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Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Howard J. Wiarda
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Extract

Wherever one looks in the Iberic-Latin world, corporatist or neocorporatist forms of authority and sociopolitical organization appear to have staged a resurgence. One is used to thinking about such traditional states and societies as Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay in terms of their authoritarian and corporatist structures, and Portugal has by now been a self-proclaimed corporatist state for some 40 years. We shall have more to say regarding these “persistent strains” later on; what concerns us now is the apparent reemergence of corporatist ideology and organization in a variety of rapidly modernizing systems. Brazil, for instance, has always been less corporatist than Portugal in theory and in law, but today is probably just as corporatist in actual practice. Research on Mexico has by this time largely abandoned the approach that stressed that country's quasi-democratic character or its supposed democratic aspirations in favor of an approach that takes Mexico on its own terms and analyzes its frankly authoritarian and corporatist structures. The resurgence of Peronismo in Argentina clearly carries with it echoes of the corporatist, in this case “justicialist,” solutions of the 1930's and 1940's. In Peru the military elite has vowed to carry through a “revolution from above” employing corporatist ideas and organizations to structure popular participation at the grass-roots and intermediary levels and reaching up to the Council of Ministers and the central state apparatus. And of course in Chile we have seen both Allende's abortive design to install a unicameral legislature based on corporative functional representation, as well as the plans by the generals that overthrew him to inaugurate a similarly functionally representative congress (though obviously the groups represented and their weights would be significantly different in these two designs) and to deal with price, wage, and production issues through a government regulated and controlled system of gremio-sindicato relations.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , January 1974 , pp. 3 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1974

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References

1 See Schmitter, Philippe C., “The ‘Portugalization’ of Brazil?” in Stepan, Alfred, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, 1973)Google Scholar; and Roett, Riordan, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonialist Society (Boston, 1972).Google Scholar

2 See especially Purcell, Susan Kaufman, “Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico”Google Scholar (Paper presented at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7–11).

3 Palmer, David Scott, “Revolution from Above”: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973).Google Scholar

4 Manoïlesco, Mihaïl, Le siècle du corporatisme (Paris, 1938).Google Scholar

5 See especially Schmitter, Philippe C., “Corporatist Interest Representation and Public Policy-Making in Portugal”Google Scholar (Paper presented at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, September 5–9). See also Elbow, Matthew H., French Corporative Theory, 1789–1948 (New York, 1953)Google Scholar; Beer, Samuel H., Modern British Politics (London, 1965)Google Scholar; Rokkan, Stein, “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism” in Dahl, R., ed., Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven, 1966) pp. 70–115Google Scholar. Nor should one forget the NLRB, the WPA, and other corporative agencies born in the U.S. in the 1930's.

6 See especially Bugarola, Martín, Entidades Intermedias y Representación Política (Madrid, 1970)Google Scholar; and Desarrollo Político: Estado, Movimiento y Sociedad (Madrid, 1968).Google Scholar

7 This definition derives from Schmitter, , “Portugalization of Brazil?” p. 3Google Scholar; and Elbow, , Corporative Theory, p. 11–12.Google Scholar

8 This tradition is emphasized in. Wiarda, Howard J., “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model,” World Politics, XXV (01, 1973), 206–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also the edited volume brought together by the same author, Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst, 1974).Google Scholar

9 See for instance Leite, João Pinto da Costa, A Doutrina Corporativa em Portugal (Lisbon, 1966)Google Scholar; Campos, Fernando, A Solução Corporativa (Lisbon, 1939)Google Scholar; and Caetano, Marcello, O Sistema Corporativa (Lisbon, 1938).Google Scholar

10 Wiarda, Howard J., “The Portuguese Corporative System: Basic Structures and Current Functions” (Paper presented at Workshop on Modern Portugal, University of New Hampshire, 10 10–14, 1973).Google Scholar

11 See his “Op-Ed” essay in New York Times, 10 21, 1973.Google Scholar

12 For a fuller discussion of corporatism and U.S.-Latin American relations see Fredrick B. Pike's essay in this volume; also Dealy, Glen, “The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America,” Journal of the History of Ideas (07, 1974)Google Scholar and reprinted in Wiarda, , Politics and Social ChangeGoogle Scholar. On the biases of “developmentalism” see Bodenheimer, Susanne, The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies (Beverly Hills, Cal., 1971)Google Scholar; Chalmers, Douglas, “The Demystification of Development” in Chalmers, , ed., Changing Latin America (New York, 1972) pp. 109–22Google Scholar; and Wiarda, Howard J., “Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin America” (Unpublished ms.: Ohio State University, Mershon Center, 1970), esp. pp. 33–46.Google Scholar

13 Especially Nolte, Ernst, Three Faces of Fascism (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

14 Linz, Juan, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain” in Allardt, Erik and Rokkan, Stein, eds., Mass Politics (New York, 1970), pp. 251–83Google Scholar. Linz's formulation has recently been applied successfully to Mexico and Brazil; it could be suggested that with some modification his model of the “authoritarian system” could be applied to all the Iberic-Latin nations.

15 For this tradition, in English, see especially Elbow, , Corporative TheoryGoogle Scholar; and Azpiazu, , The Corporative State (London, 1951)Google Scholar. Also, Fogarty, Michael, Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820–1953 (Notre Dame, 1957).Google Scholar

16 Manoïlesco, , Le siècle du corporatismeGoogle Scholar, is the classic statement of this position. See also Sarti, Roland, “Fascist Modernization in Italy: Traditional or Modern?” American Historical Review, LXXV (04, 1970), 1029–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 For Durkheim's argument see his “The Solidarity of Occupational Groups” in Parsons, Talcott et al. , Theories of Society (New York, 1965), pp. 356–63.Google Scholar

18 For example, Cole, G. D. H., Guild Socialism (New York, 1921).Google Scholar

19 See the contrasting but complementary comments in Schmitter, Philippe C., “Paths to Political Development in Latin America”Google Scholar in Chalmers, , Changing Latin America, pp. 83–105Google Scholar; Wiarda, , “Change in Iberic-Latin Tradition”Google Scholar; and Dealy, , “Democracy in Latin America.”Google Scholar

20 Roman rule in Iberia is summarized in Altamira, Rafael, A History of Spain, trans. Lee, Muna (New York, 1949), chap. 3.Google Scholar

21 Although by present standards this provides small consolation to many of those affected, it is interesting to note that Portugal treats its African subjects in much the same way it has historically treated its own aspiring classes. In the corporative system it is characteristic that successive groups have been successively “civilized” into the prevailing hierarchical system under the tutelage of the patrimonial state. First, the nobility was civilized in this way and taught the proper elitist values, then the rising business and merchant class, then the emergent middle sectors, then urban labor groups, and eventually the rural peasants. In this seemingly inherently hierarchical and continuously tutelary system, it has now become, from the Portuguese perspective, the turn of the native Africans. That is, they may be accepted to full citizenship and accommodated to the system, but only if they accept that system's values and givens. In this sense the Portuguese colonies—first in Brazil and now in Africa—represent a direct extension of the Portuguese metropole, a condition which many in these “extensions” are no longer willing to accept. On this theme see Graham, Laurence S., “Portugal: The Bureaucracy of Empire” (Paper presented at the Workshop on Modern Portugal, University of New Hampshire, Durham, 10 10–14, 1973)Google Scholar. The Roman and Thomistic conceptions underlying this approach and conception are striking.

22 Chapman, Brian, The Profession of Government (London, 1959), Chap. 1Google Scholar; and Merryman, John Henry, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (Stanford, 1969).Google Scholar

23 Except for the flawed but still interesting work by Glassman, Ronald, Political History of Latin America (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

24 Patrimonialism is one of Weber's forms of traditional authority; see the discussion in Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, 1960), pp. 329–81Google Scholar. The Iberic-Latin systems, in a sense, have turned Weber on his head, for not only have they remained cast in the patrimonialist mold without evolving other forms of authority in the Weberian scheme, but patrimonialism itself has proved infinitely flexible, adaptive, and capable of modernization. It should perhaps be noted that at this point the focus of the article shifts to Portugal and to the use of Portuguese terms; although much of the emphasis here is on an Iberian tradition and though the parallels and differences with Spain are well worth developing, it was my assignment in this collection to focus on the Luso-Brazilian world, leaving the Spanish and Hispanic to other contributors. Nonetheless the thrust of the article remains toward exploring corporatism and development in the broader Iberic-Latin world.

25 The discussion here is derived chiefly from Merêa, Manuel Paulo, O Poder Real e as Cortes (Coimbra, 1923)Google Scholar; Faoro, Raymundo, Os Donos do Voder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (Porto Alegre, 1958)Google Scholar; and Barros, Henrique de Gama, Historia da Administração Pública em Portugal nos Séculos XII–XV (Lisbon, 1945).Google Scholar

26 Anthropologist Sidney M. Greenfield has carried out some very exciting research in Portugal on the origins of this elaborate national patronage system, perhaps the first and most highly developed of its kind. I am indebted to Professor Greenfield for sharing his insights with me; for the approach see also Stricken, Arnold and Greenfield, Sidney M., eds., Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage, and Power Systems (Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1972).Google Scholar

27 Faoro, , Os Donos do PoderGoogle Scholar; and Magalhães, José Calvet de, Historia do Pensamento Econômico em Portugal: Da Idade Média ao Mercantilismo (Coimbra, 1967)Google Scholar. For the contrast with an emerging capitalist system see George Masselman's study of the Dutch empire, The Cradle of Colonialism (New Haven, 1963).Google Scholar

28 Faoro, , Os Donos do PoderGoogle Scholar; and Gama Barros.

29 Later corporatist theorists, in harking back to the supposed order, stability, and unity of this era, largely ignored its violence, terror, conflict, and misery. In fact the medieval era and guild system, which the corporatists so romanticized, was not always very pleasant; see Barros, Gama, IV, 113–72.Google Scholar

30 Faoro, , Os Donos do PoderGoogle Scholar; Merêa, , O Poder Real.Google Scholar

31 Merêa, , O Poder Real, p. 9.Google Scholar

32 Ibid. See also Morse, Richard M., “The Heritage of Latin America” in Hartz, Louis et al. , The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964), pp. 123–77Google Scholar; reprinted in Wiarda, , Politics and Social Change.Google Scholar

33 Merêa, , O Poder RealGoogle Scholar. An excellent contemporary analysis of “o sistema” is Schmitter, Philippe C., Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971).Google Scholar

34 Merêa, , O Poder Real.Google Scholar

35 Ibid.

36 Barros, Gama, III, 104 and 129 ff.Google Scholar

37 Merêa, , O Poder Real.Google Scholar

38 In Wiarda, , “Change in Iberic-Latin Tradition.”Google Scholar

39 For an introduction to the ideas of Dom Pedro see Merêa, , O Poder RealGoogle Scholar; for the importance of Suárez see Morse, , “Heritage of Latin America”Google Scholar; Liss, Peggy K., “Jesuit Contributions to the Ideology of Spanish Empire in Mexico, Part I,” The Americas, XXIX (1973), esp. 320Google Scholar; and Newton, Ronald C., “On ‘Functional Groups,’ ‘Fragmentation,’ and ‘Pluralism’ in Spanish-American Political Society,” Hispanic American Historical Review, L (02, 1970) 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Wiarda, , Politics and Social ChangeGoogle Scholar. A consideration of the way Suárez stands in the Iberic-Latin tradition of development as compared with Locke in the Anglo-American one—along with a consideration of the contemporary critiques of both these models—would make a fascinating study.

40 In Anderson's terms, a key to understanding Latin American politics lies in the ongoing competition among various “power contenders” and in their relations with the authoritarian state apparatus—see his “Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics,” incorporated as chapter 4 in his book Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton, 1967)Google Scholar; reprinted in Wiarda, , Politics and Social ChangeGoogle Scholar. Also Kling, Merle, “Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” Western Political Quarterly, IX (03, 1956), 21–35.Google Scholar

41 Though approaching the subject area from a somewhat different perspective, Philippe C. Schmitter analyzes some of the same phenomena in his “The Portugalization of Brazil?”

42 The best study of the development of the patrimonialist state apparatus in Portugal and its extension to Brazil is Faoro. See also Graham, , “Portugal.”Google Scholar For the Spanish system see especially Sarfatti, Magali, Spanish Bureaucratic-Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley, 1966)Google Scholar; Moreno, Francisco José, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” The Western Political Quarterly, XX (1967), 308–320CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Phelan, John Leddy, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administrative Science Quarterly, V (06, 1960) 47–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By way of clarification it may be noted that in my earlier work on corporative political society based chiefly on research in Latin America, I had naturally stressed this sixteenth-century model. More recent research in the Old World systems of Spain and Portugal, however, has obviously, as indicated in the above discussion, forced me to trace the model's origins and antecedents farther back historically.

43 Nowell, Charles E., A History of Portugal (Princeton, 1962)Google Scholar; Cabral, Francisco Sarsfield, Uma perspectiva sobre Portugal (Lisbon, 1973)Google Scholar; and Serrão, Joel, “Decadencia e Regeneração no Portugal Contemporaneo” (Paper presented at the Workshop on Modern Portugal, University of New Hampshire, Durham, 10 10–14, 1973).Google Scholar

44 Especially Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, A History of Portugal Vol. II: From Empire to Corporate State (New York, 1972).Google Scholar

45 Ibid., p. 48.

46 A balanced treatment is Wheeler, Douglas L., “The Portuguese Revolution of 1910,” Journal of Modern History, XLIV (06, 1972) 172–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar. An account of how the Portuguese elitist system has been broadened without this implying much fundamental change in the way Portugal continued to be ruled is Keith, Henry, “Point-Counter-point in Portuguese Educational Reform” (Paper presented at the Workshop on Modern Portugal, University of New Hampshire, Durham, 10 10–14, 1973).Google Scholar

47 All these themes need to be greatly elaborated, though it should be said that those who have examined the Caetano reforms in terms of its supposed “liberalizing” tendencies may be misunderstanding the Portuguese system. The workings of the Portuguese corporative system are analyzed in Wiarda, “The Portuguese Corporative System”Google Scholar; and in Wiarda, , The Other Great ‘Ism’: Corporatism and Development in Modern Portugal (forthcoming).Google Scholar

48 Op. cit.

49 Walker, Neuma Aguiar, “Corporativismo y Clase Trabajadora,” Desarrollo Económico, VIII (07–12, 1968) 313–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Erickson, Kenneth P., “Labor in the Political Process in Brazil: Corporatism in a Modernizing Nation” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970)Google Scholar; and Wiarda, Howard J., “The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement: Corporatism, Paternalism, Populism, and Change” in Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Tyler, William G., eds., Contemporary Brazil (New York, 1972), pp. 323–47.Google Scholar

50 Erickson, , “Labor in Brazil.”Google Scholar

51 Erickson, , “Labor in Brazil”Google Scholar; and Schmitter, , Interest Conflict.Google Scholar

52 Among others see Astiz, Carlos, “The Armed Forces as a Political Elite: Can They Develop a New Developmental Model?” (Paper presented at the 1969 Round Table of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, 10 27–31, 1969)Google Scholar; Einaudi, Luigi, “Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 09 7–11, 1971)Google Scholar; Clinton, Richard Lee, “The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, 24 (Spring, 1971) 43–66Google Scholar; and Hyman, Elizabeth, “Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on the Latin American Armed Forces,”Google Scholar and her “Fire in the Firehouse? (Trends in the Latin American Armed Forces in the Seventies)” (Unpublished, 1970).Google Scholar

53 Cotler, Julio, “El Populismo Militar como Modelo de Desarrollo Nacional: El Caso Peruano” (Paper presented at the 1969 Round Table of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, 10 27–31, 1969)Google Scholar; and Astiz, , “Bureaucracy, Technocracy, and Democracy: The Peruvian Military in Power” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 11 8–10, 1973).Google Scholar

54 Palmer, , “Revolution from Above”Google Scholar; also Palmer, and Middle-brook, Kevin Jay, “Corporatist Participation under Military Rule in Peru” (unpublished).Google Scholar

55 A fuller discussion is in Wiarda, Howard J., “The Latin American Development Process and the New Development Alternatives: Military ‘Nasserism’ and ‘Dictatorship with Popular Support,’” Western Political Quarterly, XXV (09, 1972) 464–90.Google Scholar

56 A useful effort in this direction is Glade, William P., “The State and Economic Development in Mediterranean Politics” (Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 09 4–8)Google Scholar; but see also his Latin American Economies (New York: American, 1969).Google Scholar

57 See Schmitter, , “Paths to Political Development.”Google Scholar