless inquires, but to transmit those things which bring understanding of character and temperament” [tên pros katanoêsin ethos kai tropou paradidou] Friedrich Leo listed six elements that Plutarch usually began his life with: family (génos), appearance (eĭdos), character (trópos), way of life (díaita), education (paideía), and style of speech (logos). (Die greichisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literaschen Form [Leipzig, 1901]) quoted in Pelling, “Rhetoric, Paideia, and Psychology in Plutarch's Lives,” in Pelling, Plutarch and History, 339. D.A. Russell suggested that a general structure of a Life would run as follows: ancestry, childhood anecdotes, campaigns as a boy, entry into politics, first main campaigns, war and peace, second main campaigns, change of fortune, and old age, death, and funeral. (Russell, “On Reading Plutarch's Lives,” reprinted in Scardigli, Essays on Plutarch's Lives, 75–94.

9 Russell, “Alcibiades,” 206–7.

10 Alcibiades 3–6, 16, 23.

11 So, for instance, the rivalry of Themistocles and Aristeides in politics is foreshadowed by erotic competition between the two for a potential lover (Themistocles 3, Aristeides 2). Duff's contention that Plutarch is “uninterested” in erôs “unless it bears on their character” (Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 94) is a case of an assertion that can only be judged by knowing when and where it would bear on their character. The most interesting case is that of Julius Caesar (See “Plutarch's Chaste Caesar: No Time for Love?”). But since the interest of that case is the knowing omission of what does bear on Caeser's character, we should clearly draw the double conclusion that the absence of the explicit role of erôs is itself significant and that Plutarch would never be bound to include any commentary on erôs if he wished to omit it.

12 Such a relationship, already noted in Plato's Republic, is hinted at strongly in the Dinner of the Seven Wise Men; See Aalders, , “Political Thought in Plutarch's Convivium Septem Sapientum,” Menomyne 30 (1977): 28–39Google Scholar and, “Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Its Place in Symposion Literature,” in Plutarch and His Intellectual World, ed. Judith Mossman (London: Duckworth, 1997), 119–41.

13 A similar reference occurs in the comparison of Pericles’ and Peisistratus's appearances at Pericles 7.

14 Aristotle denies the history offered here by Plutarch: “They talk nonsense who say that Peisistratus was loved by Solon … this is quite impossible, considering their respective ages …” (Constitution of Athens 17).

15 The desire that might be more normally connected to political activity, philotimia, Plutarch unequivocally condemns as “worse than covetousness” (Precepts of Politics 819F). The other great philosopher-statesman of the Lives, Cicero, is afflicted with philotimia to as great an extent as Solon is characterized by erôs. By way of comparison, it can be noted that while Solon sees through Peisistratus's stratagems, Cicero's tragic end is the result of his misplaced trust in the flattery of Octavian.

16 The innate neutrality of wealth is a common theme in Plutarch's lives, as in the beginning of the Aristides. Plutarch criticizes at times the pursuit of wealth, for either personal desire or political necessity, but not wealth or poverty themselves.

17 Aristotle seems unaware of any such slanders: Constitution of Athens 5.3

18 Whether Plutarch invented the last reference is unknown, but no other mention of it exists.

19 Cf. Sol.-Pub. 3.3

20 The obvious comparison is Brutus's willingness to sacrifice his sons when they conspired with Tarquin to restore him to a tyranny in Rome (Publicola 6). But Plutarch refers to this action of Brutus as that of “either a god or a beast.” The Duffian invitation to reflection upon it from both views is clear, but in the light of what Plutarch himself will go on to argue, it may be that to place family and friends on a Stoic sacrificial alter to the public good is, at the least, unhuman if not inhuman.

21 In this, Solon is very close to Numa (4.1, 5.2-5) and not Poplicola (1.4-2.1).

22 Compare Marcus Aurelius's meditations upon the potential loss of children (9.40).

23 The idea that fortune's vicissitudes bring pain was shared by Plutarch with his Stoic and Epicurean rivals, but it is a consistent part of his thought that trained reason in times of plenty can prepare us for loss, rejecting suggestions we should refrain from such attachments. See Progress in Virtue 82F; On Chance 97C; Letter to Appolonius 102 D, 103F, 112C; Advice on Keeping Well 126E; On the Control of Anger 463D; On Tranquility of Mind 474D, etc.

24 That human nature requires familial affection is another common idea for Plutarch; compare Pericles 1 with Solon 7.

25 See Dillon, John, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 9, 193–98Google Scholar; George Boys-Stone, “Thyrsus-bearer of the Academy or Enthusiast for Plato? Plutarch's de Stoicorum repugnantiis,” in Mossman, Plutarch and His Intellectual World, 41–59; Jackson P. Hershbell, “Plutarch's Political Philosophy: Peripatetic and Platonic,” in De Blois, Statesman in Plutarch's Lives, 151–61.

26 Letter to Apollonius 102D-E; Advice on Keeping Well 135C; That It Is Most Necessary with Rulers for Philosophers to Dialogue 778C; Stoic Self-Contradictions 1033B–C; The Stoics Talk More Paradoxically than the Poets 1057D; That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1087D, 1100D; Reply to Colotes 1125B, 1127E; Is ‘Live Unknown’ a Wise Precept? 1128F—The Lamprias catalogue includes a number of lost works targeting Epicureans and Stoics as well.

27 On Superstition 165A.

28 On this, compare Seneca's essay, De Otio (Seneca, , Moral and Political Essays, ed. Cooper, John M. and Procopé, J. F. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995], 172–80Google Scholar). On Plutarch and the Stoics, see Babut, D., Plutarque et le Stoïcisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969Google Scholar). As Boys-Stone (“Thyrsus-bearer of the Academy or Enthusiast for Plato?”) notes, Plutarch does see Platonic elements in Stoicism, but believes that “Stoics’ lives may be consistent, but only insofar as they live as if they were Peripatetics and not, strictly speaking, as Stoics at all” (48).

29 Cf. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus; Lucretius, De Reurm Natura ii.1–45, compare to v.1113–60; Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno 102–17, primarily. Plutarch when referring to the Stoa refers always to the founders of the Stoic school, Zeno and Chrysippus, using materials now lost to us. Most of our remaining Stoic writings are from the third “Roman” stoa, the stoic school at the time of Plutarch's writing, including writers like Seneca and Epictetus. Plutarch never refers to these writers by name or text, but essays such as Seneca's Consolation to Helvia clearly show the same critique of pleasure, as in Seneca's condemnation of erês: “If you consider that sexual desire was given to man not for enjoyment, but for the propagation of the race, once you are free of this violent and destructive passion rooted in your vitals, every other desire will leave you undisturbed. Reason routs the vices not one by one but altogether: the victory is final and complete.” Dialogues and Letters, trans. C.D.N. Costa (New York: Penguin, 1997), 19. Compare, for instance, Marcus Aurelius 6.13 or 8. 48.

30 cf. Advice on Keeping Well 125B. In drawing this distinction, Plutarch follows Aristotle in his distinction between the rule of the soul over the body (which Aristotle calls despotic) with that of the mind (nous) over the desires (orexios) which he calls political or kingly (Politics 1254b5–7).

31 Cf. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 39, Antony 17; contrast Marius 45.

32 On Stoic Self-contradictions 1033B–C.

33 Apology 32B–E; Gorgias 484B–85E, 517B–19D; Republic 345E–47E, 519B–21B, 620C; Theaetetus 172C–77C.

34 Dillon, Middle Platonists 23–27, 43–45.

35 On Tranquility of Mind 472B, To an Uneducated Ruler 782B, Political Precepts 824E, Numa 5, Pericles 16, Cicero 2–3.

36 E.L. Bowie, “Plutarch and Literary Activity in Achaea,” in Stadter and Van der Stockt, Sage and Emperor, 41–56. But as Michael Trapp notes, the retreat to philosophy is not as much of a retreat as Plato suggests. (Trapp, “Statesmanship in a Minor Key?” in De Blois, Statesman in Plutarch's Lives, 189–200).

37 On Ethical Virtue 441D. Although writings by both Platonists and Stoics continued to show particular concern with anger and honor, they both frequently collapsed thumos into general appetitive passion. See Dillon, Middle Platonists, 194–95; and Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 73. But note the continuing importance, even centrality, of the love of victory (philonikia) and love of honor (philotimia) in Plutarch's writings. (See Duff, Plutarch's Lives, 61, 82–87.)

38 Education of Children 2B; On Listening 37C; How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 61D; Can Virtue Be Taught? 440C; On Ethical Virtue 442D, 444B; On the Control of Anger 459B; On Tranquility of Mind 465B.

39 How to Profit from One's Enemies 87E, On Chance 97E.

40 Progress in Virtue 79F, 84B; That It Is Most Necessary with Rulers for Philosophers to Dialogue 776C; Should the Elderly be Political? 785C, 786B, 796D; That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1097C; Reply to Colotes 1099E; Is ‘Live Unknown’ a Wise Precept? 1129D.

41 How to Profit from One's Enemies 89A, Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 163 D–164B. These statements are sometimes attributed to Solon originally. (Suidas, , Lexicon and Pausanias, Description of Greece, quoted in Edmonds, J.M., ed. and trans., Greek Elegy and Iambus, Vol. I [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931], 104Google Scholar).

42 On Chance 97E.

43 Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 159B, On Ethical Virtue 444D.

44 Progress in Virtue 84E, Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 152C, On Ethical Virtue 445A–47A, Precepts of Politics 807A. See also Gianakaris (1970) 81–84.

45 To an Uneducated Ruler 780B; see, for instance, Numa XX.8.

46 That Old Men Should Participate in Political Life 795A, Precepts of Politics 815A, 818E. One of the cardinal principles of politics for Plutarch is the value of prâotês (peacefulness); see Martin, H., “The Concept of prâotês in Plutarch's Lives,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 3 (1960): 65–73Google Scholar.

47 Precepts of Politics 800A, 815A–B, 824D. Whether Plutarch sees this as extending the Platonic thesis of the unity of the virtues, and particularly the possible identification of justice and moderation in the Republic, or whether it is a knowing retreat to a “minor key” of politics in a world that no longer allows or requires heroic actions is unclear. Certainly, Plutarch never acknowledges correcting or altering Plato.

48 The dialogue takes place against the background of a comedic betrothal of an older wealthy widow and a young man that involves at one point the forced kidnapping of the groom, but ends in marriage.

49 Erotikos 757C

50 Ibid., 758E

51 Ibid., 752A.

52 Political Precepts 821F.

53 Erotikos 764D.

54 Ibid., 756E.

55 Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 156C.

56 On the Control of Anger 464B.

57 Old Men in Public Life 786A.

58 Erotikos 767E.

59 Ibid., 767D.

60 Ibid., 765C, On Ethical Virtue 447B.

61 On Ethical Virtue 451C.

62 Plutarch recites the story approvingly at Precepts of Politics 805E.

63 cf. Precepts of Politics 815A, 824D.

64 At least as Plutarch tells it; Aristotle notes that he “incurred the hostility of all parties” (Athenian Constitution 6.4; 11.2).

65 Republic 562A–569C; Politics 5.1304b20–1305a27, 6.1305a37–106a11.

66 Pericles 16; Cf. Thucydides 2.65.

67 Compare the rejection of the crown and name of monarch by Caesar: “The surprising thing is that although the people tolerated being ruled by a king, they found the mere name offensive, as if it meant the end of their freedom” (Antony 12).

68 Plutarch approves of this approach to leadership, as can be seen in the Precepts of Politics 800A.

69 Solon 18. This is also shown in the poetic fragments quoted by Aristotle (Athenian Constitution. 12.1–3). In the Dinner of the Seven Wise Men, it is true, Solon is said to have the repute of drawing “democracy out of kingship” (152A) and praises democracy and equality (152D). However, Periander notes that all of the wise men seem to praise a democracy that is most like an aristocracy (154D).

70 Plutarch also notes that this was the one law of Solon's that one might plausibly criticize before he himself offers a similar justification of it in the Precepts of Politics (823F–824C).

71 Cf. How to Profit from One's Enemies 90c.

72 Cf. Precepts of Politics 813C–D, 818A.

73 Cf. Ibid., 824D.

74 Cf. Ibid., 815B, 822C.

75 Such interpretations can be found in Jaeger, Werner, Paideia, vol. 1, 2nd ed., trans. Herbert, Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 136–49Google Scholar; Barr, Stringfellow, The Will of Zeus (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), 71Google Scholar; North, Helen, Sophrosune (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 13–15Google Scholar; Almeda, Joseph A., Justice as an Aspect of the Polis Idea in Solon's Political Poems (Leiden: Brill, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Irwin, Elizabeth, Solon and Early Greek Poetry:  The Politics of Exhortation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blok, J., Blok, Justine, and Lardinois, Andre, eds., Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches (Leiden: Brill, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76 Strangely, referring to the laws regulating the physical behavior of slaves, the misogynist Protogenes claims Solon for his own identification of true erōs solely with homosexual relationships (Erotikos 751B). The stance of Plutarch himself in this dialogue seems to favor heterosexual relationships slightly, but only because they are more likely to exhibit good moderation; he appears approving of homosexual relationships that are oriented towards virtue as well (Erotikos 770c).

77 Philip Stadter notes this was associated with marriage and fertility (Greek Lives, 397) and, by Plutarch himself, with sweetness (Gamika Paraggelmata 138D—where Plutarch mentions this law approvingly).

78 Again, Plutarch approves of this in the Erotikos 769D, noting it was not intended to promote pleasure, but in order to build affection.

79 Cf. On Stoic Self-contradictions, particularly 1033F, where Plutarch notes the Stoic criticism of Solon. For an account of Chrysippus apart from Plutarch's polemical view, see Tieleman, Tuen, Chrysippus on Affections (Leiden: Brill, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 Stadter (Greek Lives, 396) traces the requirement to the legal need to provide an heir, but Plutarch's concern with demonstrating Solon's view of natural and affectionate marriage does not so simply lend itself to the very kind of mercenary concern he insists Solon was opposed to.

81 Unlike most of Solon's other laws, Plutarch never refers to these laws approvingly anywhere in the Moralia.

82 While Aristotle describes business as, in part, the real reason (Constitution of Athens 11), Plutarch, like Herodotus (I.29), accepts Solon's motivation as purely philosophical. This accords with Plutarch's earlier portrait of Solon's concern with money as being limited and driven largely by necessity.

83 Herodotus I.28–I.34.

84 Thucydides 6.54.5.

85 Hansen, Mogens Herman, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 32Google Scholar; Barr, Will of Zeus, 73. See particularly Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 16. Thucydides in his account claims none of the laws were changed save the continuation of the Peisistratidae in power.

86 Barr, Will of Zeus, 74–75.

87 Thucydides 6.54.6; Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 14.

88 Plutarch's short essay on Monarchy, Democracy and Oligarchy uses the divisions of constitutions offered by Plato's Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman and Aristotle in the Politics. Unlike them, he does not explicitly rank the three good forms with respect to each other, but he does show he approves of the good rule of a single man.

89 Note especially Elderly in Public Life 790C, 792C, 794F, 796D.

90 Thucydides 6.54.6. Compare Plutarch's comments on Caesar: “[W]hen permanence is added to the unaccountability of monarchy, tyranny is the result” (Caesar 57).

91 Cf. Sol.-Pub. 1.5.

92 Ibid., 1.1.

93 Ibid., 3.3.

94 Pelling, “Do Plutarch's Politician's Learn?” 90, 100.

95 Stadter, “Trajanic Ideology,” 233–35.

96 Pelling, “Do Plutarch's Politician's Learn?” 99.

97 Pub. 1.9.

98 Pub. 1.1, 1.5–2.1.

99 Monica Affortunati and Barbara Scardigli notice this but offer an interpretation that makes Plutarch's modifications of history the product of a good faith effort to explain the praise Livy offers of Publicola in their “Aspects of Plutarch's Life of Publicola,” in Plutarch and the Historical Tradtion, ed. Stadter (New York: Routledge, 1992), 109–31, particularly 110–12.

100 Pub. 11.2; Livy 2.1.

101 Pub. 4.4–7.5; Livy 2.5.

102 Pub.16.7; Livy 2.11.

103 Livy 2.13; Pub. 18.2–19.5.

104 Livy 2.18; Pub. 21.4–6.

105 Pub. 10.1–5, 11.1–2.

106 Pub. 23.1–2; Livy 2.17. Plutarch actually claims he was wealthy (Cf. Sol.-Pub 1.5).

107 Livy 2.7–2.9; Pub. 12.4, Cf. Sol.-Pub 2.3.

108 Livy 2.9. Pub. 12.1; Cf. Sol.-Pub 2.3.

109 Cf. Sol.-Pub. 1.2, 1.5, 3.3, 3.4.

110 Plutarch conveniently omits the fact that, according to Livy, two years later Rome first instituted the dictatorship, an institution whose eventual affect on the Republic was clear by Plutarch's time (Livy 2.18).

111 In this, Plutarch was working within a set vocabulary that crossed most Hellenic and Roman schools of the time. Compare Polybius: “[A]ll other writers represent [Scipio] as a man favored by Fortune who usually succeeded in his undertakings against all odds and with the help of mere chance, for they apparently consider that such men are more godlike and more worthy of our admiration than those who always act upon rational calculation. They do not seem to recognize that these are two quite different categories of achievement, the one being merely enviable, while the other is in the highest degree praiseworthy” (10.2); I have used the translation of Ian Scott-Kilvert, Rise and Fall of Athens.

112 On the Fortune of the Romans 316c–d, 319b–320c, 326a–b; Compare On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander 326d, 327e–329a, 330e, 332c–e—Alexander, the Greek philosopher, is virtuous, Rome fortunate.

113 Compare the conclusion of the Lives of the Gracchi.