Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
In this essay, Lincoln's ideas on democratic leadership are examined in the light of Tocqueville's political theory. In certain respects, Lincoln's words and deeds help to confirm the wisdom of Tocqueville's ideas on the role of leadership in a democracy. But in other respects, Lincoln's thought exposes the weaknesses and limitations of Tocqueville's understanding of democratic leadership. Both Tocqueville and Lincoln believed that the task of leadership was to elevate and educate the citizenry. In order to accomplish this task, they both believed that leaders should rely largely—but not exclusively—on what Tocqueville called the doctrine of self-interest properly understood. Lincoln differed from Tocqueville, however, insofar as Lincoln suggested that leaders in a democracy must remain close to the people's fundamental values and aspirations. Lincoln was such an effective democratic leader in large part because he simultaneously critiqued and embraced those aspects of the American character which worried Tocqueville. Unlike Lincoln, Tocqueville usually failed to recognize the element of mutuality which effective democratic leadership requires.
The author is grateful to Bruce Miroff, the late Wilson Carey McWilliams, Dennis Bathory, Daniel Tichenor, Bruce Caswell, Daniel O'Connor, Catherine Zuckert, and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this manuscript were presented at the annual meetings of the Western Political Science Association and the New England Political Science Association.
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14. One measure of Lincoln's effectiveness is that he managed to win the popular vote in the 1858 Senate race; this was a stunning achievement given the wide renown of Senator Stephen Douglas. Ultimately, though, by calling Lincoln “effective” I do not primarily intend to call attention to his success in gaining votes. Instead, by calling Lincoln an effective leader, I mean to suggest that Lincoln was a great educator of his fellow citizens.
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