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Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Speech

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

John McV. Haight Jr
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Extract

On october 5, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt aroused the democratic world by calling for a quarantine of the aggressor nations. Since that morning in Chicago there has always been uncertainty as to how the President meant to implement his speech. A review of the available documents concerning the aftermath of the quarantine speech provides four additional notes which help clear up this uncertainty. The first demonstrates that Roosevelt instead of backing down before seemingly overwhelming opposition from the American public, believed he could persuade not only his fellow countrymen but “90 percent of the population of the world” to quarantine the aggressor nations. The second shows that the President looked upon the Nine Power Conference which met in Brussels during November, 1937, as an opportunity to initiate positive action in the Far East. The third, by an analysis of the activities of Norman Davis, the American delegate to that conference, indicates the extent to which the President was willing to go in imposing a quarantine against Japan. The last note attempts to explain briefly why by mid November Roosevelt finally “pulled in his horns” and permitted the Nine Power Conference to disintegrate. From these notes comes further support for the conclusions that the man who met defeat at Brussels was President Roosevelt and the policy which failed to be adopted was that of a quarantine, of containment, of the aggressor nations.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , April 1962 , pp. 233 - 259
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1962

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References

1 Two men closely associated with Roosevelt in the fall of 1937 reported that the President recoiled before public opinion. See Welles, Sumner, Time for Decision (New York, 1944), p. 63Google Scholar; Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1950), p. 13Google Scholar; and Rosenman, Samuel I., Working with Roosevelt (New York, 1952), p. 167Google Scholar. Burns, James M. used the phrase “pulled in his horns,” Roosevelt, the Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), p. 319Google Scholar. Beard, Charles A. claimed the President was “bewildered by the outburst of discussion” that followed his Chicago address, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940 (New Haven, 1946), p. 188Google Scholar; Rauch, Basil shared this opinion, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1950), p. 50Google Scholar; Hubbard, G. E. regarded the fireside chat of October 12, as “the turn of the tide against the quarantine speech,” Survey of International Affairs, 1937, ed. Toynbee, Arnold J. (London, 1938), Part III, p. 276Google Scholar. See also Drummond, , Passing of American Neutrality (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1955), p. 55Google Scholar; Langer, William L. and Gleason, S. Everett, Challenge to Isolation (New York, 1952), pp. 19–24Google Scholar, recognize that Roosevelt did not “let the whole incident sink into oblivion” but they ignore the Nine Power Conference and focus upon Sumner Welles's Plan to call an international conference.

2 See Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, vol. 10Google Scholar, Microfilm Roll 5, no. 400 for Oct. 6; also no. 403 for Oct. 15. For texts of the fireside chat and of Roosevelt's statement to the press Oct. 20, see Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1937 (New York, 1941), pp. 429–38, 462–3Google Scholar.

3 See for example the statement to the press by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on Oct. 15, New York Times, Oct. 16, and Norman Davis' speech at the opening of the Nine Power Conference Nov. 3, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931–1941 (Washington, 1943) I, 404–10Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as FR Japan.

4 Borg, Dorothy, “Notes on Roosevelt's ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (1957), 424–33Google Scholar. In contrast Secretary of State, Hull, Cordell, claimed: “The reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and violent,” The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I, 545Google Scholar.

5 Borg mistakenly assumes that Roosevelt agreed with his advisers that “the country reacted with speed, vehemence and solidarity against the speech,” op. cit., 424–6, 433.

6 For Roosevelt's letter to Endicott Peabody, his former headmaster at Groton, see F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928–1945, ed. Roosevelt, Elliott (New York, 1950) I, 116–7Google Scholar. The President used exactly the same phraseology in a letter of the same date to a long-standing British friend, Arthur Murray. See Elibank, Viscount, “Franklin Roosevelt, Friend of Britain,” Contemporary Review, Vol. 187 (1955), 362Google Scholar.

7 F. D. R., Personal Letters, I, 718–9. See also letters of Oct. 22 to Cardinal Mundelein and John H. Clarke, I, 720–3.

8 See entry of Oct. 22 in the Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York, 1954), II, 232Google Scholar.

9 Henry, to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 7, as printed in “Roosevelt's Kriegswille gegen Japan. Enthiillungen Aus den Akten des Quai d'Orsay,” Berliner Monatshefte, 02 1945, pp. 56–8 (my translation)Google Scholar. On the basis of some seventeen years as the French Charge in Washington, Henry evaluated his conversation with Roosevelt at the White House as an “exceptionally frank heart to heart talk.”

10 F. D. R., Personal Letters, I, 726. Welles had cited the Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, and New York Sun.

11 Borg, , op. cit., 433Google Scholar.

12 For example, Secretary Hull gave several hours' advance notice to the American Minister in Geneva that Roosevelt was to make an important speech in Chicago and that the League of Nations' authorities should be so informed. See State Department Archives, 711.00 President's Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/A. Hereafter cited as SD. See also Moffat Papers, Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919–1943, ed. Hooker, Nancy H. (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 154Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as Moffat Papers.

13 Public Papers, 1937, pp. 408–9.

14 For quotations see Welles, , Time for Decision, pp. 69, 13–24, 65–9Google Scholar. For the basic documents, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 (Washington, 1954), I, 665–70Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as FR, 37.

15 Norman Davis Papers, File Box no. 4. Nine Power Conference folder, Memorandum of trip and talk with Roosevelt at Hyde Park, Oct. 19, 1937. This memo also includes reference to the talk on Oct. 12, at the White House. Hereafter cited as Davis Papers, R-D Talks. The Davis Papers are in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress.

16 On Oct. 8, Japan had officially condemned China as the source of trouble in the Far East, New York Times, Oct. 9.

17 Langer and Gleason ignore the Conference completely but emphasize the Welles Plan (pp. 19–24); Beard mentions the Conference but briefly (pp. 207–8); Burns does likewise (p. 353). Rauch claims Roosevelt was uninterested (p. 50, see also p. 52); even Borg fails to recognize the significance of the Brussels meeting; Charles C. Tansill pays the Nine Power Conference more attention but sees it only as indicating the weakness of American policy, Back Door to War (Chicago, 1952), pp. 485–8Google Scholar; Hubbard, G. E. shares this view, Survey of International Affairs, 1937, pp. 275–93Google Scholar.

18 A few hours after hearing the Chicago speech a subcommittee of the League of Nations dealing with the Far East proposed that the Assembly call a conference of the Nine Powers. The next day after the Assembly concurred, the American Minister to Switzerland reported: “I have been told on good authority that President Roosevelt's speech influenced several delegations which might otherwise have abstained from voting.” Harrison to Secretary of State, Geneva, 10 6, FR, 37, IV, 61Google Scholar; for texts of the League's resolutions, see FR, Japan, I, 384–96.

19 For Roosevelt's contributions to the plans for the Conference see FR, 37, IV, 67–8, 69–70, 71; Ickes, , op. cit., II, 228Google Scholar and The Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919–1943 (manuscript in the custody of the Houghton Library, Harvard University), 10 9–10, 1937Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as the Moffat Journals and cited only when pertinent material has not been published in the Moffat Papers. For text of Hull's acceptance of the Nine Power Conference see FR, Japan, I, 396–7.

20 summarizes Davis' activities in Europe, , op. cit., 409–11Google Scholar.

21 On Sept. 15 and 29 Davis spoke in these terms to Pierrepont Mofifat who had sat at the European Desk of the State Department since July, 1937. Moffat recorded his opinion that Davis is “the antithesis of an isolationist.” See the Moffat Journals for those dates.

22 Hull, , op. cit., I, 544Google Scholar.

23 Borg provides an analysis of Roosevelt's reliance upon the Davis draft (pp. 415–7). Langer and Gleason, failing to see Davis' connection with the Chicago speech, claim he was shocked by it, op. cit., p. 19.

24 Moffat Journals, Oct. 8. For Davis' early interest in the Nine Power Conference see Moffat Papers, Oct. 7, pp. 154–5.

25 Davis Papers, File Box no. 4, Nine Power Conference folder, Draft for Speech.

26 Roosevelt apparently relied heavily on the ideas of William C. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France, then on leave in Washington. See Rosenman, , Working with Roosevelt, pp. 170–2Google Scholar. See also Moffat Papers, Oct. 10, pp. 155–6. Bullitt in the fall of 1937 opposed an interventionist policy. For a summary of his views see Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, FR, 37, IV, 174–5. See also Wright, Gordon, “Ambassador Bullitt and the Fall of France,” World Politics, X (1957), 68–9Google Scholar.

27 See Davis Papers, R-D Talks. Moffat outlined the division within the Department in much the same terms, as Davis (Moffat Papers, p. 157).

28 Moffat Papers, pp. 152–7, 182–3. In the fall of 1937 Moffat followed the thinking of his father-in-law, Joseph C. Grew, the Ambassador to Japan (see for example Grew to Secretary of State, Oct. 15, FR, 37, III, 612–6). Moffat could count for support upon Hugh Wilson, the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge of European affairs, upon Bullitt (see in particular Moffat Journal, Oct. 8), and Maxwell M. Hamilton, the present chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (see his memo Oct. 12, FR, 37, III, 596–600).

29 Hornbeck had been shifted from chief to political advisor within Far Eastern Division about Aug. 15, 1937. For his views see particularly his Memo July 27, FR, 37, III, 278–80. See also memo with his initials dated Oct. 6 and 7 included in Davis Papers, File Box no. 4, Conversations, Memorandums, Brussels Conference Folder.

30 FR, Japan, I, 400–1.

31 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 12 and 19. In a statement to the press Oct. 19 soon after Davis departed from Hyde Park, Roosevelt re-emphasized that he sought a solution by agreement in the Far East, New York Times, Oct. 20.

32 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 12.

33 Ibid., Oct. 19.

34 Entry for Oct. 10, Moffat Papers, p. 156.

35 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 12.

36 Henry, to French Foreign Minister, 11 7, Berliner Monatshefte (Feb. 1943), p. 57Google Scholar.

37 On the principle of collective neutrality and the Argentine Anti-War Pact see Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), pp. 267–8, 285–7Google Scholar. See also Borg, , op. cit., 406–8Google Scholar.

38 See the note captioned “Handed to me by the President as of possible use” which apparently is an excerpt from an article or book and filed in the Davis Papers along with the memorandum on the Roosevelt-Davis talks of Oct. 12 and 19. See also Borg, , op. cit., 421Google Scholar.

39 Press Conferences, microfilm roll 5, no. 400.

40 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 19.

41 Roosevelt's memo is attached to Davis' record of the talk on Oct. 19. It is printed in slightly altered form in FR, 37, IV, 85–6. In this latter form it was forwarded to the British Foreign Office (see Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to Secretary of State, Oct. 28, FR, 37, IV, 114–6).

42 See a comment made by the New York Times the day after the President's press conference of Oct. 15: “There are some indications that Roosevelt has some plan in mind, and that he thinks will be an effective quarantine against treatybreakers and at the same time will not involve this country in political or economic sanctions or in actual military demonstrations.” See also Beard's references to the New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 7 and 9, American Foreign Policy in the Making, pp. 191–2 and pp. 195, 197.

43 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 19.

44 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States, pp. 284–6Google Scholar.

45 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, 37, III, 629–30. For earlier reports on the Indo-China situation see Chargé in Paris (Wilson) to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, ibid., pp. 623–5; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 21, State Department Archives, 793.94111/82.

46 Henry, to the French Premier, Oct. 22, printed in Berliner Monatshefte (02 1943), pp. 55–6Google Scholar. See also Welles to Bullitt, Oct. 22, FR, 37, III, 632.

47 Roosevelt used the first of these phrases in conversation with Cardinal Mundelein during a luncheon immediately after the quarantine speech. The second was used, Oct. 6, in a conversation with his Ambassador to Italy, William C. Phillips (Cardinal Mundelein, to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, D. C, Oct. 6, State Department Archives, 711.00, President's Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/2/2; Phillips, William C., Ventures in Diplomacy (London, 1955), pp. 105–6Google Scholar. See also Borg, , op. cit., 420 and 422)Google Scholar.

48 When a reporter mentioned sanctions, Roosevelt replied, “Look ‘sanctions’ is a terrible word to use. They are out the window.” (Press conferences, microfilm roll 5, no. 400.)

49 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 19. At a cabinet meeting in December 1937 Roosevelt is reported to have said, “We don't call them economic sanctions, we call them quarantines.” Blum, John M., From the Morgenthau Diaries, Years of Crisis, 1928–1938 (Boston, 1959), p. 489Google Scholar.

50 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct. 19.

51 Roosevelt used this phrase in a talk with Clark Eichelberger, a memorandum of which Borg, has uncovered, op. cit., p. 422 nGoogle Scholar.

52 Ickes, , op. cit., 213Google Scholar.

53 Ibid., p. 223. This meeting took place Oct. 8. On Oct. 6 the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Key Pittman, publicly proposed: “Let civilized governments ostracize Japan, refuse to have any dealings with the country, refuse commercial or credit relations and there need not be a single shot fired.” New York Times, Oct. 7, p. 1. Pittman presented his program in an interview with the New York Times ten days later.

54 See for example remarks of Representative Celler, Emanuel of New York, New York Times, 10 10, p. 37Google Scholar.

55 The British government first suggested an economic boycott Oct. 1, and amplified its suggestion Oct. 12 and 19. British Embassy to Department of State, Oct. 1, FR, 37, III, 560; Oct. 12, 600–2, Memo by Under Secretary of States (Welles); Oct. 19, IV, 89–91, British Embassy to Department of State. For the American request for postponement see Memo by Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) of a conversation with the British Chargé (Mallet) Oct. 5, ibid., III, 582–4.

56 Davis Papers, File Box no. 4, Nine Power Conference folder, Memo captioned “Delegation of the United States, Nov. 2, 1937. Estimate of the situation and suggestion of certain possibilities.”

57 See in particular Davis' cable of November 10 addressed to the President and the Secretary of State in which he refers to his Hyde Park talk with Roosevelt, FR, 37, IV, 175–76.

58 Moffat recorded in his Journals, Oct. 30–31, that Davis claimed “The Department had specifically promised that it would give him a free hand in regard to method and would confine itself to instructing him on substance.” In his final report on the conferenceDavis admitted that the Department's instruction contained “no provision that any positive measures should or might be discussed at the conference” but he added “there was also no expressed provision that such methods should not be discussed… provided that previously every effort to bring about mediation had been exhausted.” Davis Papers, File Box no. 5, OfficialReport folder, report dated Dec. 16, 1937.

59 For analysis of Delbos' reasons for obstructing Davis, see my article “France and the Aftermath of Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech,” World Politics, Jan. 1962, pp. 283–306. The Belgian Premier, Paul Henri Spaak also opposed Davis' initial program. At off at Papers, pp. 165–6, Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 3, FR, 37, IV, 147–8.

60 For the record of the two talks on November 10 see Moffat Papers, pp. 174–8; Moffat Journals, Nov. 10; Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 11, FR, 37, IV, 177–8; Nov. 14, 183–5; and Nov. 13, 152–5, for account of Eden's report in Memo by Welles of a conversation with the British Ambassador (Lindsay).

61 Eden had informed Davis Nov. 2 that he was agreeable to “independent cooperation and was fully sympathetic to Roosevelt's ideas of arousing public opinion.” See Moffat Papers, pp. 162–5; Davis to Secretary of State, FR, 37, IV, 145–7; and Nov. 6, 160–162, Memo of Conversation with British Ambassador (Lindsay) with Welles.

62 Though Sumner Welles indicates that during the summer of 1937 Roosevelt did think of combined fleet action in the Far East, there seems no further evidence to indicate the President talked of such action with Davis or even thought the Nine Power Conference would take such steps. For Welles' report see Rosenman, , Working with Roosevelt, p. 164Google Scholar. It is likely Davis' discussion of fleet movements was prompted by Henry's report to Delbos that Roosevelt implied such a step during their talk on November 6. See Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, 37, III, 666–67; and Nov. 14, IV, 183–185, Davis to Secretary of State.

63 Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, ibid., 175–7.

64 Moffat Papers, pp. 174–5.

65 Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 12, FR, 37, IV, 180–1.

66 Moffat Papers, pp. 182 and 184; Moffat Journals, Nov. 17. See also Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 14, FR, 37, IV, 183–6; Nov. 15, 187–8, Secretary of State to Davis; Nov. 16; 193, Secretary of State to Davis.

67 Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, ibid., 201–2.

68 Moffat Papers, p. 153. Burns, , Lion and the Fox, pp. 318–9Google Scholar, erroneously considered that Hull was surprised and shocked by Roosevelt's strong words.

69 Hull, , op. cit., I, 506–9, 535–6, 544–6, 556–8Google Scholar.

70 Davis Papers, R-D Talks, Oct 12.

71 Secretary of Stata to Davis, Oct. 18, ibid., 84–5. See also Hull's press release on Belgium's invitation to the Nine Power Conference, New York Times, Oct. 17.

72 Hull, , op. cit., I, 552Google Scholar. Moffat even concluded after reading Davis' memorandum on the Hyde Park talk that Roosevelt “did not see his way out of the situation any more than we did.” (Moffat Papers, p. 157.)

73 Welles, , Seven Decisions, pp. 21–4Google Scholar.

74 See for example editorial New York Times, Oct. 8.

75 The New York Times, Nov. 16, published interviews with Senators Nye, Vandenberg, Minton of Indiana, King of Utah, and Lodge of Massachusetts. Headlines for the article read “Any Move by the Nine Power Conference Will Be Firmly Opposed in Congress.” For a summary of the isolationist campaign against a quarantine see Borg, , op. cit., 430–2Google Scholar.

76 Hull, , op. cit., I, 556Google Scholar.

77 For Roosevelt's reliance upon Hull's ties with the Senate for leadership in foreign policy see Welles, , Time for Decision, p. 23Google Scholar.

78 For Roosevelt's concern over the economic situation see Ickes, , op. cit., II, 229Google Scholar, 240–4; and Burns, , Lion and the Fox, p. 319Google Scholar. The New York Times, Nov. 16, reported that Roosevelt would not ask for a revision of the Neutrality Act as that would delay a reform of t h e domestic situation.

79 Roosevelt to Stimson, Nov. 24, 1937, Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, N. Y. Stimson's letter to the President, Nov. 15, is filed along with this reply.

80 Premier Chautemps on Nov. 10 had provided Roosevelt with the latest evidence that France still called for the United States to use its “physical strength against any aggressor.” Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, FR, 37, IV, 172–4.

81 Roosevelt to Hull, Nov. 22, filed with Stimson-Roosevelt correspondence Nov. 24, 1937, Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park.

82 Ickes, , op. cit., II, 260Google Scholar, speaks of Roosevelt's despondency in early December and sees it stemming from his inability to get Congress to follow his leadership. Ickes, ibid., 274–7, indicates that at the time of the Panay incident Roosevelt returned to plans for economic quarantine and a naval blockade of Japan.

83 FR, Japan, I, 401.