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Considerable controversy in recent decades has centered on the question of why the philosopher in Plato's Republic would condescend to participate in politics. The traditional view is that philosophers rule from a general obligation to the city in which they live, a specific duty to the kallipolis which educated them or an acknowledgement of “the rule of reason as the primary and natural imperative.” However, if the ultimate happiness of the philosopher consists in a contemplative life divorced from politics, then the justice of the city which demands that philosophers rule conflicts with the psychic harmony of the individual philosopher. The analogy between justice in the state and in the individual soul breaks down as justice in the state demands functions of the philosopher for which he has no inclination or expertise. The just rule of reason is possible for individuals but impossible for states, unless philosophers can be required to meet their obligation to rule.
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References
1 Aronson, S.H., “The Happy Philosopher — A Counterexample to Plato's Proof,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 10 (10 1972), 383–398CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Beatty, J., “Why Should Plato's Philosopher Be Moral and, Hence, Rule,” The Personalist, 57 (Spring 1976), 132–144Google Scholar; Beatty, J., “Plato's Happy Philosopher and Politics,” Review of Politics, 38 (10 1976), 545–575CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cooper, J.M., “The Psychology of Justice in Plato,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (04 1977) 151–157Google Scholar; Galis, L., “The State-Soul Analogy in Plato's Argument That Justice Pays,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 12 (07 1974), 285–294CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, D., “The Republic and the ‘Limits of Politics,’” Political Theory, 5 (08 1977) 293–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hall, D., “The Philosopher and the Cave,” Greece and Rome, 25 (10 1978), 169–173CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kraut, R., “Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato,” Philosophical Review, 82 (07 1973), 330–344CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sparshott, F.E., “Plato as Anti-Political Thinker,” Ethics, 77 (04 1967), 214–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vlastos, G., “Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic,” Journal of Philosophy, 66 (08 1969), 505–522CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Strauss, L. in Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1959)Google Scholar and The City and Man (Chicago, 1978) founded a tradition of interpreting the philosopher's reluctance to engage in politicsGoogle Scholar. See Bloom's, A. interpretative essay in his edition of The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968)Google Scholar; Bloom, A. “Response to Hall,” Political Theory, 5 (08 1977), 315–330CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pangle's, T. interpretative essay in his edition of The Laws of Plato (New York, 1980)Google Scholar; Rosen, S., “The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic” Review of Metaphysics, 18 (03 1965), 452–475.Google Scholar
2 Hall, “The Republic and the ‘Limits of Politics,’” p. 310; cf., Bookman, J.T., “Plato on Political Obligation,” Western Political Quarterly, 25 (06 1972), 264CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davies, J.C., “The Philosopher and the Cave,” Greece and Rome, 24 (04 1977), 23–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Beatty, “Why Should Plato's Philosopher Be Moral and, Hence, Rule,” pp. 132–40; Beatty, “Plato's Happy Philosopher and Politics,” pp. 548–72; Galis, “The State-Soul Analogy in Plato's Argument That Justice Pays,” pp. 290–304; Kraut, “Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato,” pp. 330–44.
4 Aronson, “The Happy Philosopher — A Counterexample to Plato's Proof,” p. 397; Beatty, “Why Should Plato's Philosopher Be Moral and, Hence, Rule,” pp. 130–35.
5 Kraut, “Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato,” pp. 340–41.
6 Beatty, “Plato's Happy Philosopher and Politics,” p. 564.
7 Ibid., p. 567
8 Brickhouse, T.C., “More on the Paradox of the Philosopher's Rule,” The Personalist, 59 (07 1978), 384–386.Google Scholar
9 Strauss, City and Man, p. 124; Strauss, Natural Right, p. 151.
10 Strauss, City and Man, p. 127.
11 Ibid., p. 128.
12 Hall, “The Republic and the ‘Limits of Politics,’” p. 302.
13 Strauss, City and Man, p. 128.
14 Bloom, Republic, p. 407. All quotations from the Republic in this paper refer to Bloom's translation.
15 Ibid., p. 408.
16 Strauss, City and Man, p. 124; cf. Pangle, Laws, p. 509.
17 Strauss, City and Man, p. 124; Bloom, Republic, pp. 408–410; Bloom, “Response to Hall,” pp. 315–30; Pangle, Laws, pp. 509–510; Rosen, “The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic,” pp. 457–67; Hall, “The Republic and the ‘Limits of Politics,’” pp. 293–313.
18 Murdoch, I., The Fire and the Sun (Oxford, 1977), p. 34Google Scholar. See also Friedlaender, P., Plato (New York, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 50, 52, 194–7Google Scholar; Kraut, “Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato,” pp. 340–43; Vlastos, G., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), pp. 19–21Google Scholar; Voegelin, E., Plato (Baton Rouge, 1966, pp. 13, 127.Google Scholar
19 Bloom, Republic, p. 411.
20 Barker, E., Greek Political Theory (London, 1964), p. 236.Google Scholar
21 Sparshott, “Plato as Anti-Political Thinker,” p. 218.
22 Vlastos, “Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic,” p. 313.
23 However, Bloom (“Response to Hall,” p. 318) insists that the unphilosophic task of eugenic matchmaking is an integral part of ruling the kallipolis. Although one might say that the essential task of philosophy is arranging marriage of the forms, of the copulation of virtue and happiness for example, Bloom's view is that eugenic engineering is to be taken literally, and thus is evidence of the impossibility of the just state. To the extent that Bloom would not consider arranging copulation “a real gas,” I would accept his objection that such activity runs counter to philosophic eros.
24 Sparshott, 1967, 218.
25 The Piraeus, or port of Athens, was the home of resident aliens like the wealthy Cephalus, the center of the partisans of commercial democracy and Athenian imperialism, and the source of the spread of foreign doctrines. Whether or not it symbolized the decay of Athenian stability, the firelit processions in Piraeus (328a) anticipates the shadowy and evanescent existence of the inhabitants of the cave in book 7 (which in turn specifically links up with Er's descent into Hades in book 10).
26 Gadamer, H.G., Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (New Haven, 1980), p. 81.Google Scholar
27 Symposium 179d, translated by Joyce, M. in Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973).Google Scholar
28 Gould, T., Platonic Love (New York, 1963), pp. 23, 57.Google Scholar
29 Phaedrus 251c, translated by R. Hackforth in Hamilton and Cairns, Dialogue.
30 Letter VII 335d, translated by L. Post in Hamilton and Cairns, Dialogue.
31 Counter-evidence to the above might be found in Letter 9 (358 a-b) where Plato wrote to his friend Archytas, the philosopher-statesman of Tarentum, whose political and social policy Aristotle so admired (Politics 1320b). However, as the authenticity of the letter is questioned, and as it is not used as evidence for the position that philosophers are reluctant to rule, I shall not complicate my task by introducing it.
32 Rosen, “The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic,” p. 460.
33 Ball, T., “Theory and Practice: An Examination of the Platonic and Aristotelian Conceptions of Political Theory,” Western Political Quarterly, 09 1972), 541, 545.Google Scholar
34 Bloom, “Response to Hall,” p. 328.
35 Kraut, “Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato,” p. 332.
36 See footnote 1.
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