Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
In an oft-neglected section of the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas undertakes a detailed, point-by-point comparison of the political regime prescribed by the Mosaic law with the teachings of the then recently translated Politics of Aristotle, thereby comparing the perspectives of faith and philosophy on political issues such as rulers, property, citizenship, and families. Because it organizes political affairs in light of the divine, Thomas concludes that the polity of the Old Testament is in fact the answer to the question concerning the best regime. Despite Christianity's view of the Mosaic law as abrogated, Thomas attempts to salvage the political wisdom of the Old Testament by arguing that the Mosaic regime can still serve as a guide for Christian political thinkers.
Much of this article originally comprised part of the author's doctoral dissertation (“Friar Thomas and the Politics of Sinai: An Inquiry Concerning the Status of the Mosaic Law in the Christian Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” Boston College, 1988), which was financially supported by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
1. The origin of this tripartite division of the Mosaic law by Thomas is not completely clear. Verdam, P.J. (Mosaic Law in Practice and Study Throughout the Ages [Kampen, 1959], p. 17)Google Scholar traces the distinction back to the commentary on the Letter to the Romans of the Ambrosiaster. Funkenstein, Amos (“Gesetz und Geschichte: zur historisierenden Hermeneutik bei Moses Maimonides und Thomas von Aquin” Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1 [1970]: 170–1, n. 87)Google Scholar notes that the distinction from that commentary is cited in the Glossa ordinaria on Deuteronomy 8:11, but also claims that the distinction possibly had its roots in the particular vocabulary choices made by Jerome in translating the Hebrew scriptures. Kühn, Ulrich (Via caritatis: Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin [Gôttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965], pp. 187–8)Google Scholar states that while the distinction between ceremonial and moral precepts was a traditional one, the further distinction of the judicial precepts originated only shortly prior to Thomas. Peter Lombard, he says, did not employ a separate classification of judicial precepts, whereas the Summa fratris Alexandri did. For the Ambrosiaster, see CSEL 81, p. 114, 1. 26–p. 116, 1. 8; p. 115, 1. 20–p. 117, 1. 5; p. 168, 11. 11–19; p. 169, 11. 10–18.
2. Indeed, with the exception of one article (Ia–IIae, q. 105, a. 1), these questions concerning the judicial precepts are usually not even included in the English language editions of selections of Thomas's political thought. Such editions, which usually omit not only the questions concerning the judicial precepts but those concerning the rest of the Mosaic law as well as the New Law, can easily lead to the unfortunate notion that the Summa's treatise on law (Ia-IIae, qq. 90–108) concludes with question 97.
3. Etienne, Jacques, “Loi et grâce: Le concept de la loi nouvelle dans la Somme théologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue théologique de Louvain 16 (1985): 17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, Lib. II, p. VI, cap. IV (PL 176, 449–450); Albert, In sententia, Lib. IV, dist. Ill, a. 6; and Bonaventure, In sententia, Lib. IV, dist. Ill, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. For Jerome, see especially Epistle 112; for Augustine, see especially Epistle 82.
5. See Funkenstein, “Gesetz und Geschichte”; Smalley, Beryl, “William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and St. Thomas Aquinas on the Old Law,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. Maurer, Armand, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 1:10–71;Google ScholarChamorro, Juan-Fernando O.P., “Ley nueva y ley antigua en Santo Tomás,” Studium 7 (1967): 355–80.Google Scholar
6. The explicit references to the Politics in question 105 are: a. 1, obj. l/III, 1278b8; a. l/II, 1270b17 and III, 1279a32, b4; a. 2, obj. 2/II, 1270a23; a. 2, obj. 3/I, 1257a14; a. 2/II, 1263a25 and 127Oa23; a. 2, ad3/II, 1266b14; a. 3/III, 1275b23; a. 3, ad 2/III, 1278a2 and II, 1270bl; a. 4, obj. 1/I, 1254a12; a. 4, obj. 4/I, 1253b8 and 1259a37 and III, 1278b32; a. 4/I, 1252b13.
7. The novelty of this direct, point by point comparison of the Torah of Moses and the Politics of Aristotle should not be overlooked by historians of Western political thought. The Politics was translated into Arabic early on, but its presence among Arabic authors was apparently rather shadowy. Muslim authors cite it and even quote it, but no Muslim or Jewish commentaries were written on it during the medieval period. The work was not even available to Averroes and Maimonides. Among the Latins, the Politics was one of the last of Aristotle's works to be recovered; William of Moerbeke's translation — perhaps undertaken at the request of Albert the Great or Thomas himself— is thought to have been finished in approximately 1260. Thomas's analysis of the judicial precepts is thought to have been written around a decade later, at about the same time as his commentary, which, with the possible exception of Albert's, is thought to have been the first Latin commentary. (The fact that in his analysis of the judicial precepts Thomas rarely—if ever—cites those sections of the Politics upon which he has not commented would seem to indicate, though not prove, that the commentary was written prior to ques-tion105 of the Prima secundae.) I do not know of a direct comparison of the Politics and the Torah prior to Thomas's, though I hesitate to simply assert that there are none, see Fortin, Ernest L., “St. Thomas Aquinas,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Strauss, Leo and Cropsey, Joseph (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 224;Google ScholarLerner, Ralph, Mahdi, Muhsin, and Fortin, Ernest L., eds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 16–7, 297–8;Google ScholarPines, Schlomo, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed” in his trans, of the Guide (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. lxi;Google ScholarWeisheipl, James A., O.P., , Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Washington, D.C.: Cath-olic University of America Press), pp. 380–81.Google Scholar
8. For a recent discussion of the problem of Thomas's view of the best regime, see Blythe, James M., “The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction Between Regal and Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquinas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986): 547–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar An annotated bibliography is included in the first footnote. See also Tierney, Brian, “Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Ideal Constitution,” Proceedings of the Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference 4 (1979): 1–11.Google Scholar
9. 739c-e.
10. 1265b29–1266a30.
11. In libros Politicorum II, lectio 7.
12. 1284a4–15; 1288a15–29; cf. Ethics 1160a31–b1.
13. See 1268a23–25; 1270b21–27; 1272a31–33; 1274a15–18.
14. De regno, bk. 1, chap. 6.
15. I. Th. Eschmann, O.P., (introduction to On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus, by Aquinas, Thomas, trans. Phelan, Gerald B. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982], p. xviiiGoogle Scholar) argues that there is a lacuna at this juncture in the treatise and that Thomas's remarks concerning a limited or tempered monarchy are missing.
16. Quite possibly Thomas has Aristotle's discussion of the election of the Cosmi in Crete in mind (Politics 1272a31–4O). Thomas is silent about the idea of hereditary monarchy in this article.
17. Strauss, Leo (Natural Right and History [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950], pp. 140–43)Google Scholar suggests that such an answer to the question of the best regime is characteristic of the classical natural right thinkers.
18. Politics 1314b38–1315a2.Google Scholar
19. Thomas begins the body in a most curious fashion — he quotes Cicero's definition of a populus in the De republica (I, 25) as that definition is reported by Augustine in the De civitate Dei (II, 21; XIX, 21): “populus est coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.” What is curious about Thomas's procedure, of course, is that Augustine argues that if Cicero's definition is accepted, then a populus has never existed; he argues that no regime was ever bound together by justice, because no regime was justly ordered to God (XIX, 21). Thomas, however, argues that the judicial precepts fulfill the demands of Cicero's definition; hence the implication would seem to be that, in Thomas's eyes, the regime of Moses established Israel as a legitimate populus because it justly ordered Israel to God and thus made the people of ancient Israel an exception to Augustine's blanket condemnation.
20. De civitate Dei, XXI, 11.Google Scholar
21. 1262b38–1263b29; 1266a38–1267b19.
22. Among the passages listed in the previous note, Thomas would especially seem to have 1263a26–31 in mind here.
23. 1266b14–18.
24. 1266b19–21.
25. 1270a14–28.
26. 1275b22–24.
27. 1252b13–14.
28. This and the subsequent quotation are taken from the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947)Google Scholar; cf. De regno, bk. 2, chap. 3, par. 111.