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Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration of David Hume and Religious Establishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Will R. Jordan
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Abstract

While recent scholarship has attempted to clarify the Founders′ opposition to religious establishment, few pause to consider public establishment as a viable alternative. This study examines one of the eighteenth century's least likely proponents of religious establishment: David Hume. Despite his reputation as an avowed enemy of religion, Hume actually defends religion for its ability to strengthen society and to improve morality. These salutary qualities are lost, however, when society is indifferent about the character of the religion professed by its citizens. Hume's masterful History of England reveals that a tolerant established church is best equipped to reap the advantages of religion while avoiding the dangers of fanaticism. Hume's differences in this respect from Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville are explored.

In the last few years, we have witnessed a remarkable increase in public discourse about the role of religion in American life. From the spirited campaign rhetoric of vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman to George W. Bush's faith-based initiative, our national leaders have demonstrated a growing willingness to bring religion into the public square. One result has been a renewed debate about the meaning of both the First Amendment and the Founders′ principle of nonestablishment. Often missing from this debate is a discussion of the deeper issues at play in the relationship between church and state. What exactly do individual citizens have to fear from a union of church and state?

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , Fall 2002 , pp. 687 - 713
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2002

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References

1. H refers to Hume's, The History of England: From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983)Google Scholar.

2. See Mossner's, Ernest Campbell, The Life of David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 289–90, 325–6, 587–8, 606Google Scholar.

3. See, for example, Ayer, A.J., Hume (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), pp. 22–23Google Scholar; and Norton, David Fate, “Hume, Atheism, and the Autonomy of Morals,” in Hume's Philosophy of Religion (Winston-Salem: Wake Forest University Press, 1986), p. 110Google Scholar. Although a full examination of Hume's personal beliefs would exceed the scope of this article, I generally follow those who describe Hume as an agnostic, uncomfortable with the dogmatism of atheism. See, for example, Mossner, , Life of Hume, pp. 485–87Google Scholar; and Stewart, John B., Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 275Google Scholar. I do not believe that Hume's mitigated skepticism is in any way inconsistent with his support for certain forms of popular religion.

4. See Smith's, Norman Kemp introduction to Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 18Google Scholar; Whelan, Frederick G., Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 106–107, 308–309Google Scholar; and Gaskin, J. C. A., “Hume on Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. Norton, David Fate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 332–35Google Scholar.

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6. The view that Hume should be viewed first and foremost as a moral philosopher is as old as Smith's, Norman Kemp classic, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. ECHU refers to the first work in Hume's, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A.. 3rd ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. ECPM refers to the second work in Hume's Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals.

9. T refers to Hume's, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A.. 3rd ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978)Google Scholar

10. For a full description of this move from sympathy to the sentiment of humanity see Capaldi, Nicholas, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 237–67Google Scholar.

11. In addition to most polytheistic religions, Hume lists modern Judaism and Catholicism as superstitious religions. Enthusiastic religions include the radical Protestant sects of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

12. E refers to Hume's, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Miller, Eugene (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985)Google Scholar.

13. According to Hume, , the disagreeable “monkish virtues” include “celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, [and] solitude” (ECPM, p.270).Google Scholar

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15. Few scholars emphasize Hume's acceptance of religion as part of “common life.” See Livingston, Donald W., Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 65Google Scholar; and Danford, John W., David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 162–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. For a detailed account of how this “universal propensity to believe” is consistent with Hume's philosophy as a whole, see Yandell's, Keith E. “Hume on Religious Belief,” in Hume: A Re-evaluation, ed. Livingston, Donald W. and King, James T. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 109–125Google Scholar.

17. On this point, I break with Kemp Smith and others who assert that nothing is left of religion but mitigated skeptical philosophy once superstition and enthusiasm are discounted. See Smith's, Kemp introduction to the Dialogues, pp.19–20Google Scholar.

18. In early editions of the essay “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm,” Hume lists the Church of England among the superstitious religions. The fact that no mention of this church appears in the essay after 1768 reveals Hume's decided thinking on this subject: the Church of England is neither superstitious nor enthusiastic. In addition to the Church of England, it would seem that most Protestant denominations, after an initial period of enthusiasm, fall into Hume's middle category. Hume observes that enthusiastic fury “is like that of thunder and tempest, which exhaust themselves in a little time, and leave the air more calm and serene than before. When the first fire of enthusiasm is spent, men naturally, in all fanatical sects, sink into the greatest remissness and coolness in sacred matters” (E, p.77).Google Scholar

19. Among the reforms lauded by Hume are the translation of the liturgy into English (H, 3.364) and the abolition of auricular confession (H, 3: 355).Google Scholar

20. See Mossner, , Life of Hume, pp. 150–58, 246–49Google Scholar.

21. This despite the fact that he was constantly editing and revising his manuscripts.

22. Hume criticizes the Commonwealth Parliament for their refusal to establish a church. He thinks it careless and imprudent “to leave every one, without any guidance of the magistrate, to embrace whatever sect, and to support whatever clergy, were most agreeable to him” (H, 6:40).Google Scholar

23. Hume, asserts that the greater part of mankind can be coaxed into changing their religion “from interest, authority, or the reigning fashion” (H, 3: 354).Google Scholar

24. Persecution was also successful in extinguishing the enthusiastic dissent of the Lollards. Hume, thinks this policy successful because the leadership of the sect—most notably Lord Cobham—had alienated the populace by resorting to violence (H, 2: 356–57).Google Scholar The task of the prudent sovereign is to recognize when such persecution will not violate the citizens' moral sense.

25. John B. Stewart, one of the few scholars to comment on Hume's theory of establishment, asserts that Hume's opposition to persecution is one of principle as well as discretion. This assertion is based solely on Hume's cryptic response to Montesquieu: “it is very questionable, whether persecution can in any case be justified” (H, 5: 576).Google Scholar Stewart overlooks the fact that Hume defends Archbishop Laud in the very next sentence and sometimes echoes Montesquieu's qualified support for persecution. See Stewart's, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 283–86Google Scholar.

26. There are strong echoes of Machiavelli's “cruelties well used” in this description of “wholesome severities.”

27. Interestingly, Stewart quotes this passage without pausing to consider what might be allowed before the sect is diffused and strongly rooted. I suggest that this oversight occurs because it more closely conforms to the traditional understanding of Hume. If Hume is only interested in weakening and sanitizing religion, as is commonly believed, then the benign course of toleration could be adopted in all situations. Alternately, if Hume sees religious homogeneity as a positive good, he might be willing to risk public tranquility in pursuit of that good. See Stewart, , Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 279–80Google Scholar.

28. Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), p. 789Google Scholar.

29. Ibid., pp. 792–93.

30. Although Hume is often credited with influencing Madison in Federalist, No. 10, when we consider religious factions there is much stronger agreement between Smith and Madison. For an account of the Hume-Madison connection see Adair, Douglass, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” in his Fame and the Founding Fathers (New York: Norton and Co., 1974)Google Scholar.

31. Madison, James, Writings (New York: Library of America, 1999), pp. 381–82Google Scholar

32. Smith, , Wealth of Nations, p. 793Google Scholar.

33. Pennsylvania was one of the few colonies, and then states, without a religious establishment, although it did exclude non-Christians from public office.

34. Smith, , Wealth of Nations, p. 793Google Scholar.

35. Jefferson, Thomas, Writings (New York: Library of America, 1984), pp. 286–87Google Scholar.

36. The United States itself was similarly fortunate to be dominated by a handful of relatively moderate, middling and tolerant Protestant sects. It is difficult to imagine how nonestablishment would succeed, or even be attempted, under less favorable circumstances.

37. I leave it to the reader to decide how many states possess the “two or three hundred” roughly equal sects required to make Smith's theory function as described.

38. Smith, , Wealth of Nations, 792Google Scholar.

39. Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, edited and translated by Mansfield, Harvey C. and Winthrop, Delba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 285CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. Ibid., pp. 282–83.

41. Madison, , Writings, p. 789Google Scholar.

42. For a detailed examination of this aspect of Hume's thought see Miller, David, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 15Google Scholar; Bongie, Laurence, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-Revolution (Indianapolis: Liberty-Fund, 2000)Google Scholar; and Livingston, Donald W., Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume's Pathology of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 256–66Google Scholar.

43. Tocqueville, , Democracy in America, p. 278Google Scholar.

44. For an example of this view see Franklin's, Benjamin letter to Richard Price in his Writings (New York: Library of America, 1987), p. 1031Google Scholar.

45. Most, but not all, of the American Founders agreed with Hume on this point. Joseph Story suggests the general sentiment of the Founders was that “Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state. … An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation” (726). Although the U.S. Constitution forbids establishment, this policy was adopted in order to avoid conflict between the various state establishments. It was assumed that most states would continue to encourage religion as they saw fit. See Story, , Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol.3 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), pp. 726–31Google Scholar.