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Alexander Hamilton and Woodrow Wilson on the Spirit and Form of a Responsible Republican Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

David E. Marion
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Even a cursory review of contemporary scholarship on the presidency and the federal administration reveals a resurgence of interest in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton and Woodrow Wilson. Developments in the last decade involving the apparent enlargement of the authority and prerogatives of the national executive together with the popularization of the idea of an emerging American bureaucratic state have contributed to this renewal of interest in the work of both theorists. What is especially striking is that to a considerable extent the contemporary interest in the thought of Hamilton, and to a lesser but still significant degree in the political teaching of Woodrow Wilson, is rooted in the crystallization of opinion that is critical of the alleged predominance of the executive establishment and the appearance of an “imperial” presidency on the one hand, and the systematic interference of federal administration in the affairs of the people on the other. Thus, for example, a major theme in both the popular and academic press during the period of American history bracketed by the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis centered on the illiberalism of a powerful executive. More recently, proponents of participationist democracy, particularly the devotees of the public interest advocacy movement and the self-styled Tocquevillians of the public choice school, have urged reforms to check the concentration of power in the central government in general, and the national executive in particular. More importantly for the purposes of this essay, alongside this indictment of the national government has emerged an increasing tendency to cast Hamilton, witness the work of James McGregor Burns, and Wilson, a frequent target of criticism in the writings of that wing of the public choice school which includes Vincent Ostrom, as the theoreticians of a centralized executive-administrative order.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 3 , July 1980 , pp. 309 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1980

References

1 Burns casts Hamilton as the expositor of “presidential government” or a political order in which the executive “would act vigorously and creatively, dominating the legislative process as well as the executive, upsetting the carefully contrived balance of powers between nation and states and between President and the other branches” (Burns, James MacGregor, Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership [Boston, 1965], p. 18)Google Scholar. Perhaps the most fully developed critique of Wilson in the public choice literature appears in Ostrom, Vincent, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 23–29.Google Scholar

2 Consider in this connection, Nathan, Richard P., The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York, 1975), p. 91Google Scholar. Also see Cooke, Jacob, “The Hamiltonian Presidency: A Model for Our Time?” (Paper delivered at the White Miller Burkett Center, University of Virginia, 4 04 1978).Google Scholar

3 In this regard, see especially Ostrom, , Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, pp. 23–29Google Scholar; and Bish, Robert and Ostrom, Vincent, Understanding Urban Government (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 8.Google Scholar

4 Mosher, Frederick et al. , Watergate: Implications for Responsible Government (New York, 1974), p. 51Google Scholar. Compare the reasoning of the NAPA Commission with the argument in favor of confining executive authority in order to preserve the strict separation of powers that appears in the concurring opinion submitted by Douglas, Justice in the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Steel and Tube v. Sawyer, 1952.Google Scholar

5 Hamilton, Alexander, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Syrett, Harold C., 26 vols. (New York, 1960–1978), 5:37Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Papers).

6 In a letter to Lafayette, , dated 6 10 1789Google Scholar, Hamilton, declares himself to be “a friend to mankind and to liberty”Google Scholar (Hamilton, , Papers, 5:425).Google Scholar

7 See, for example, the opening paragraphs of the report on the national bank (Hamilton, , Papers, 7:256–57).Google Scholar

8 Hamilton, , Madison, and Jay, , The Federalist Papers (New York, 1961), No. 23, p. 153: also No. 36, p. 224; No. 61, p. 372: and No. 85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 An early example of this opinion appears in the generally insightful volume by Henry Cabot Lodge on the life of Hamilton: “He believed in class influence and representation, in strong government, and in what, for want of a better phrase, may be called an aristocratic republic” (Lodge, Henry Cabot, Alexander Hamilton [Boston, 1898], p. 278; also see p. 138).Google Scholar

10 Hamilton, , Federalist, No. 71, p. 432Google Scholar. Also consider Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, trans. Lawrence, George (New York, 1969), p. 223.Google Scholar

11 Hamilton, , Federalist, No. 70, p. 423.Google Scholar

12 Ibid.

13 On this question, see the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hanke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 21 (1920).Google Scholar

14 Hamilton, , Federalist, No. 70, pp. 427–28.Google Scholar

15 Hamilton, , Papers, 5:81: also pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

16 During the New York Ratifying Convention Hamilton expressed confidence that “prudent men will consider the merits of the plan in connection with the circumstances of our country …” (Hamilton, , Papers, 5:71).Google Scholar

17 Hamilton, , Papers, 5:425.Google Scholar

18 Wilson's thoughts in this regard are reflected in the following passage: “A democracy, by reason of the very multitude of its voters and their infinite variety in capacity, environment, information, and circumstance, is peculiarly dependent upon its leaders. The real test of its excellence as a form of government is the training, the opportunities, the authority, the rewards which its constitutional arrangements afford those who seek to lead it faithfully and well. It does not get the full profit of its own characteristic principles and ideals unless it uses the best men in it, without regard to their blood or breeding. It cannot use them unless it calls them into service by adequate rewards of greatness and power. Its problem is to control its leaders and yet not hamper or humiliate them; to make them its servants and yet give them leave to be masters too, not in name merely but in fact, of the policy of a great nation—types of a power that comes by genius and not by favor” (Wilson, Woodrow, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Link, Arthur S. [Princeton, 1966–] 12: pp. 178–79Google Scholar) (hereafter cited as Wilson Papers).

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20 Croly, Herbert, The Promise of American Life (New York, 1963), p. 153.Google Scholar

21 Wilson, Woodrow, The New Freedom (New York, 1919)Google Scholar, Preface.

22 Herbert Croly announced shortly after the turn of the century that “reconstruction” and not simple “restoration” was the order of the day (Croly, , Promise of American Life, p. 152).Google Scholar

23 Wilson, , New Freedom, p. 109.Google Scholar

24 Ibid., p. 231.

25 Wilson, Woodrow, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly (1887), p. 216.Google Scholar

26 Wilson Papers, 6:286: also see p. 279.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., p. 286.

28 Ibid., p. 266: also 8: 37.

29 Ibid., 6: p. 286, 279.

30 Ibid., p. 275.

31 Ibid., 4: 62.

32 Ibid., 12: 9 and 4: 141.

33 Ibid., 8: 269; and 5: 122.

34 Ibid., 5: 332, 53.

35 Ibid., 4: 62.

36 Wilson, , “The Study of Administration,” pp. 214–16.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., p. 214.

38 Ibid., p. 215.

39 Wilson, , New Freedom, p. 55.Google Scholar

40 Compare Ostrom's understanding of Hamilton's political thought (Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, pp. 81–90Google Scholar) with Hamilton's own description of his objectives in Federalist, Nos. 1, 15, 23, 27, 34, and 59, and in his June 18th speech at the Philadelphia Convention (Farrand, Max, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention, of 1787, 4 vols. [New Haven, 1966] 1:282–311).Google Scholar