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The Concept of Tradition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
The question of tradition,* its nature as well as the binding power it might have, was formulated in a most precise and ideal manner at the beginning of the modern age. This occurred in the course of a remarkable and rather dramatic episode in the history of ideas in which several important characters of the time took part, Galileo, Descartes, and Pascal. Pascal did more than take part. At the age of twenty-four he attempted a critical estimate of the sum total of historical knowledge by clearly defining tradition with respect to the range and limits of its validity. This thesis can be found in a short dissertation bearing a title which at first glance looks rather strange: “Fragment of a Preface for a Tract on Empty Space” —the tract itself was never written.
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References
* This article was translated by Professor George Wack.
1 Oeuvres de Blaise Pascal, Brunschvicq, Leon & Bontroux, Pierre, editors, Vol. II (Paris, 1908), 129–145.Google Scholar
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