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Reflections on Soviet and American Negotiating Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Stephen D. Kertesz
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Extract

Negotiation, the essential activity of diplomats, is an important phase in the process of shaping and executing foreign policy.* “Il faut négocier, négocier et toujours négocier,” suggested Talleyrand. Sir Harold Nicolson has even expressed the wish that the word “negotiation” be substituted for the word “diplomacy” because of the disagreeable flavor of the latter to many people. Success or failure of foreign policy is greatly influenced by the skill of negotiators, whose behavior can be more important for the course of history than is generally recognized. The skill of a negotiator, however, is determined not only by personal ability, but, more importantly, by the total political context, domestic and foreign, within which he operates.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 1957 , pp. 3 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1957

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References

* An earlier version of this essay was delivered at a meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D. C., on September 9, 1956.

1 Leites, Nathan, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill., 1953).Google Scholar

2 General John R. Deane, head of the U. S. Military Mission in Moscow, noted that the Teheran Conference “was characterized by the bluntness of Soviet diplomacy. Stalin made no attempt at oratory nor did he search for words that would satisfy diplomatic niceties. His comments were terse and to the point.” The Strange Alliance (New York, 1947), p. 44.Google Scholar

3 Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941 (Washington, 1948), pp. 244–246, 251–253.Google Scholar

4 Churchill, Winston S., The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 628–629Google Scholar. Cf. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, pp. 1165–1177.Google Scholar

5 Churchill, , The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), p. 327Google Scholar; Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1951), pp. 126–127.Google Scholar

6 Hull, , op. cit., pp. 1171–1173.Google Scholar

7 For a detailed treatment of this subject see Mosely, Philip E., “Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation” in Negotiating With the Russians, edited by Dennett, Raymond and Johnson, Joseph E. (Boston, 1951), pp. 271–303Google Scholar. Lord Strang suggested that “The Soviet Government have imposed their pattern of diplomatic negotiation upon those who have dealing with them, and have constrained the rest of the world to acquire their negotiating technique.” Home and Abroad (London, 1956).Google Scholar

8 Vyshinsky, A J. and Lozovsky, S. A., Diplomaticheskii Slovar, Vol. I (Moscow, 1948)Google Scholar, “Diplomacy,” pp. 591–592.Google Scholar

9 Arthur Koestler's Ivanov defined well the basic difference between the two societies: “There are only two conceptions of human ethics, and they are at opposite poles. One of them is Christian and humane, declares the individual to be sacrosanct, and asserts that the rules of arithmetic are not to be applied to human units. The other starts from the basic principle that a collective aim justifies all means, and not only allows, but demands, that the individual should in every way be subordinated and sacrificed to the community—which may dispose of it as an experimentation rabbit or a sacrificial lamb.” Darkness at Noon, (Signet book edition, 1955), pp. 113–114.Google Scholar

10 “Initiative (in diplomacy) … is an important factor. This is all the more necessary for the diplomacy of this country, which finds itself in conditions of capitalist encirclement, because the Soviet Union has continuously experienced hostile international actions. In such conditions it is not sufficient to guess at the schemes of the enemies, frustrate their plans and confine oneself to defense against hostile diplomatic activities. The conditions of capitalist encirclement require the application of extensive counter plans which would not only foil the enemy but would systematically improve the international position of the Soviet state and strengthen the economic and cultural contacts between the USSR and foreign Countries.” (Bolshevik, Vol. III, No. 10 (1946), p. 77).Google Scholar

11 Secretary Byrnes summed up his experiences concerning the Paris Conference of 1946 in the following words: “Mr. Molotov assumed that we and the British had organized a bloc against him. The fact is I never attended a meeting that would even suggest such an effort. Later in the conference he even charged that we instigated amendments offered by the smaller powers. Many of these amendments supported objectives that had been included in our original proposals for the treaties. But we had been obliged to drop them because of the Soviet veto in the Council. Because Molotov exercised a tight control over the votes and actions of his supporters, he assumed that we did the same. It was inconceivable to him that Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, Australia or New Zealand, for example, could have ideas of their own, and that we would hesitate to try to influence their views. So he charged us with the formation of ‘blocs’ aimed at destroying the work of the Council.” Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 140.Google Scholar

12 Lenin's teachings contain a number of characteristic passages to this effect, such as the following:

“We Communists must use one country against another. Are we not committing a crime against Communism? No, because we are doing so as a socialist state which is carrying on Communist propaganda and is obliged to take advantage of every hour granted it by circumstances in order to gain strength as rapidly as possible.” (Lenin, V. I., “Speech to Moscow Nuclei Secretaries,” Selected Works (New York, 1943), VIII, p. 284).Google Scholar

“The more powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort and by necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, “rift” among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of various countries, and among various countries, and among various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, by taking advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be only temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this do not understand a particle of Marxism, or of scientific modern socisalism in general.” (Lenin, V. I., “Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,” Selected Works (New York, 1943), X, p. 112).Google Scholar

13 We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deducse our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat. … For us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class struggle. (Lenin, V. I., Religion (New York, 1935).Google Scholar

Morals or ethics is the body of norms and rules on the conduct of Soviet peoples. At the root of Communist morality, said Lenin, lies the struggle for the consolidation and the completion of Communism. Therefore, from the point of view of Communist morality, only those acts are moral which contribute to the building up of a new Communist society (Radio Moscow, August 20, 1950).

14 For the meaning of agreements in Communist doctrine see Leites, Nathan in A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 527–533.Google Scholar

15 It is particularly instructive to read how the Soviet government violated the most elementary rules of diplomatic confidence in 1948 during the course of negotiations with the United States. Walter Bedell Smith thought that the incident was important because “it taught all of us, the hard way, that the men in the Kremlin had carried over into peace the tactics of breaking confidence, of indulging in practices of deception, falsification and evasion which we had always hitherto associated only with relations between enemy states in time of shooting war.” My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, 1950), p. 157Google Scholar. For a detailed description of the incident see pp. 157–167.

16 Grew, Joseph C., Turbulent Era (Boston, 1952), Vol. II, p. 1446.Google Scholar

17 “Politically we must take advantage of the differences between our opponents which are due to profound economic causes. If we try to take advantage of small and fortuitous differences, we shall be playing the part of petty politicians and cheap diplomats. But we shall gain nothing worth while by it.” Lenin, , Selected Works (New York, 1923), VIII, p. 283.Google Scholar

18 “We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by its military organization” (Lenin, , “Report of Central Committee at 8th Party Congress,” 1919).Google Scholar

On the basis of this idea Stalin characterized communism's role in international affairs in the following way: “The tasks of the Party in foreign policy are: 1) to utilize each and every contradiction and conflict among the surrounding capitalist groups and governments for the purpose of disintegrating imperialism; 2) to spare no pains or means to render assistance to the proletarian revolutions in the West; 3) to take all necessary measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the East; 4) to strengthen the Red Army” (Stalin, , “Party After Seizure of Power,” Pravda, 08 28, 1921).Google Scholar

According to this line of thought, peaceful co-existence between the Communist and capitalist countries is necessary in order to delay the inevitable war until the proper moment: “We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come to a head, or, finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consist in admitting the co-existence of two opposed systems” (Stalin, , “Speech to the 15th Congress of the Soviet Union, December 3, 1927” (Moscow) 1949.Google Scholar

19 Khrushchev first described how world conditions had changed since the promulgation of the “Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists.” Then he concluded:

“In these circumstances certainly, the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be preserved, remains in force. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive toward military gambles and aggression and may try to unleash war.

“But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and, if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans.”

20 Koestler, , op. cit., p. 126.Google Scholar

21 As an illustration of the Soviet way of thinking I may mention a conversation between myself and the Soviet Ambassador to Italy, Mikhail Kostylev, in July 1947, while I was Hungarian Minister to Italy. When the Hungarian Government, because of a Soviet veto, declined the Anglo-French invitation to the Marshall Plan Conference in Paris, I invited Kostylev to lunch. During our conversation I explained to him the economic plight of Hungary and Hungary's need for industrial equipment and capital from the United States. I mentioned to him the fact that the U.S.S.R. was in no position to give us these things. In his lengthy reply he explained to me that I was wrong. Real planning and economic integration cannot take place in capitalistic countries. The Marshall Plan would be a good thing for a few American capitalists, but it could not and would not effectively help the people in European countries. Real planning takes place only in Soviet Russia and in the countries which are her neighbors, and eventually this will help the people much more effectively than the intervention of American capitalists, who intend to find an outlet in Europe for their products and to create industrial colonies there. He added emphatically that no matter what our personal opinion might be, we were government officials, and thus we must obey the orders of our governments. This settled the matter as far as our conversation was concerned.

This was the only occasion when I heard a Soviet diplomat hint that he might have a private opinion. Although Kostylev himself had an excellent economic background, he only repeated the official Soviet slogans to me.

22 Chester Bowles traveled in Europe as Chairman of the United Nations Appeal for Children and as a consultant to Trygvie Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations. In this dual capacity he was in Hungary for five or six days in late January of 1948. While in Budapest he received an invitation to call on Rákosi who launched into a long discussion of the Cold War and suggested that a major development of a constructive nature lay just ahead. He said that within a few weeks we would see the development of what he called the “United States of Southeastern Europe.” He added that this new organization would include Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and “possibly Czechoslovakia.” He emphasized again and again that it would be under the leadership of Tito. This new Tito-led federation should be welcomed by the countries of Western Europe because it would increase the likelihood that a bridge could be built across Europe to prevent war and to exert a moderating influence.

In case of war, Rákosi was frank to say that the new federation would support the Soviet Union, as Western Europe would be pledged to support the United States. However, he emphasized that the states of the new federation, with their greater understanding of Western Europe, would inevitably exercise a moderating influence on the Soviet Union, as the states of Western Europe might be expected to exercise a similar moderating influence on the United States. In this way he hoped that a blow-up between the Soviet Union and America might eventually be avoided.—The source of this information is a letter to the author from Chester Bowles (October 9, 1956).

23 Before I left Hungary in March 1947 to occupy my post as Hungarian Minister to Italy, I had a long conversation with the Soviet Minister to Hungary, Georgii Pushkin (now Ambassador to Eastern Germany). He warned me that I should not follow the pro-Italian line of my predecessors. I told him that we fully understood the changed power situation in Europe but that it was next to impossible to find in Hungary popular support for a pro-Russian foreign policy because of many unpleasant things and political mistakes which occurred after the Red Army occupied the country. Pushkin replied that undoubtedly mistakes were committed but that these were immaterial; not the present but t h e future counts. One should educate the new generation properly and this generation will cooperate.

On the same occasion I clarified the Russian view concerning Hungary's relations with the Vatican, about which contradictory opinions were circulating in governmental and ecclesiastical circles. The Smallholder Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister suggested to me that while in Rome I should explore the possibilities of the renewal of diplomatic relations with the Vatican and the conclusion of a concordat. They advised me, however, to discuss the problems involved with President Tildy. The President gave me ambiguous, noncommittal instructions. One of the Catholic bishops assured me that the Communists and Russians supported the plan. Cardinal Mindszenty remained skeptical about the sincerity of the Communist attitude. Since the Russian-dominated Allied Control Commission's consent was still necessary to the planned diplomatic move, I decided to clarify the Russian and Communist standpoint by a direct approach. In my interview with Pushkin I brought up the problem of exchanging envoys with the Vatican. I argued that Hungary had large Catholic masses and that it would be advisable for the new regime to settle all pending Church-State problems by the intervention of an experienced papal diplomat. The Russian Minister replied: “The Vatican is just an agent of American interests in Europe, financed by American capitalists. The new Hungarian democracy does not need the representative of such reactionary forces.”

During one of my meetings with Ambassador Bogomolov in Paris, prior to the conference of 1946, I reminded him of Lenin's severe criticisms of the Versailles Treaty and argued that a genuine Danubian settlement should be made on the basis of self-determination of all nations. Bogomolov introduced his lengthy, philosophical but entirely negative answer with the statement that principles have only a relative meaning. Conditions change. What seemed just and true after the first World War may no longer be true, he said.

24 Cf. Kertesz, Stephen, “The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy,” Review of Politics, XV (1953), 179–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 See for example Deane, , op. cit., pp. 34, 48, 50, 53, 84–85, 129–130, 133–35, 139–41, 160–61, 200–01, 254Google Scholar. We should note, however, that the Russians were greatly encouraged by the unprecedented American attitude. The anomalous practice developed that the Russians received military information through the American Lend-Lease representative in Moscow, while the American Ambassador and Military attache were deliberately left out from this channel of communication. Cf. Standley, William H. and Ageton, Arthur A., Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago, 1955) pp. 236–239, 245–246.Google Scholar

26 Speidel, Helm, “Reichswehr und Rote Armee,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, I (01 1953), pp. 9–45.Google Scholar

27 Cf. Mosely, Philip E., “Hopes and Failures: American Policy Toward East Central Europe,” The Fate of East Central Europe, Kertesz, Stephen D., ed. (Notre Dame, 1956), pp. 52–54.Google Scholar

28 Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, 1933), II, pp. 785, 789–90, 793–94.Google Scholar

29 See especially the reports and memoranda of Loy W. Henderson and George Kennan published in Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union 1933–1939 (Washington, 1952).Google Scholar

30 Such realistic views were expressed in studies prepared by the Country and Area Committee within the Department of State during 1943 and 1944. See Mosely, , “Hopes and Failures,” op. cit., p. 57.Google Scholar

31 Hull, , op. cit., pp. 1459–1460.Google Scholar

32 See, for example, the document headed “Russia's Position,” which Hopkins had with him at the first Quebec Conference. Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), pp. 748–749.Google Scholar

33 Welles, , op. cit., p. 216.Google Scholar

34 Hull, , op. cit., p. 1266Google Scholar. Roosevelt “thought that the same idea might be applied to Eastern Poland, … and that a plebiscite should be held after the shell shock of the war had subsided” loc. cit.

35 According to John C. Campbell, wartime American mistakes of omission and commission fall into three general categories: failure to assess Soviet policies correctly; failure to define our objectives clearly and pursue them consistently; and failure to relate military power and military decisions to political objectives. “Negotiations with the Soviets,” Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (1956), 307.Google Scholar

36 Memoirs by Truman, Harry S., Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, 1955), pp. 79–82.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., p. 350. Truman adds, “We had much to learn on this subject.”

38 Cf. Byrnes, , op. cit., p. 255.Google Scholar

39 Byrnes, ibid.

40 Cf. Adm. Joy, C. Turner, How Communists Negotiate (New York, 1955).Google Scholar

41 Davies, Joseph E., Mission to Moscow (New York, 1941), p. 357.Google Scholar

42 Deane, , op. cit., p. 291.Google Scholar

43 Hull, , op. cit., p. 1311.Google Scholar

44 Twenty-five years later a Soviet daily expressed the same idea with the usual twisted semantics and facts in the following, somewhat different formulation: “There now exist two diametrically opposed political lines. One, directed to bring down imperialism and strengthen democracy, is followed by the U.S.S.R. The other, which is the policy of the U.S.A. and Britain, is directed to strengthening imperialism and stifling democracy.” Trud (Labor), 10 16, 1947.Google Scholar

45 The withdrawal of Soviet forces and control from Eastern Austria was an encouraging sign after the record sabotage by Soviet negotiators. The Austrian treaty was an act which the Soviet Union should have signed ten years ago, but still it meant the withdrawal of Soviet control in the direction of the historic boundary of Russia.