Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T05:43:22.782Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Shin Chiba
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

This article explores the theme of love and the political in the thought of Hannah Arendt by examining her attitude toward such kinds of love as eros, philia, agape, cupiditas, caritas, compassio, fraternitas. Arendt generally regards love as unpolitical because of its inherent inclination to exclude the outside world. But she has shown a sustained interest in the relationship between love and the political. Arendt's concern for love is dictated by her search for a new, public, and artificial vinculum—or bond. This public bond, what Arendt calls amor mundi, is basically grounded in the notion of political friendship. I argue that amor mundi would be of more relevance, if it included not only political friendship but an element of eros as the craving for the durable world as well as two strands of agape—love of forgiveness and an enlarged neighborly love.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , Summer 1995 , pp. 505 - 536
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

I would like to thank the Editors and the anonymous reviewers of The Review for their valuable comments. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professors Sheldon S. Wolin, George Kateb, Nicholas Xenos, Pavel Machala, Thomas L. Dumm, Dana R. Villa, and Junichi Saito for help and encouragement.

1. E.g., Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 15.Google Scholar

2. Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 242.Google Scholar

3. Arendt, Hannah, Der Liebesbegriffbei Augustin: Versuch einer Philosophische Interpretation (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1929), SS. 31–90.Google Scholar

4. Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind, 2 vols. (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1978), 2: 84–146.Google Scholar

5. Cf., Kohler, Lotte and Saner, Hans, eds., Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926–1969, trans. Robert, and Kimber, Lita (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), p. 264.Google Scholar

6. E.g., Arendt, , The Human Condition, p. 243.Google ScholarArendt, Hannah, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), pp. 23–31.Google Scholar

7. My interest in Arendt's life-long search for the new, appropriate vinculum was stimulated by thoughtful considerations given to this theme by Young-bruehl, Elisabeth, Boyle, Patrick S.J., and Scott, Joanna Vecchiarelli Cf., Young-bruehl, Elisabeth, Hannah Arendt: For the Love of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 74–76Google Scholar and Appendix 3: pp. 490–500. Boyle, Patrick S.J., “Elusive Neighborliness: Hannah Arendt's Interpretation of Saint Augustine,” in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, ed. Bemauer, James W. S. J. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 81–113CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Scott, Joanna Vecchiarelli, “‘A Detour Through Pietism': Hannah Arendt on St. Augustine's Philosophy of Freedom,” Polity 20 (1988): 394–425CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. Cf., Canovan, Margaret, “Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm” in Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, eds. Hinchman, Lewis P. and Hinchman, Sandra K. (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1994), pp. 190–94.Google ScholarD'entreves, Maurizio Passerin, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 16, 144–46.Google ScholarHinchman, Sandra K., “Common Sense and Barbarism in the Theory of Hannah Arendt,” Polity 17 (1984): 329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. To be sure, love is a religious or ethical attitude and sentiment. Love, together with mercy and benevolence, was discovered and explored first by Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. But, needless to say, love has never been the monopoly of these religions; instead it has been open to, and approached from, every group and every man and woman.

10. Cf., Boyle, S.J., “Elusive Neighborliness: Hannah Arendt's Interpretation of Saint Augustine,” pp. 82, 103–104Google Scholar. Bowen-moore, Patricia, Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), pp. 9–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1965), pp. 88–89.Google Scholar

12. Arendt, , Men in Dark Times, p. 12.Google Scholar

13. Ibid., pp. 12–13.

14. Ibid., p. 13.

15. Esheté, Andreas, “Fraternity,” Review of Metaphysics 35 (1981): 27–28.Google Scholar

16. Cf., Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber, ed. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 128.Google ScholarBarnard, Frederick M., “Fraternity and Citizenship: Two Ethics of Mutuality in Christian Thomasius,” Review of Politics 50 (1988): 582–602.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. It should be noted that Arend's clear distinction between fraternity and friendship was not informed by Augustine, since, as she indicated, the term “brother” was used by Augustine to refer to “neighbors” or “others” rather than tightly organized intimates. See Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, SS. 70, 86. Cf., Canning, Raymond, “Love of Neighbor in St. Augustine,” Augustiniana, Annus 33, Fasc. 1–2 (1983), pp. 17–19.Google Scholar Arendt's view of the unpolitical nature of fraternity somewhat resembles the view of James F. Stephen, a conservative political thinker of the nineteenth century. See Stephen, James F., Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Three Brief Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1890), pp. 221, 238–42.Google Scholar J.-P. Proudhon goes much deeper than Arendt and Stephen in his distrust of fraternity, since he holds that the notion of fraternity is a “myth” and hides a “secret intention of robbery and despotism.” See Proudhon, P.-j., General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Robinson, John Beverley (New York: Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., 1969), pp. 79, 87.Google Scholar Among those thinkers who are at least open to the civic or political possibility of the notion of fraternity vis-à-vis Proudhon, Stephen, Lessing, Weber, and Arendt, we can add, for instance, Isaiah Berlin to the ranks of Maclntyre, Rawls, Dworkin, and Esheté. Cf., Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 160.Google Scholar But a feminist theorist of democratic difference Anne Phillips, for instance, resists any attempt to rehabilitate the notion of fraternity: “As a model of solidarity it is flawed and partial, celebrating the unity of men and exclusion of women. As a basis for future action it is increasingly anachronistic, ignoring major changes that have occurred in the composition of the labour force.” Cf., Phillips, Anne, Democracy and Difference (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 25.Google Scholar

18. Maclntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 237.Google Scholar

19. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 105–106.Google ScholarCf., Miyajima, Izumi, “Byôdô” [orig. Japanese: Equality], in Gendai no Seijishisô [Contemporary political thought], ed. Shiratori, Rei and Sato, Seishi (Tokyo: Tôkaidaigaku Shuppanbu, 1993), pp. 62–66.Google Scholar

20. Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 186–224, 410–13.Google ScholarCf., Fujiwara, Yasunobu, “Democracy to Byôdô: Ronald Dworkin” [orig. Japanese: Democracy and equality: Ronald Dworkin], in Seijishisô no Genzai [orig. Japanese: The present of political thought], ed. Fujiwara, Yasunobu and Chiba, Shin (Tokyo: Waseda University Shuppanbu, 1990), pp. 144–45.Google Scholar

21. Cf., Thomassen, Niels, Communicative Ethics in Theory and Practice, trans. Irons, John (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp.143–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22. Arendt, , Men in Dark Times, pp. 14–16.Google Scholar

23. Arendt, , On Revolution, p. 81.Google ScholarCf., Kateb, George, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), pp. 92–96.Google Scholar

24. Arendt, , On Revolution, p. 86.Google ScholarArendt, , The Jew as Pariah, ed. Feldman, Ron H (New York: Grove Press, 1978), pp. 246–47.Google ScholarArendt, , The Human Condition, pp. 53–54.Google ScholarCf., Beiner, Ronald, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 120–25.Google ScholarBakan, Milfred, “Arendt and Heidegger: The Episodic Intertwining of Life and Work,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 12 (1987): 91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25. E.g., Arendt, , The Jew as Pariah, pp. 133, 234–36.Google Scholar Cf., Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, SS. 77–90.

26. See Mcwilliams, Wilson Carey, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).Google ScholarCf., Abbott, Philip, “The Tyranny of Fraternity in McWilliams' America,” Political Theory 2 (1974): 304–20.CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcwilliams, Wilson Carey, “Fraternity and Nature: A Response to Philip Abbott,” Political Theory 2 (1974): 321–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar From our standpoint an important question confronting us in this connection is how the notion of fraternity can be revised and reformulated, so that it may become a genuinely political concept capable of doing justice to the plurality and diversity of the outside world.

27. Fehér, Ferenc, “Freedom and the ‘Social Question’: Hannah Arendt's Theory of the French Revolution,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 12 (1987): 21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28. Arendt, , The Human Condition, pp. 51–52.Google Scholar

29. Ibid., p. 242. In Arendt's response to Scholem's charge that she is “heartless” toward the Jewish people--for lack of Herzenstakt--, she also argues for the unpoliticalness of love as follows: “I am not moved by any ‘love’ of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in my life ‘loved’ any people or collective group, neither the German people, the French, the Americans, nor the working class or anything of that sort. I indeed love only my friends, and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons. Moreover, this ‘love of the Jews’ would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something rather suspect. … Generally speaking, the role of the ‘heart’ in politics seems to me altogether questionable” (Arendt, , The Jew as Pariah, pp. 246–47Google Scholar).

30. Arendt, , The Human Condition., pp. 242–43.Google Scholar

31. Ibid., p. 264.

32. Ibid., p. 247.

33. Ibid., p. 55.

34. Arendt, Hannah, “Philosophy and Politics,” in Social Research 57 (1990): 83–84.Google Scholar

35. E.g., Jonas, Hans, “Hannah Arendt, 1906–1975,” in Social Research 43 (1976): 3Google Scholar. Young-bruehl, , Hannah Arendt, pp. xii–xv, 136, 222Google Scholar. Bakan, , “Arendt and Heidegger: The Episodic Intertwining of Life and Work,” pp. 71–74Google Scholar. Kohler, Lotte and Saner, Hans, “Introduction,” in Kohler and Saner, Hannah Arendt-Karl Jaspers Correspondence, pp. xxii–xxvGoogle Scholar. Kohn, Jerome, “Introduction,” in Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding 1930–1954, ed. Kohn, Jerome (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), p. xxxi.Google Scholar

36. If this interpretation is correct, one can rightly identify the intimate sphere of friends and associates as one of the strategic sites which can initiate and carry out the task of rejuvenating the human condition of plurality as well as of reestablishing the public realm. A Japanese political theorist, Junichi Saito has written stimulating articles which explore the possibility of the sphere of intimacy—a “micro-publicity”—including the sphere of friends as a locus for reinvigorating the public realm. See Junichi Saito, “Hihanteki Kôkyôsei no Kanousei omegutte: Shinmitsuken no Potential”(orig. Japanese: On the possibility of critical publicity: the potential of the sphere of intimacy), in Ono, Noriaki et al. , Modern to Postmodern (The modern and the postmodern) (Tokyo: Bokutakusha Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 189–224.Google ScholarSaito, Junichi, “Jiyûshugi” (orig. Japanese: liberalism), in Gendai no Seijishisô (The contemporary political thought), ed. Rei Shiratori and Seishi Sato, pp. 188–91.Google Scholar

37. Cf., Arendt, , The Human Condition, p. 243.Google Scholar

38. E.g., Beiner, , Political Judgment, p. 119.Google ScholarYack, Bernard, The Problems of A Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 113–14.Google Scholar

39. E.g., Arendt, , Men in Dark Times, pp. 12–14, 16, 23–26.Google ScholarArendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” pp. 82–86.Google ScholarMaclntyre, , After Virtue, pp. 131–45.Google ScholarCf., Beiner, , Political Judgment, pp. x, 80–82, 119–20.Google ScholarBakan, , “Arendt and Heidegger: The Episodic Intertwining of Life and Work,” pp. 95–96.Google Scholar

40. E.g., Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Terence (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 1165b: p. 244.Google Scholar The Aristotelian conception of philia posits three different kinds of friendship; the first based on mutual utility, the second on mutual pleasure, and the third on a shared concern for the goods themselves. Ibid., 1155a–1172a: pp. 207–66. Cf., Maclntyre, , After Virtue, p. 158.Google ScholarSchroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on the Good of Virtue-Friendship,” History of Political Thought 13 (1992): 203–205.Google ScholarCooper, John M., “Aristotle on Friendship,” in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 301–304.Google ScholarPrice, A. W., Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 131–61.Google ScholarKaneko, Haruo, Ai no Chitsujo [orig. Japanese: The order of love] (Tokyo: Sôbunsha, 1989), p. 39.Google ScholarIt can be rightly indicated, however, that even in Aristotle all these three concepts of friendship are modelled on the idea of kinship and thus based on the premise that the friends constitute the homogeneous body of the like. E.g., Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a, 1156b, 1159b, 1161b, 1162a, 1165a, 1165b, 1168a, 1168b: pp. 208–9, 223–24, 230–31, 243–44, 253–54.Google ScholarCf., Maclntyre, , After Virtue, pp. 123–24.Google ScholarHardie, W. F. R., Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 319–20.CrossRefGoogle ScholarIn dealing with Aristotle's notion of philia Arendt seems to have shown a tendency either to disregard or to bypass this aspect of the Greek notion of friendship.

41. Arendt, , The Life of the Mind, 2: 200.Google ScholarCf., Young-bruehl, , Hannah Arendt, p. 433.Google ScholarBakan, , “Arendt and Heidegger: The Episodic Intertwining of Life and Work,” pp. 72, 91–96.Google Scholar

42. E.g., Arendt, , Men in Dark Times, pp. 24–26.Google ScholarArendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” pp. 82–86.Google Scholar

43. Arendt, , Men in Dark Times, pp. 24–25.Google Scholar Aristotle also maintains that the “sharing of conversation and thought” constitutes friendship. Cf., Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1170b: p. 261.Google Scholar Elsewhere Arendt stated as follows: “Friendship to a large extent, indeed, consists of this kind of talking about something that the friends have in common. By talking about what is between them, it becomes ever more common to them. It gains not only its specific articulateness, but develops and expands and finally, in the course of time and life, begins to constitute a little world of its own which is shared in friendship” (Arendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” p. 82Google Scholar).

44. Arendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” pp. 82–86.Google Scholar Arendt writes as follows: “Socrates seems to have believed that the political function of the philosopher was to help establish this kind of common world, built on the understanding of friendship, in which no rulership is needed” (p. 84).

45. Aristotle mentions that “friendship seems to hold cities together,” that “every friendship is found in a community,” and that “concord is apparently political friendship.” Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a, 1161b, 1167b: pp. 208, 229, 250.Google Scholar

46. Cf., Sandel, Michael J., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 179–83.Google Scholar

47. Arendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” p. 84.Google Scholar

48. Ibid., p. 82.

49. Arendt, , On Revolution, p. 34.Google Scholar

50. Cf., D'entrèves, , Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, pp. 158–61.Google Scholar

51. Honig, Bonnie, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 176–79, 186.Google Scholar

52. For example, C. S. Lewis argues as follows: “Headmasters and headmistresses and the heads of religious communities, colonels and ships' captains, can feel uneasy when close and strong friendships arise between little knots of their subjects…. Authority frowns on friendship. Every real friendship is a sort of secession, even a rebellion” (Lewis, , “Friendship-Trie Least Necessary Love,” Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Badhwar, Neera Kapur [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993], pp. 40, 46).Google Scholar

53. E.g., Arendt, , Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1972), pp. 60–83.Google Scholar

54. Cf., Erler, Hans, Hannah Arendt, Hegel und Marx: Studien zu Fortscritt (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1979), SS. 26–41.Google ScholarYoung-bruehl, , Hannah Arendt, pp. 324, 327, 377.Google ScholarBowen-moore, , Arendt's Philosophy of Natality, pp. 16–20, 48–68, 103.Google Scholar Arendt seems to find this kind of amor mundi in Machiavelli and Jefferson. Cf., Arendt, , On Revolution, pp. 217–21, 253, 281, 286.Google Scholar

55. E.g., Arendt, , The Human Condition, pp. 16, 21, 53, 74–75.Google ScholarArendt, Hannah, “Religion and Politics,” Confluence 2 (1953): 111–12.Google ScholarCf., Kateb, , Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, pp. 89–90.Google ScholarCanovan, , Arendt: A Reinterpretation, p. 153.Google ScholarIsaac, Jeffrey G., Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 75–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Arendt's Machiavellian—this is also Rousseauist and Nietzschean—viewpoint vis-a-vis the otherworldliness of historical Christianity is shared by some twentieth-century Christian theologians as diverse as Rudolf Bultmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Juan Segundo, or political theologians such as Jürgen Moltmann, Johannes Metz. But it is likely in Arendt's case as well as in Machiavelli's, Rousseau's, and Nietzsche's that Christianity itself—primitive Christianity and the religion of Jesus—as well tends to be considered as the religion of otherworldliness. Herein exists a deep chasm between Arendt, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, on the one hand, and the above mentioned Christian political thinkers, on the other, who have attempted in one way or another to retrieve the authentic political dimension of the Gospel of Jesus under the unpolitical spell heavily laid down by historical Christianity. On the whole, Arendt thought that the absolutereligion in general—cannot provide the basis for the political and that religion ceased to be a vital influence on the political in the modern age: the age of secularism. E.g., Kohler, and Saner, , eds., Hannah Arendt-Karl Japsers Correspondence 1926–1969, p. 166.Google ScholarArendt, , The Jew as Pariah, pp. 91–94.Google ScholarCf., Strong, Tracy B., Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 126–28, 203–205.Google Scholar

56. Arendt, , The Human Condition, p. 53.Google Scholar

57. Ibid., pp. 53–54,242–43. Arendt's political animus against Christian love is shared by some political theorists. E.g., Stephen, , Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Three Brief Essays, pp. 221,238–41.Google Scholar But it also is criticized by some other theorists. E.g., Wolin, Sheldon S., “Democracy and the Political,” Salmagundi, no. 60 (Spring-Summer 1983): 4.Google ScholarWhitfield, Stephen J., Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), p. 154.Google Scholar Erler, Arendt, Hegel und Marx, S. 32.

58. Arendt, , The Human Condition, pp. 240–41.Google Scholar

59. Ibid., p. 241.

60. Arendt, , Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, SS. 67–68.Google Scholar

61. Ibid., SS. 25–27, 55–68.

62. Arendt thinks that due to the universalism of caritas or agape, what is loved in neighborly love is love itself rather than the neighbor. She maintains that because of its universalism and theocentric nature, neighborly love cannot properly deal with the historical and contingent conditions of the other person and that it results in both self-denial and the denial of the other. See Arendt, , Der Liebesbegriffbei Augustin, SS. 68–72, 79, 84–89.Google ScholarSimilarly, the universalism of agape was a stumbling-block for Nietzsche. He thought that it necessarily led to the disappearance of the distinctions and criteria that allow human beings to judge what is real. Nietzsche thought that the universalism of agape admonishing one to love everyone including one's enemy or an evil person removes one's capacity to judge morally. See Nietzsche, , “The Antichrist,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Kaufmann, Walter (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 600–10.Google ScholarCf., Strong, , Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, pp. 124–30.Google Scholar

63. E.g., Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and the Destiny of Man, Vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 298.Google ScholarNiebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 71.Google Scholar

64. Niebuhr insists that agape as expressed in loving one's enemy is conceived as simply beyond human moral capacity and as made actual in history only by divine grace. As such, it remains a foretaste, an anticipation, and an expression of the life in “the yonder and hereafter,” that is, in the Kingdom of God. Niebuhr, , Nature and Destiny of Man, 1: 298.Google Scholar Niebuhr also maintains as follows: “Love may have to live in history as suffering love because the power of sin makes a simple triumph of love impossible.” Niebuhr, , Nature and Destiny of Man, 2: 290.Google Scholar

65. Arendt, , The Human Condition, p. 242.Google Scholar

66. Maclntyre, , After Virtue,, p. 174.Google Scholar Concerning the apparent tension between philia as preferential love and agape as universal love, see the following discussion: Wadell, Paul J., Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. xvi, 70–119.Google Scholar

67. Cf., Chiba, Shin, “Christianity on the Eve of Postmodernity—Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer—,” in The Challenges for Christian Ethics Today: Toward an Ecumenical Future, ed. Chiba, Shin, Ruiz, E. Lester and Hunsberger, George R. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, forthcoming).Google Scholar

68. Nietzsche, , “The Antichrist,” p. 610.Google Scholar

69. Hans Erler rightly contrasted the corrective power of love-presumably agape--with its lack in the notion of respect. See Erler, , Arendt, Hegel und Marx, SS. 32–33.Google Scholar C. S. Lewis's thoughts on friendship should be noted here. He warned that even the “angelic” idea of friendship has a blind spot, i.e., a tendency to the loss of mutual self-corrective capacity, the “secession of, indifference or deafness (at least on some matters) to, the voices of the outer world” (Lewis, , “Friendship— The Least Necessary Love,” p. 46).Google Scholar

70. A British New Testament scholar, George B. Caird once wrote the following remark on the notion of loving one's enemies: “He who retaliates thinks that he is manfully resisting aggression; in fact, he is making an unconditional surrender to evil. Where before there was one under the control of evil, now there are two. Evil propagates by contagion. It can be contained and defeated only when hatred, insult, and injury are absorbed and neutralized by love” Caird, George B., The Gospel of St Luke (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 104.Google ScholarCf., Kaneko, , Ai no Chitsujo [orig. Japanese: the order of love], p. 50.Google Scholar

71. Chiba, Shin, “Shinkô, Kibô, Ai [orig. Japanese: faith, hope and love],” Fukuin to Sekai [the gospel and the world] 47 (1992): 44–45.Google Scholar Reinhold Niebuhr made a persistent attempt to integrate love and justice dialectically, though in orthodox Protestantism both concepts have been traditionally not only distinguished but also severed from each other. See Niebuhr, , Nature and Destiny of Man, 2: 244–56.Google ScholarNiebuhr, Reinhold, Love and Justice, ed. Robertson, D. B. (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1976).Google ScholarCf., Harland, Gordon, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 128–68.Google Scholar But in my view even this Niebuhrian attempt has not gone far enough, because we can still see in it a traditional dichotomous treatment in which the content of love is spoken of in distinction to the substance of justice and thus the content of love is conceptually unencumbered of the meaning of justice. More clearly than in the case of Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, for instance, like Luther and Lutherans in general, categorically distinguished the personal realm in which love is applicable and the socio-political realm where justice is relevant. In my view Arendt too seems to suffer from this traditional dichotomy between love and justice. Cf., Brunner, Emil, Justice and the Social Order, trans. Hottinger, Mary (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), pp. 20, 125–130.Google Scholar

72. E.g., Allen, Diogenes, Love: Christian Romance, Marriage, Friendship (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 1987), p. 137.Google Scholar

73. My interpretation diverges from Ronald Beiner's understanding that amor mundi is possible only as a form of political friendship. Cf., Beiner, , Political Judgment, pp. 123–25.Google Scholar But my interpretation is basically in agreement with Paul J. Wadell's view which suggests the complementary character of agape and philia. Cf., Wadell, , Friendship and the Moral Life, pp. 81,–84, 97–141.Google ScholarWoodard, Joseph Keith, “Thinking through Friendship,” Review of Politics 52 (1990): 626–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74. Cf., Maclntyre, , After Virtue, pp. 155–56.Google Scholar

75. Arendt, , “Philosophy and Politics,” pp. 82–84.Google ScholarCf., Bakan, , “Arendt and Heidegger: The Episodic Intertwining of Life and Work,” pp. 72–73Google Scholar.

76. For instance, the following two sentences are typical ones which suggest the negative meaning of “love of the world” in the thought of Augustine: “if love of the world be there, love of God will not be there.”; “The love of the world maketh the soul adulterous, the love of the Framer of the world maketh the soul chaste.” Augustine, , “The Homiles of the First Epistle of John, II, 14,” trans. Browne, H., in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. 7, ed. Schaff, Philip (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1888), p. 475.Google Scholar Augustine, “Sermons on New Testament Lessons, XCII. 3,” trans. R. G. MacMullen, in, Ibid., 6: 533. Cf., Jaspers, Karl, Plato and Augustine, trans. Manheim, Ralph (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1962), pp. 95–96.Google ScholarShigeizumi, Akio, Augustinus Rinri Shisô no Kenkyû [orig. Japanese: studies in the ethical thought of Augustine] (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyô Shuppankyoku, 1971), pp. 260–64.Google Scholar Augustine, however, may still speak of a right form of amor mundi as well: “I do not mean that the creature should not be loved; but a love of the creature, if it be referred to the Creator, becomes charity and not covetousness…. Thus we are to enjoy ourselves and our brothers in the Lord"; “we are forbidden to love in the world that which it loves in itself; and we are enjoined to love in it what it hates in itself, namely, the workmanship of God, and the various consolations of His goodness.” Augustine, , “The Trinity, IX. 13,” in Baillie, John et al. , eds., Augustine: Later Writings, trans. Burnaby, John (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 66.Google ScholarAugustine, , “The Homiles on the Gospel of John, LXXXVII. 4,” trans. Gib, John, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 7: 355.Google ScholarCf., Kayama, Shinji, “Augustinus no ‘Kami no Kuni’ no Seiji Shiso (1)” [orig. Japanese: the political thought of Augustine's Civtate Dei], Waseda Seiji Koho Kenkyfi [Waseda Studies in politics and public law], no. 36 (09 1991): pp. 146–152.Google Scholar

77. Kateb, , Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil, p. 96.Google Scholar

78. Here I am following Paul Tillich over against Anders Nygren in affirming the “ontological oneness of love” or the inseparability of the forms of love in the actual situation. E.g., Tillich, Paul, Love, Power and justice: Ontological Analyses an Ethical Applications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 27–34, 67–68, 90.Google ScholarNygren, Anders, Agape and Eros: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love, Pt. I, trans. Hebert, A G. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 21–40.Google ScholarCf., Irwin, Alexander C., Eros Toward the World: Paul Tillich and the Theology of the Erotic (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), pp. 12–15.Google Scholar

79. E.g., Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 241–42.Google ScholarArendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Beiner, Ronald (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 42–44.Google ScholarCf., Beiner, , Political Judgment, pp. 2–3,11.Google Scholar

80. Arendt, , Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, pp. 40–43.Google ScholarCf., Arendt, , The Life of the Mind, 2: 266–67.Google Scholar

81. Arendt, , Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 73.Google Scholar

82. Arendt, , The Human Condition, p. 55.Google ScholarCf., D'entrèves, Maurizio Passerin, “Hannah Arendt and the Idea of Citizenship,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ed. Mouffe, Chantal (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 146–47.Google ScholarCanovan, , “Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm,” p. 195.Google ScholarBiskowski, Lawrence J., “Practical Foundations for Political Judgment: Arendt on Action and World,” Journal of Politics 55 (1993): 879–85.Google Scholar

83. Cf., Arendt, , The Life of the Mind, 2: 84–146.Google Scholar

84. E.g., Ibid., pp. 6–7. 28–29, 101–120, 155–58.

85. Arendt, Hannah, “The History of the Will” (unpublished paper) in The Papers of Hannah Arendt, The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Container 44, p. 24704.Google ScholarCf., Arendt, , The Life of the Mind, 2: 94–95, 101–104.Google Scholar

86. Arendt, , The Life of the Mind, 2:104, 136, 144.Google Scholar