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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Any discussion of American occupation policies in Germany must necessarily vary somewhat from a discussion of similar policies in Japan, Korea, Italy. In Japan and Korea one may concentrate on the objectives of the period after hostilities. Many of these objectives have long-range significance. It might seem that one could safely ignore the combat phase in considering the general occupation which the United States is maintaining in Germany. Some, indeed, would go so far as to omit also the program during the months immediately following the capitulation of Germany, maintaining that only longrange items are of importance for World Peace. There is, of course, something to be said for such an approach if one feels that simplification is desirable, and that one can limit the field to be observed as one likes. But in Germany the combat phase, the phase immediately after hostilities, and the long-range phase are so intimately tied together in the military government organization designed by the United States that, in my opinion, it is not feasible to begin with the current phase which is highlighted in the press and which perhaps has the greatest interest for students of political science.
1 The full title of this document is: American Military Government of Occupied Cermany, 1918–20. It constitutes the “Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany.” A mimeographed edition in four volumes was issued at Coblezin in 1920; part of the report was printed in Washington in 1943.
2 These statistics are taken from the monthly Reports of the Military Governor, U. S. Zone.
3 Report of the Military Governor, U. S. Zone, June, 1946.
4 SeeBingham, Barry, “Screening Out the Nazis, Is a Tedious Business,” Louisville Courier Journal,11, 1946.Google Scholar
5 See the New York Times, February 19, 1947.Google Scholar
6 Vol. XL, pp. 1097–1112.
7 State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.