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Antifoundationalism and Plato's Phaedo
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
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The claim made by antifoundationalist thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and more recently Richard Rorty is that the search for a standard or foundation for our moral and political judgments inevitably arrives at a distorting reductivism. This radical claim, if true, makes dubious the very possibility of political philosophy understood as the rational investigation of human affairs. A response to this claim which merely adduces the potentially harmful consequences of such a view is inadequate; our manifest need for such a standard in no way guarantees the existence of such a standard. An adequate response requires that we meet the premise of the antifoundationalist view. That premise resides in a certain understanding of Platonic thought, an understanding which I here undertake to show is mistaken.
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References
I wish to express my gratitude to Joseph Cropsey, Nathan Tarcov and David Bolotin whose careful and illuminating criticisms of my earlier work on the Phaedo helped to clarify and deepen my understanding of this dialogue.
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21. I shall understand Socrates as the character portrayed in the Platonic corpus rather than the Aristophanic, Xenophontic, or historical Socrates.
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24. Hackforth, R., Plato's “Phaedo”, trans, with commentary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 7.Google Scholar In the most recent book-length commentaries on the Phaedo, neither Dorter, Kenneth, Plato's “Phaedo”: An Interpretation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)Google Scholar nor Burger, Ronna, The “Phaedo”: A Platonic Labyrinth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984),Google Scholar explicitly focus on the political bearing of the Phaedo. However, Burger's insightful commentary provides the necessary evidence for a consideration of this issue.
25. Citations to the Stephanus pagination of the Phaedo will appear in the text. The Greek text used is that of Burnet, John, Plato's “Phaedo” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).Google Scholar Translations are based on Gallop, David, Plato “Phaedo” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), altered for greater literalness.Google Scholar
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29. The distinction between immortality and imperishability proves important in the final proof of immortality discussed below.
30. On the phrase, “second sailing,” see Shipton, K.M.W., “A Good Second-Best: Phaedo 96 ff.,” Phronesis 24 (1979): 50 n.15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
31. Davis, , “Socrates’ Pre-Socratism,” p. 559.Google Scholar
32. This is the only mention of wisdom (σοøία) in the Phaedo. I shall argue, however, that Socrates never lost his desire for comprehensive understanding; his alteration of philosophy does not involve a circumscription of view.
33. Compare, Hackforth, , Platos “Phaedo”, p. 124Google Scholar n.2.
34. Compare Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 172,Google Scholar who maintains that Socrates’ claim to be blinded is “ironical.”
35. Vlastos, Gregory, “Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays I, ed. Vlastos, Gregory (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), p. 151 n. 50,Google Scholar states that the nutritional perplexities and the mathematical perplexities are unrelated. Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 171,Google Scholar disagrees. Following Gallop, I try to indicate the connection between these perplexities. Here, we may also note that the “problem of two” exists elsewhere in the dialogues as the exemplar of the sovereign Platonic problem—the problem of the one and the many. See Republic 524d3–5; Theaetetus 184e8–185c2; Sophist 205a4–e2.
36. On wonder as the origin of philosophy, see, Theaetetus 155dl-4.
37. Particularly helpful in shedding light on the perplexities is Davis, , “Socrates’ Pre-Socratism,” pp. 561–62.Google Scholar
38. The first word of Cebes’ question is “now.” Gregory Vlastos maintains that the perplexities show a confusion of logical and physical causality, a confusion which is addressed by the doctrine of the Ideas (“Reasons and Causes,” pp. 155–56Google Scholar). By relying on the doctrine of Ideas Plato may, as Vlastos claims, avoid the reduction of physical to logical causality. But as Vlastos also sees, the doctrine of Ideas is peculiarly uninformative (p. 156) and fails to explain the world of our experience (p. 166). My view, presented in the text, is that Plato's Socrates is calling attention to the problem of the heterogeneity of causality and thus of nature so that we can appreciate the concerns which led to his “second sailing,” an approach to nature which preserves this heterogeneity in a way that the Ideas do not.
39. See, for example, Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 169.Google Scholar Gallop, like Vlastos, , “Reasons and Causes,” p. 134,Google Scholar translates the word, ảιτιά, as reason instead of as cause. Gallop calls the latter a mistranslation since “it covers at most only part of the field with which Socrates is concerned. Many of the things he will mention are not amenable to what we should call causal explanation.” I follow Burger, , Platonic Labyrinth, p. 252Google Scholar n.2, in thinking that this is a reason to preserve the usual translation since it serves to make more evident the question underlying Socrates’ treatment of causality, whether there is a single cause which accounts for all coming into being, passing away, and existence.
40. Unlike many of the other subtitles there is evidence that Plato himself referred to the dialogue in this way. See Thirteenth Letter 363a7.
41. Plato suggests that the body and its needs impede complete harmony of the individual and the common. See Republic 464d8-e2; Laws 739cl-d2.
42. See Apology 38al-7.
43. Plato indicates that, at best, the existence of the best regime is dependent on chance. See Republic 499b2-c3, 540dl-541a8; Laws 709al-b9. Even this may be too optimistic; the best regime may be possible only in speech. See Republic 473a5-bll, 592a7-b5.
44. On the view that a perfect regime may be possible only if a god rules rather than humans, see, Statesman 271d3–272bl; Laws 713c2–714bl; Theaetetus 176a5-bl.
45. Taylor, C.C.W., “Forms as Causes in the Phaedo,” Mind (January 1969): 46–47,Google Scholar recognizes the rift between man and nature in this passage. He writes that Plato is here “singling out human action as unique.” Taylor thinks that Plato finally integrates man and nature through an explanation in terms of the “Form of the Good” although Taylor admits that such explanation is not forthcoming in the present dialogue.
46. This point is evident in book 1 of Aristotle's Politics where he says that the city is natural but that the man who first founded the city was the greatest benefactor (Politics 1252b30-a3 and 1253a30-;31).
47. For an overview of this conflict, see, Bernstein, Richard, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 3–169;Google ScholarTaylor, Charles, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar The renewed interest in classical political philosophy arises from the desire of political theorists to speak of man free of the modern view of nature. But these authors such as H. G. Gadamer and Alasdair Maclntyre do not rely on the classical understanding of nature as a whole. For an expression of the view that this leads to arbitrariness, see, Habermas, Jürgen, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. McCarthy, Thomas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), p. 201.Google Scholar
48. Robinson, Richard, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 143;Google ScholarVlastos, , “Reasons and Causes,” p. 138Google Scholar n.15; Hackforth, , Plato's “Phaedo”, p. 132;Google ScholarBurger, , Platonic Labyrinth, p. 254Google Scholar n.27 contend that the goal of the “second sailing” is not teleological, that the goals of the two sailings are different. Against this, Wiggins, David, “Teleology and the Good in Plato's Phaedo,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy vol. IV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 3;Google ScholarDorter, , Plato's “Phaedo” p. 120;Google ScholarTaylor, , “Forms as Causes,” p. 53;Google ScholarShipton, , “A Good Second-Best,” pp. 33,Google Scholar 40 maintain that the goals are the same. As Wiggins points out, the language at the end of the teleology section indicates that Socrates remains in pursuit of the same cause. I think that the latter are correct to this extent: if Socrates’ goal is wisdom then he must be striving for that one purpose or cause by virtue of which the whole is a whole. I do not mean to suggest—as I believe Wiggins does—that the Ideas by themselves fulfill Socrates’ goal.
49. Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 179;Google ScholarDorter, , Plato's “Phaedo”, p.124;Google ScholarVlastos, , “Reasons and Causes,” pp. 139,Google Scholar 143; Shipton, , “A Good Second-Best,” pp. 42–43;Google ScholarFrede, Dorothea, “The Final Proof of Immortality of the Soul in Plato's Phaedo 102a-107a,” Phronesis 23 (1978): 28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
50. How this occurs is a mystery. One purpose of the doctrine of recollection is to explore this mystery. See, Klein, Jacob, A Commentary on Plato's “Meno”(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 149–50.Google Scholar
51. Dorter, , Plato's “Phaedo”, p. 124.Google Scholar
52. Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 78;Google ScholarKlein, , Plato's “Meno”, pp. 120–25.Google Scholar
53. For Rorty's view of the importance of the doctrine of Recollection, see, “Priority of Democracy,” pp. 269–70Google Scholar and n.43.
54. See, for example, 65d4, 78dl-5, 74all-12 where Socrates refers to the intelligibles using the locution, the X-in itself.
55. I am here and in what follows pursuing a suggestion made by Cropsey, Joseph, “The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates,” Interpretation 14 (05 and 09 1986): 169–74,Google Scholar concerning Socrates’ distancing himself from his own orthodoxy.
56. On the safety of the Ideas see, 101dl-2, 100d8-el. On the fear engendered by the sophists’ arguments see, 101a5, 101b2, 101b5, 101b7, 101c9-dl.
57. Socrates uses a word (δuσχυρίξομαι) used two other times in the Phaedo at 63c2 and 114d2. In the latter instances, Socrates is indicating that he would not affirm with certainty what he is saying about the gods and the afterlife. Socrates also concludes his reference to the doctrine of participation with a phrase used by supplicants unsure of the appropriate designation of the god to whom they are praying. See Burnet, John, Plato's “Phaedo”, p. 111Google Scholar (note to 100d6). On Socrates’ uncertainty concerning participation, see, Vlastos, , “Reasons and Causes,” pp. 141–42.Google Scholar
58. Burnet, John, Plato's “Phaedo”, p. 118Google Scholar and Gallop, , Plato “Phaedo”, p. 197Google Scholar both recognize the new movement in the argument.
59. The character of the intelligible so understood has given rise to much debate concerning its precise character. The debate revolves largely around whether the causal entities are immanent forms or concrete particulars. For an account of the proponents and problems of each view, see, Morris, Michael, “Socrates’ Last Argument,” Phronesis 46 (1985): 226–27.Google Scholar Those who hold the latter view see more clearly the real difference between the “old, safe” explanations and the “more sophisticated” explanations. However, I take the ambiguity in this passage as intended to convey Socrates’ view that the intelligible is inseparable from the concrete individual. In other words, each entity is in heterogeneous ways: both as this individual and as this kind of individual.
60. This reasoning is recognized by Dorter, , Plato's “Phaedo”, pp. 151–52Google Scholar and by Keyt, David, “The Fallacies in Phaedo 102a–107b,” Phronesis 8 (1963): 170–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar as well as by numerous others. See, Frede, , “The Final Proof,” p. 31.Google Scholar
61. Rorty, , “Solidarity or Objectivity,” p. 14.Google Scholar
62. Republic 508cl-511e5. See also, Robinson, , Plato's Earlier Dialectic, pp. 142–45;Google ScholarStenzel, Julius, Plato's Method of Dialectic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), pp. 10–12Google Scholar Compare, Rorty, , “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism,” p. 166.Google Scholar
63. Frede, , “The Final Proof,” pp. 39;Google ScholarGadamer, , “The Proofs of Immortality,” p. 37–40.Google Scholar
64. See also Apology 20d6–e2, 21d2–10, 29b3–7. Burger, , Platonic Labyrinth, p. 136.Google Scholar
65. Helpful for understanding Socrates’ knowledge of ignorance is Bruell, Christopher, “Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates,” Political Science Reviewer (1983): 141–43.Google Scholar
66. Socrates goes out of his way to make the status of philosophy questionable beginning with his aforementioned dream. In addition, near the start of the dialogue Socrates imposes upon himself the need to defend the view that the gods have opposed his philosophic way of life (63b4-c7). Socrates' initial step in this defense makes the status of philosophy even more questionable as he offers what can be called a “religion for philosophers,” what philosophers ought to believe (see especially 66bl-67b5). A defense of philosophy based on belief must be a dubious defense. Also, we must note that it is Socrates who ties a defense of philosophy to the demonstration of the immortality of the soul thus involving philosophy in all the problems of that doctrine. As for why Socrates proceeds in this manner, the true defense of philosophy may require overcoming those concerns for certainty which are “satisfied” by the gods but not by philosophy. On the religious character of the Phaedo see Hackforth, , Plato's “Phaedo”, pp. 15,Google Scholar 38; Burnet, , Plato's “Phaedo”, p. 152.Google Scholar
67. At the end of the first proof of immortality as well as at the end of the last proof Socrates suggests that the premise of intelligibility, that nothing can come from or pass away into nothing, or that everything has a cause, is a matter of assertion rather than demonstration (72all and 106c9-d8). Contrary to Wiggins, , “Teleology and the Good,” p. 11,Google Scholar Plato does question this fundamental principle of intelligibility.
68. Davis, , “Socrates’ Pre-Socratism,” pp. 565–66.Google Scholar
69. The initial investigation which supplies the rational defense of philosophy is perhaps that sketched in Apology 21b9–22e5.
70. My understanding of the misology section is much indebted to Cropsey, , “Dramatic End,” pp. 168–69;Google Scholar and Bolotin, David, “The Life of Philosophy and the Immortality of the Soul: An Introduction to Plato's Phaedo” Ancient Philosophy (1987): 54–55.Google Scholar
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73. Rorty, , “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism,” pp. 171,Google Scholar 172; Bernstein, , “One Step Forward,” p. 550.Google Scholar
74. On the view that the goal of conversation is simply variety, see, Rorty, , Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 378,Google Scholar 379. Rorty distinguishes conversation and inquiry (p. 371). He also understands conversation to have no common ground nor common goal (p. 318)
75. Rorty, , “Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism,” pp. 166,Google Scholar 173; “Solidarity and Objectivity,” pp. 13–15.Google Scholar
76. Rorty, , Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 377.Google Scholar
77. Strauss, , Philosophy and Law: Essays Toward the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors, trans. Baumann, Fred (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987), p. 113 n.12.Google Scholar
78. See Maclntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 148,Google Scholar 162: Gadamer, H.G., “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” in Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, ed. Rabinow, Paul and Sullivan, William M. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 135–45.Google Scholar
79. Rorty, , “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 571.Google Scholar