Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
In June, 1974, the two Germanys completed the official “normalization of relations” between them. In the annals of diplomatic history this final act was unique. The two states exchanged, not ambassadors, but “permanent representatives.” Of these, the West German envoy was accredited to East Berlin's foreign ministry as the representative of a foreign country. His East German counterpart, on the other hand, was to deal with the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, in accordance with West Germany's view of the special nature of the East-West German relationship. The West Germans insisted that while there was no longer one German state, there still existed one German nation; this precluded the treatment of the two Germanys as foreign countries. The German Democratic Republic (GDR), however, maintained that not only had the one German state come to an end, but that there existed now, along with the two states, two different nations, one socialist, the other bourgeoiscapitalist. Because of the wholly different systems on which they were based, East and West Germany had nothing in common anymore and constituted two entirely separate, hence foreign, countries. As such, they could establish contact with each other only by means of the customary diplomatic relations. The complex procedure by which relations were in the end established was a compromise between these differing views.
1 Janssen, Karl-Heinz, “Was ist Deutschland?” Die Zeit, 02 29, 1972Google Scholar; Kurt Sontheimer, “Der Wille zur Einheit,” ibid., Oct. 24, 1972; Ludz, Peter Christian, Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft: Bundesrepublik und DDR in der Welt von morgen (Munich, 1974), pp. 96–97Google Scholar; Schweigler, Gebhard, National bewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR (Düsseldorf, 1974), p. 33Google Scholar. An American edition of Schweigler's, study has been brought out by Sage Publications, National Consciousness in Divided Germany (Beverly Hills, Cal., 1975)Google Scholar.
2 On Villegardelle see Bloom, Solomon F., The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx (New York, 1967), pp. 24–25Google Scholar; Disraeli, Benjamin, Sybil or The Two Nations (London, 1845), bk. 2, chap. 5Google Scholar; von Treitschke, Heinrich, Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe (Berlin, 1897), II: 112 ff., esp. 133–34Google Scholar. The two-nation concept kept reappearing in Marxist literature; see Liebknecht, Wilhelm, “Die zwei Nationen,” Vorwärts, 09 22, 1891Google Scholar; Lenin, V. I., Collected Works (Moscow, 1972), IX: 307Google Scholar.
3 Sachwörterbuch der Geschichte Deutschlands und der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Swb) (Berlin [East], 1969–1970), II: 125 ff.Google Scholar; Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie (Berlin [East] 1969), pp. 305 ff.Google Scholar; Schmidt, Walter and Stephan, Klaus, in Einheit, 28 (1973), 244–45Google Scholar.
4 Engels, in Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, Werke (Berlin [East], 1957–1963), XXXI: 362Google Scholar; see also Marx, , quoted in Bloom, p. 61Google Scholar.
5 This is the most extreme view. Other authors speak of the attainment of a “relative” unity; Schmidt/Stephan, p. 245. Ernst Engelberg refers to a governmental (staatliche) unity, but adds that it did contribute “essentially” to the strengthening of national feelings (nationales Bewusstsein), presumably also among workers who now felt as Germans rather than Prussians, or Bavarians, ; Deutschland von 1849 bis 1871 (Berlin [East], 1965), p. 240.Google Scholar
6 Stegmann, Dirk, Die Erben Bismarcks (Cologne, 1970)Google Scholar; Berghahn, Volker, Der Tirpitz-Plan (Düsseldorf, 1971)Google Scholar.
7 Stegmann, pp. 449 ff.; Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), pp. 329–30, 431 ffGoogle Scholar.
8 On this see the thoughtful contemporary observations of Heller, Hermann, Sozialismus und Nation (Berlin, 1931), pp. 43 ff.Google Scholar; also Rosenberg, Arthur, Geschichte der deutschen Republik (Karlsbad, 1935), pp. 107 ffGoogle Scholar.
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11 Ullmann, Hermann, Durchbruch zur Nation: Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, 1919–1933 (Jena, 1933)Google Scholar.
12 Hitler's Secret Conversations: 1941–1944 (New York, 1961), pp. 53, 125, 233Google Scholar; Rauschning, Hermann, The Voice of Destruction (New York, 1940), pp. 231–33, 247Google Scholar.
13 This misjudgment of the crucial role of the petty bourgeoisie in the rise of Nazism is indicative of the difficulty Marxists have had since the days of the Communist Manifesto in fitting this social segment into their class scheme. In the capitalist era whose two “main” classes (Hauptklassen), according to Marxist tenets, are the bourgeoisie and the working class, the petty bourgeoisie is denied a separate class status. Yet the mistaken assumptions of the Manifesto concerning its future, the recurrent complaints of Marx, and Engels, , of Lenin, , Kautsky, , and Luxemburg, Rosa, about the unpredictability of the Kleinbürgertum point up the difficulties of reconciling dogma and reality. On this point see also Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow, 1963), p. 155. Recently an East German scholar has questioned the subordinate role of the petty bourgeoisie. Regarding it as a separate class, he suggested that during the revolution of 1848 it could have acted independently of the bourgeoisieGoogle Scholar; Weber, Rolf, cited in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG), 21 (1973), 447Google Scholar.
14 Berthold, Werner, Marxistisches Geschichtsbild—Volksfront und antijaschistisch-demokratische Revolution: Zur Vorgeschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR und zur Konzeption der Geschichte des deutschen Volkes (Berlin [East], 1970).Google Scholar
15 Benser, Günter, “Die Befreiung Europas vom Faschismus durch die Sowjetunion,” ZfG, 23 (1975), 370–71Google Scholar. When referring to the population of the GDR, on the other hand, the constitution spoke of the people, the citizens, or the toilers rather than the nation.
16 Even the question of the continued existence of a common language was raised. It was answered in the affirmative on the grounds that both states had added only few new words to their respective vocabulariesand that most of these, especially Americanisms, had been adopted by both. It was noted, however, that words common to both vocabularies—freedom, democracy, capitalism, colony—had assumed different meanings in East and West; Ihlenburg, Karl Heinz, “Entwicklungstendenzen des Wortschatzes in beiden deutschen Staaten,” Weimarer Beiträge, 1964, No. 3, pp. 372 ff., esp. 376 ff., 385 ff.Google Scholar; Hans Joachim Gernentz, “Zum Problem der Differenzierung der deutschen Sprache in beiden deutschen Staaten,” ibid., 1967, No. 3, pp. 463 ff. The question remains of serious concern to both sides, with the East Germans now trying also to draw a linguistic line of demarcation; cf. Hildebrandt, Dieter, “Reden wir noch deutsch miteinander?” Die Zeit, 02 21, 1975Google Scholar; also Peter Wapneski, “Die Sprache verrät den Menschen,” ibid., 03 18, 1977.
17 Swb, I: 411; Streisand, Joachim, Deutsche Geschichte in einem Band (Berlin [East], 1970), p. 457Google Scholar.
18 Streisand, pp. 455, 459–61; Swb, I: 412; and the contrived rationalization of these tactics by Bensing, Manfred, “Die deutsche Nation im Prozess des sozialen Typenwandels,” in Studien u'ber die Revolution, ed. Kossok, M. (Berlin [East], 1969), pp. 479–80, 482–83Google Scholar. See also Schweigler, pp. 68 ff., who ignores, however, the historical and ideological implications of the East German shifts of position.
19 Swb, I: 414.
20 Swb, II: 127; Streisand, pp. 484–85.
21 Ludz, pp. 108–09.
22 Ulbricht, Walter, in Neues Deutschland, 01 20, 1970Google Scholar; also Hager, Kurt, “Die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft,” Einheit, 26 (1971), 1228 ffGoogle Scholar.
23 The GDR does not consider itself a classless society since elements of private enterprise still survive in the agricultural production cooperatives (landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften). However, with the increasing application of industrial techniques to these cooperatives the early assimilation of the peasantry into the working class is anticipated; Thiede, Ulrich, “Das Bündnis der Arbeiterklasse mitder Klasse der Genossenschaftsbauern,” Einheit, 28(1973), 360 ffGoogle Scholar.
24 Hager, pp. 1217 ff.; Diehl, Ernst et al. , in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, 14 (1972), 369–70Google Scholar; conference reported in ZfG, 22 (1974), 993Google Scholar. See also the pertinent section of Zentraler Forschungsplan der marxistischleninistischen Gesellschaftswissenschaften der DDR bis 1975, in Einheit, 27 (1972), 175Google Scholar.
25 Die Zeit, Mar. 22, 1974.
26 Benser, pp. 369–72; Kegel, Gerhard, “Zur Deutschlandpolitik der beiden Deutschlands,” Einheit, 23 (1968), 736–37Google Scholar; Swb, I: 414; II, 133, 545.
27 Geggel, Heinz, “Keine ideologische Waffenruhe,” Einheit, 28 (1973), 6ff.Google Scholar; Roland Meister, “Sozialistische Friedenspolitik—revolutionäre Politik,” ibid., 915 ff.
28 Schweigler, pp. 31–32, 64–65, 84 ff., 89–91, 96, 101–02; also Krüger, Horst, “Passierschein für Ostberlin,” Die Zeit, 08 26, 1969Google Scholar. Those, on the other hand, who deny such a growing identification of GDR citizens withtheir state, denials not supported by any substantiating documentation, have found themselves enmeshed in considerable logical and semantic difficulties; see, for example, Ludz, pp. 76, 81–82, 84–85; same, quoted in Schweigler, p. 81; also Schweigler, pp. 48–49.
29 For accounts of Western journalists and other observers see Schweigler, pp. 81 ff. A study on East German attitudes prepared in the office of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1976 spoke of an “indigenous state consciousness” of the GDR citizenry and found them siding with East Berlin in recent controversies with Bonn; Frankfurter Rundschau, Sept. 18,1976.
30 The enthusiastic welcome offered Chancellor Willy Brandt by a large crowd when he visited the East German city of Erfurt in 1970 is often taken as evidence of the continued existence of strong all-German feelings. It is difficult to draw conclusions from this one episode as to its representative character and actual motivations; see Schweigler, p. 100; also the contemporary analysis of Janssen, Karl Heinz, “Rapport aus Erfurt,” Die Zeit, 03 31, 1970Google Scholar. Moreover, seven years have passed since then, and time most likely has helped to further erode any then existing sense of a common nationhood. It is also noteworthy that the study prepared in the West German chancellery (n. 29) was done at a time at which a considerable number of East Germans were reported to have applied for permission to leave for West Germany on the basis of the Helsinki and other agreements. Evidently the authors of the study did not feel that these applicants affected the overall picture.
31 Resolution of Nov. 7, 1972, of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, in Einheit, 28 (1973), 63; also Swb, II: 144. How meaningful “proletarian internationalism” has become to GDR citizens, it is impossible to say. The attitude of the East German novelist Rolf Schneider who has stated that he feels more comfortable with Poles than with West Germans is probably, as he himself implies, not representative. Menge, Marlies, “Polen liebt er über alles,” Die Zeit, 06 6, 1975Google Scholar.
32 For details see Schweigler, pp. 112, 135 ff., 145, with numerous tabulations of public opinion polls; also Ludz, pp. 106–07. The most recent survey of the Allenbach-Institut, one of the most highly respected polltakers in West Germany, found in 1975 that of those interviewed only 52 percent looked on GDR citizens as fellow countrymen (as against 68 percent in 1970). The number of those who considered them foreigners had grown from 20 to 29 percent, while those who were undecided or did not answer the question had increased from 12 to 19 percent. Kaiser, Carl-Christian, “Deutsche auf Distanz,” Die Zeit, 04 2, 1976Google Scholar.
33 Schweigler, pp. 145 ff.; Dahrendorf, quoted on p. 183.
34 Ludz, pp. 106–07, who, however, does not seem to view this attitude as evidence of an emerging West German national conciousness; also Schweigler, p. 31. In this same vein the anniversary of the East Berlin rising of June 17, 1953, an official holiday, has become largely an occasion for relaxation and outings rather than for the commemoration of the lost unity. Again, when the dissident East German poet Wolf Biermann, after his expatriation by the GDR government, was to read some of his poems on a special prime-time West German TV program, the protests against Biermann replacing the popular program usually shown at that time were so strong that the network felt compelled to reschedule him at a later hour; Janssen, , “Biermann und wir,” Die Zeit, 12 3, 1976Google Scholar.
35 Schweigler, pp. 137, 31–32, 205; Zundel, Rolf, “Deutscher Zwiespalt,” Die Zeit, 04 6, 1973Google Scholar; Ulrich Lomar, “Neuvereinigung statt Wiedervereinigung,” ibid., 8, 1969. See also Sontheimer (n. 1).
36 In a poll in 1973, 65 percent of all interviewees considered a West European union more important than German reunification; citedby Sommer, Theo, in Die Zeit, 08 31, 1973Google Scholar. Cf. Brandt, Willy, “What Is Germany's Ostpolitik?” New York Times, 11 11, 1970Google Scholar; also Benckiser, Nikolas, “Deutschlandfrage und Weltpolitik,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05 23, 1970Google Scholar.
37 Schweigler, , p. 206. A shorter version of this paper was read at the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the New York State Association of European Historians, New Platz, New York, 10 18, 1975Google Scholar.