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Bad Attitudes: The Consequences of Survey Research for Constitutional Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

John Brigham
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Abstract

Following World War II, survey researchers taught a generation of Americans that ordinary people were not to be trusted on fundamental rights because their attitudes were reactionary, intolerant, and generally bad. The article examines this research and its influence on constitutional politics. It proposes that this attitude perspective fostered elite domination in matters of fundamental right and an orientation away from economic rights. The article also suggests that by turning from public opinion to public knowledge we may reclaim a democratic constitutional practice.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , Fall 1990 , pp. 582 - 602
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1990

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