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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Sweeping reapportionment of state legislatures according to the principle of “one man, one vote” now seems assured. Some very clear judicial notes have been coming out of the political thicket. At least six of the justices have found that long-forbidden territory wholly congenial. To the political animals — the lions, unicorns, bears, foxes, elephants, and donkeys — we must now add Br'er Rabbit “born and bred in a briar patch.” And yet, despite the volumes of discussion, some issues in reapportionment have been inadequately discussed and invite an attempt to clear the air.
1 David, Paul T. and Eisenberg, Ralph, State Legislative Redistricting (Chicago, 1962), p. 10Google Scholar.
2 Baker, Gordon E., Rural versus Urban Political Power (New York, 1955), p. 13Google Scholar.
3 Steiner, Gilbert Y. and Gove, Samuel K., Legislative Politics in Illinois (Urbana, 1960), p. 99Google Scholar; Jewell, Malcom E. says that the legislative attitude in Illinois “describes the attitude of legislators in most states …” “Political Patterns in Apportionment” in Jewell, (ed.), The Politics of Reapportionment (New York, 1962), p. 28Google Scholar.
4 “Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Spring, 1962, at p. 350Google Scholar.
5 “Recent Developments in Reapportionment: The Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation,” Address before the Conference of Chief Justices of the States, Washington, D.C., 08 6, 1964, mimeo. p. 17Google Scholar.
6 Krock, Arthur, “The Sweep of the Colorado and New York Decisions,” New York Times, 06 18, 1964Google Scholar.
7 Waters, Laughlin E. and Hinderaker, Ivan, “California Reapportionment: A Case Study,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Spring, 1952Google Scholar.
8 See especiallyBaker, Gordon E., “The California Senate” in Jewell, Malcom E., ed., op. citGoogle Scholar.
9 Key, V. O. Jr and Crouch, W. W., The Initiative and Referendum in California Politics (Los Angeles, 1939)Google Scholar andHistorical Statistics of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960)Google Scholar. Compare the analysis in Sait, E. M., American Parties and Elections (New York, 1939, Third Edition), pp. 692–94Google Scholar.
10 Grouch, W. W., The Initiative and Referendum in California (Los Angeles, 1950), p. 21Google Scholar.
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12 Cited in MacDonald, pp. 100–103. Miss MacDonald's M. A. thesis in the Department of Political Science, University of Texas, Austin (1964) was kindly made available by Wallace Mendelson.
13 “Statistical interpretations of party loyalty in terms of Congressional votes can be very misleading. The line-up on floor votes often fails completely to indicate the actual influences brought to bear by members of Congress, particularly in committees. …” Gross, Bertram M., The Legislative Struggle in Congress (New York, 1953), p. 67Google Scholar, f.n. 11. See also Carroll, Holbert N., The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh, 1958), p. 272Google Scholar, for an informed criticism of the use of roll-call votes to measure partisanship.
14 Lockard, Duane, New England State Politics (Princeton, 1959), pp. 213, 218–220Google Scholar.
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18 Lockard, , op. cit., p. 275Google Scholar.
19 Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote, I (Charlottesville, 1961), 1–14Google Scholar. Volume II gives data for all counties in the country.
20 The American Voter, An Abridgement (New York, 1964), p. 242Google Scholar.
21 Scammon, Richard M., America Votes-5 (Pittsburgh, 1964)Google Scholar.
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23 White, Theodore, The Making of the President 1960, p. 97Google Scholar, quoted inLevin, Murray (with George Blackwood), The Compleat Politician (New York. 1962), p. 15Google Scholar; David, and Eisenberg, , “Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote,” op. cit., p. 5Google Scholar.
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27 (New York, 1956), pp. 64 ff., 283 ff.
28 In 1942 the Republicans won 52 percent of the popular vote but elected only 48 percent of the House. Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 691–92Google Scholar.
9 Key, V. O., op. cit., p. 282Google Scholar.
30 (New York, 1962), pp. 6–7. This is not to say that the problem of representing minorities can always be dismissed. The situation of Negroes in the United States is perhaps unique. James Q. Wilson has noted that “other things being equal, Negro political strength in city organizations (i.e., party machines) tends to be directly proportional to the size and density of the Negro population, and inversely proportional to the size of the basic political unit.” Thus Chicago, with a packed Negro ghetto and relatively small wards, had a Negro member of the city council as early as 1915, whereas New York, with a compacted Negro area but with larger electoral districts, did not have a Negro district leader in Tammany Hall until 1935. But the response of government to Negroes (as contrasted to the number of city officials or political party officers who are Negroes) may be greater if (as in New York) electoral districts are larger so that Negroes are thrown together with whites in constituencies in which the elected councilmen or legislators feel constrained to consider Negro interests as well as the interests of other voters—and especially where he must consider Negro interests in order to “attract and hold liberal white voters. …“ But in reflecting on these points, one may conclude that the New York polity with its rich, associational life and its liberal ethos has “a tone and rhetoric which is unlike that of any other northern city.” Negro Politics (Glencoe, 1960), Chapter II and pp. 151–2Google Scholar. For a brief, general discussion see MacKenzie, W. J. M., Free Elections (New York, 1958), Ch. IV, p. 112Google Scholar.
31 de Grazia, Alfred, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York, 1962–1963), pp. 130–167Google Scholar; see also his Politics and Government (New York, rev. ed., 1962), I, 319Google Scholar.
32 Cf. Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 3rd edition, 1950), p. 269Google Scholar.
33 Elections and Electors (London, 1955)Google Scholar; for references, see pp. 5, 104–5, and Chapter 12.
34 The Governmental Process (New York, 1951), p. 520Google Scholar.
38 Cf. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (New York and London, 1954), p. 217Google Scholar.
36 “The English Pluralists Reconsidered,” a paper read at the American Political Science Association, 1961 (mimeo.).