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Diplomacy in the Atomic Age: Part II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Stephen D. Kertesz
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InTheYears following the second World War, Western diplomacy was confronted with staggering problems. Some of these have been results of long developments, others of more recent origin. Meetings between Mussolini and Hitler and between the dictators and Western statesmen are glaring examples of a new brand of diplomacy which was characterized by lack of preparation through traditional diplomatic channels. Subsequent events disclosed not only some weaknesses of democracies in international politics but exposed even more the lack of good faith and other destructive tendencies of totalitarian diplomacies. Not only did Western foreign policy fail to answer adequately the challenges of a crumbling world order, but totalitarian diplomacy also erred often and gravely. Mussolini's diplomatic mistakes caused the doom of Fascist Italy and Hitler's blunders contributed greatly to the destruction of Nazi Germany. The Nazi-Soviet deal and Stalin's overextended faith in Hitler are prize examples of diplomatic miscalculations.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , April 1959 , pp. 357 - 388
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1959

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References

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42 “Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the Conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President, but his apparent indecision was probably the direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western, not Southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interest best served if the Anglo-Americans as well as the Russians participated in the occupation of the Balkans.” Deane, John R., The Strange Alliance (New York, 1947), pp. 43–44Google Scholar.

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