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Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato's Gorgias

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Devin Stauffer
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Abstract

The quarrel between Socrates and Callicles has long been recognized as the highpoint of Plato's Gorgias. But the acceptance of an overly simple view of Callicles has kept this quarrel from being understood in its full complexity. While Callicles appears to be a cynical immoralist, this appearance hides his deepest convictions; and while he and Socrates never come to a genuine meeting of the minds, the unbridgeable gap between them is due to Callicles′ unwillingness to acknowledge his moral convictions rather than to his lack of them. Through a close examination of their quarrel, the essay attempts to uncover true character of the irreconcilable differences between Socrates and Callicles and thus provide a pathway for a new understanding of Plato's Gorgias.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , Fall 2002 , pp. 627 - 658
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2002

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References

1. See, e.g., Euben, Peter, Corrupting Youth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 218, 227–28Google Scholar; Newell, Waller, Ruling Passion (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Kagan, Donald, The Great Dialogue (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 126Google Scholar; Klosko, George, “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias,” Greece & Rome 31 (1984): 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gorgias, ed., intro., and commentary Dodds, E. R. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 387–91Google Scholar.

2. The quotation is from Shorey, Paul, What Plato Said (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 154Google Scholar; Shorey is quoted by Dodds, , Gorgias, p. 266Google Scholar, and Newell, , Ruling Passion, pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

3. For a sense of the wide range of scholars who express this view of Callicles, see Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, trans, by Dobson, William (New York: Arno Press), pp. 169–88Google Scholar; Grote, George, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, vol. II (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992), pp. 90–151Google Scholar; Barker, Ernest, Greek Political Theory, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 1951), pp. 127–44Google Scholar; Jaeger, Werner, Paideia, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 125–41Google Scholar; Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: The Humanities Press, 1960), pp. 103–22Google Scholar; Friedländer, Paul, Plato, vol. II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), pp. 244–72Google Scholar; Shorey, What Plato Said, pp. 133–54Google Scholar; Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 12–15Google Scholar; Voegelin, Eric, Plato (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), pp. 24–45Google Scholar; Kagan, , The Great Dialogue, pp. 124–32Google Scholar; Kahn, Charles, “Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983): 75–121Google Scholar, and Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 125–47Google Scholar; Irwin, Terrence, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 115–31Google Scholar; Santas, Gerasimos, Socrates (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 201–303Google Scholar; Klosko, George, “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 126–39Google Scholar; Nightingale, Andrea Wilson, “Plato's Gorgias and Euripides' Antiope: A Study in Generic Transformation,” Classical Antiquity 11 (1992): 121–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kastely, James, “In Defense of Plato's Gorgias,” PMLA 106 (1991): 96–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

There are a few commentators on the Gorgias who have presented more complex portraits of Callicles. See Benardete, Seth, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 61–102Google Scholar; Newell, Waller, Ruling Passion, pp. 9–39Google Scholar; McKim, Richard, “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias,” in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Griswald, Charles Jr, (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 34–48Google Scholar; Nichols, James H. Jr, “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato's Gorgias,” in Gorgias and Phaedrus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 141–49Google Scholar. But none of these commentators, in my view, sufficiently stresses the moral character of Callicles' true convictions or satisfactorily explains the relationship between Callicles' true convictions and his apparent (and self-proclaimed) immoralism.

4. Unless otherwise noted, all references given in parentheses in the text are to Plato's Gorgias. I have used E. R. Dodds's text. Translations from the Greek are my own, although I have benefited considerably from Nichols's translation and from Dodds's commentary.

5. Cf. Kahn, , “Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 94, 97Google Scholar.

6. The strengths and weaknesses of Socrates' “refutation” of Polus—the heart of which is the argument that runs from 474c4 to 475e6—are analyzed in greater detail by Grote, , Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, pp. 106–113Google Scholar; Santas, , Socrates, pp. 230–40Google Scholar; Kahn, , “Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 84–97Google Scholar; and Vlastos, Gregory, “Was Polus Refuted?,” AJP 88 (1967): 454–60Google Scholar. McKim calls attention to the uncovering of Polus's buried attachment to justice (see “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 44–48Google Scholar); on this issue, see also Brickhouse, Thomas and Smith, Nicholas, Plato's Socrates (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 74–78Google Scholar.

7. Cf. Nichols, , “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato's Gorgias,” p. 142Google Scholar; Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 15, 266–67, 390Google Scholar; Taylor, , Plato: The Man and his Work, pp. 116–17Google Scholar.

8. Jaeger, , Paideia, 2: 138–39Google Scholar.

9. Cf. Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 266–67Google Scholar. Dodds notes that Callicles' vision of a great man overcoming his oppression by the weak even leads him to use “words suggestive of a religious revelation.”

10. The shift in Callicles' speech is discussed also by Newell, , Ruling Passion, pp. 14–15Google Scholar, and Benardete, , Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, pp. 64–65Google Scholar.

11. On the irony of Socrates′ praise of Callicles, cf. Benardete, , Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, p. 62Google Scholar; McKim, , “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias,” p. 40Google Scholar; Jaeger, , Paideia, 2: 140Google Scholar.

12. Cf. Shorey, , What Plato Said, pp. 144–45Google Scholar; Friedländer, , Plato, 2: 262Google Scholar; Klosko, , “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias,” p. 127Google Scholar.

13. Callicles' addition of courage at 491a7–b3 is prepared by his statement at 490a7 in which he speaks of “the better and the more prudent.” In this earlier statement, we can already see that prudence is not all there is to superiority in Callicles′ eyes. Also, in his statement at 491a7–b3, Callicles makes another addition that is worth noting: he emphasizes that the prudence he admires is directed towards political life (see hoi an eis ta tēs pole ōs pragmata phronimoi ōsin, hontina an tropon eu oikoito, “those who are prudent in the affairs of the city, [and can determine] in what way they will be well managed”). Cf. Nichols, , “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato's Gorgias,” p. 143Google Scholar.

14. Friedländer notes that “Kallikles' formula about the rule of the intelligent… is quite close to the Socratic view” (Plato, 2: 262Google Scholar). See also Barker, , Greek Political Theory, pp. 138–39Google Scholar, and Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 291–92Google Scholar.

15. I say that Callicles understands the superior “especially as the more courageous” because he himself brings up courage, whereas it took a suggestion from Socrates for him to agree that the superior are the more prudent (compare 491a7–b3 with 489d6–9). Consider also the statement mentioned in note 13 above: that Callicles speaks of “the better and the more prudent” suggests not only that he does not think prudence exhausts superiority but also that he does not even regard prudence as the core of superiority. This point will be confirmed at 495c3–7, where Callicles emphatically agrees that courage is not the same as—i.e., should not be reduced to—knowledge.

16. On the difference between justice and moderation, see Irwin, , Plato's Moral Theory, pp. 125–30Google Scholar.

17. That unrestricted hedonism is not, in fact, necessary to a defense of immoderation is suggested by Gentzler, Jyl, “The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias,” Ancient Philosophy 15 (1995): 37–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Klosko, , “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 128–34Google Scholar.

18. Klosko is wrong to claim that “Callicles has no shame” (“The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias,” p. 136Google Scholar). Among those who notice Callicles′ sense of shame, are Kahn, , “Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 105–06Google Scholar, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 136–42Google Scholar; Friedländer, , Plato, 2: 263Google Scholar; Newell, , Ruling Passion, pp. 24–26Google Scholar; and Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato's Gorgias, trans. Jackson, Robin, Lycos, Kimon, and Tarrant, Harold (Brill: Leiden, 1998)Google Scholar, lecture 30. McKim is the commentator who places the greatest weight on Callicles′ sense of shame (see “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 34–48Google Scholar).

19. See sphodra ge at 495c7; see also note 15 above.

20. Cf. Lysis 220b7–d7, Theaetetus 176a5–9. For more thorough examinations of the flaws in Socrates′ first argument against hedonism, see Grote, , Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, pp. 120–27Google Scholar; Friedländer, , Plato, 2: 265–66Google Scholar; and Santas, , Socrates, pp. 267–86Google Scholar.

21. This argument is presented and analyzed in greater detail by Kahn, , “Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias,– pp. 108–10, 118Google Scholar, and Santas, , Socrates, pp. 270–81Google Scholar.

22. Callicles′ defense of Pericles could appear to be in keeping with the anticivic spirit of his earlier praise of men like Xerxes, Darius, and Heracles, because it is set against Socrates′ defense of the “conservative” view that Pericles caused a decline in Athens by corrupting the Athenians (see especially 515e2–9). Yet, even if Callicles′ admiration of Pericles puts him on the more imperialistic and less restrained or traditionalist wing of Athenian politics, this admiration still reflects an attachment to justice, if not in every sense, at least in the common and important sense of service to the city and concern for its greatness. Because he believes that Pericles served Athens well, Callicles regards Pericles as “a good man” (see especially 503a2–4, cl–3, 515c5–d5, 516b8–9, 517a7–bl).

23. Such fear seems to be the true content or basis of what Socrates calls Callicles' “love of the demos” at 513c7–8. That is, when considered in light of the preceding arguments about assimilation and safety Callicles′ “love of the demos” looks less like true love than fear-bred conformism. This reading of 513c7–8 can also help to explain what Socrates had in mind when he first spoke of Callicles′ love of the demos at 481d3–5.

24. Consider, e.g., Republic 357a2–362c8.

25. The two passages that should be considered here are 474c4–475e6 and 503d5–508c3, in which Socrates does give arguments of sorts for the goodness of justice. In the first of these passages, however, Socrates relies on Polus′ unwillingness to deny that justice is noble (see p. 630 above)Google Scholar. If Polus were to deny this premise, Socrates′ argument would collapse, and thus the argument really reveals more about Polus than about justice itself. As for 503d5–508c3, the argument for “order” here is more clearly an argument for moderation than for justice. And even as an argument for moderation, it leaves crucial questions unanswered, such as whether there is an end beyond the order of the soul with a view to which the order of the soul is useful, and if so, what it is. Even those who are sympathetic with Socrates' claims about justice and moderation express dissatisfaction with his arguments: see, e.g., Irwin, Terrence, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 109–10, 114–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Plato's Moral Theory, pp. 125–31Google Scholar, Kahn, , Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 142–7Google Scholar.

26. See 523a3–5,524a8–b2; consider also 527a6–8; compare Euthyphro 5e5–6c4, Republic 377e6–378e3.

27. I am following the most reliable manuscripts (BTW), which have ho sos logos (“your argument”) at 527c6. Dodds follows manuscript F, which omits sos and reads simply ho logos (“the argument”). See Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 385–86Google Scholar. Compare 477e2.

28. Socrates turns to Callicles′ attack on the philosophic life at 500cl–d4. Everything that follows 500d4 bears on this theme in one way or another or is a part, direct or indirect, of Socrates′ defense of himself.

29. For expressions of such admiration see, e.g., Jaeger, , Paideia, 2:144–51Google Scholar; Taylor, , Plato: The Man and His Work, pp. 126–28Google Scholar; Friedländer, , Plato, 2:270–71Google Scholar; Barker, , Greek Political Theory, pp. 140–42Google Scholar; Kahn, , Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 138–45Google Scholar.

30. The speech to which I am referring runs from 507a5–508c3 (Socrates continues speaking after 508c3, but he has turned to another topic: see 508c4–5). As mentioned above, Socrates′ presentation of virtue in this speech moves away from an initial emphasis on moderation to give at least equal stress to justice. The speech therefore has two main parts (507a5–d3 and 507d4–508c3). The first part of this speech is not the only indication Socrates gives that justice may not be the most important part of virtue as he understands it: consider also 458a5–bl, 464b2–c3,470e4–ll, 477b5–e5,482b7–c3,515a5–7. Cf. Irwin, , Plato's Moral Theory, pp. 125–30Google Scholar; Benardete, , Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, pp. 61, 85–90Google Scholar; Grote, , Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, p. 133Google Scholar.

31. My suggestion runs counter to the views of many commentators, who, in my view, do not pay sufficient attention to the literal meaning of Socrates′ statement at 482b2–6 and too readily assume that Socrates is fully convinced of the views he defends. See, e.g., Irwin, , Plato's Moral Theory, pp. 115–31, 243–48Google Scholar, Plato's Ethics, pp. 41–63, 111–24Google Scholar; Kahn, , Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 125–28, 137–47Google Scholar; Vlastos, Gregory, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 200–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jaeger, , Paideia, 2:134–39,146–52Google Scholar; Taylor, , Plato: The Man and His Work, p. 128Google Scholar; Friedländer, , Plato, 2:270Google Scholar; McKim, , “Shame and Truth in Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 35–47Google Scholar; Voegelin, , Plato, p. 37Google Scholar; Brickhouse, and Smith, , Plato's Socrates, p. 13Google Scholar.

32. In this connection consider also Republic 347a3–d8,496c3–e2, passages which provide additional evidence that Socrates had doubts about the standard he defends. It would go beyond the scope of this essay, and, I believe, beyond the scope of the Gorgias and the Apology, to consider adequately the grounds of these doubts; that would require a careful study of the examination of justice in the Republic.

33. See, e.g., 462b3–166b7, 480al–481b5, 511b7–513c3.The best summaries of Socrates′ critique of rhetoric are Barker, , Greek Political Theory, pp. 133–37Google Scholar; Vickers, Brian, In Defense of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 83–113Google Scholar; Kastely, , “In Defense of Plato's Gorgias,” pp. 96–109Google Scholar.