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Courts, Agencies, and Congressional Committees: A Neo-Institutional Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Mark C. Miller
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Extract

Based on over 75 personal interviews with members of Congress and their staffs, this article examines how three House authorization committees differ in their reactions to federal court decisions versus their reactions to federal agency decisions. In general, Congress holds the courts in higher esteem than it does the agencies. The courts are generally seen as less political than the agencies, and committee reactions to court decisions are seen as much more unusual than reactions to agency decisions. The attitudes of the three committees toward decisions of the other institutions vary in ways consonant with their institutional roles, the committees' political cultures, and the primary goals of the committee members. The domination of lawyer members on the policy oriented Judiciary Committee results in that committee being the most deferential to the courts. The constituency focused Interior Committee is oriented to local interests and members' reelection goals, and it responds to the courts or to agencies only when constituency pressures force it to do so. The power oriented Energy and Commerce Committee treats the courts and the agencies just like any other political actors.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 55 , Issue 3: Special Issue on Public Law , Summer 1993 , pp. 471 - 489
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1993

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