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The Enigma of Senator Taft and American Foreign Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

John P. Armstrong
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Extract

Less than a year after Senator Taft died, a foundation was established for the preservation of his ideals. Men's ideals are sometimes confused with their ideas, as is probably the case in this instance, because it is often difficult to distinguish between them. This paper is concerned with both. More specifically, it is concerned with the ideas Senator Taft propagated about foreign policy and the ideals that fostered them.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , April 1955 , pp. 206 - 231
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1955

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References

1 The official title of the organization is “Robert A. Taft Memorial Foundation, Inc.” Representative B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee is its president. The New York Times, 08 8, 1954.Google Scholar

2 For example, the Senator was reported to have given seven addresses in one day, late in August, 1950, in which he “played over the whole range of controversial subjects” for purposes of audience reaction. Korea proved to be the issue that “rang the bell everywhere, every time” (Ruch, Walter W., “Taft Tries Out in Ohio the G.O.P. Line on Korea,” The New York Times, 09 3, 1950, E, p. 10).Google Scholar

3 Congressional Record (hereafter referred to as Cong. Rec.), 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 01 5, 1951, p. 56.Google Scholar

4 Ibid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 4, 1943, p. 9096.

5 Ibid., 2d Sess., April 17, 1944, p. A1806.

6 Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 24, 1939, p. A263.

7 “It follows that except as such policies may ultimately protect our own security, we have no primary interest as a national policy to improve conditions or material welfare in other parts of the world or to change other forms of government” (Taft, Robert A., A Foreign Policy for Americans [Garden City, New York, 1951], p. 14).Google Scholar

8 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 05 19, 1941, p. A2344.Google Scholar

9 Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., May 3, 1939, p. A1802; ibid., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., May 29, 1941, p. A2558.

10 Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 23, 1939, p. A253; ibid., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., May 19, 1941, p. A2344.

11 Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., April 25, 1939, p. A1666.

12 Ibid., Jan. 23, 1939, p. A253.

13 Ibid., 2d Sess., Oct. 25, 1939, p. A504.

14 Ibid., 3d Sess., July 9, 1940, p. 9311.

15 Christian Century, “Senator Taft Firm for Neutrality,” LVII (06 12, 1940), p. 756.Google Scholar

16 Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 01 23, 1939, p. A253.Google Scholar

17 Vital Speeches, V (02 1939), 254Google Scholar; Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 05 30, 1940, p. A3384Google Scholar; ibid., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 29, 1941, p. A297; Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 123, appendix.Google Scholar

18 Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 13, 1939, p. 357.Google Scholar

19 Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 22, 1941, p. 1280.

20 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 126, appendix.Google Scholar

21 U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, Secretary, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945 (Washington, 1949), p. 302.Google Scholar

22 This impression is borne out by a statement he made later during the lend-lease debate: “I have always believed that our markets and factories should be open to the allies. I voted for the repeal of the arms embargo in October, 1939. I have voted for every appropriation designed to build up plants for the manufacture of war equipment both for the English and for our own defense” (Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 01 29, 1941, p. A297)Google Scholar. And in 1944, he underlined the fact that a policy of aid to Britain had not been a matter of the moment with him when he replied to a critic that on that point his “record [was] clear. As early as April, 1939, I advocated the repeal of the Arms Embargo Act. …” (Taft, , A Foresign Policy, op. cit., p. 125, appendix)Google Scholar. But it should be noted that at the time he said, “It seems to me that there is nothing unneutral about supplying arms to any nation which can buy them. …” (The New York Times, 09 5, 1939, p. 19)Google Scholar. And on another occasion he described cash-and-carry as “the most neutral position we can take. …” (Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 10 2, 1939, p. A76).Google Scholar

23 In spite of his reiterated protestations to the contrary, there is much in the record from which we can infer that he felt, instinctively at least, that Britain's fate was more than a sentimental matter to us. For example, the only time he became concerned over Hitler's intentions and the state of our defenses was in the period after the fall of France and the beginning of the Battle of Britain. At that time he saw “an attack on our own shores” as a distinct possibility (Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., June 21, 1940, p. A4111). A short time later, he warned that Hitler intended to dominate the entire continent of Europe, and contemplated the defeat of Britain and a “serious threat” to the United States from Europe or Asia (Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 01 29, 1941, p. A298)Google Scholar. Even his belief in American invulnerability disappeared momentarily. “We have suddenly waked up,” he said with an air of dismay, “to find that our Navy is inadequate and our Army completely unequipped for modern warfare. Only the most heroic efforts can build up our defense in time to meet the possible threat of an attack. …” (Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 06 21, 1940, p. A4111).Google Scholar

24 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 03 7, 1941, p. 1973.Google Scholar

25 Ibid., May 19, 1941, p. A2343. In the decade following Pearl Harbor, it might be noted, Senator Taft only added to the ambiguity of his prewar position instead of clarifying it. On the one hand, he openly acknowledged that World Wars I and II might have been prevented had Germany's leaders known in advance that the United States would not remain neutral (Cong. Rec., 81st. Cong., 1st Sess., 07 11, 1949, p. 9206)Google Scholar; he also claimed that, as early as 1920, he had come to believe that any major war anywhere in the world must inevitably involve the United States; and he granted that the technological revolution in warfare had profoundly affected our security position (ibid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 4, 1943, p. 9097). But he also said that if he had his “part to play over again in the days of neutrality legislation and lend-lease, I would do exactly as I did then” (ibid., May 10, 1943, p. A2267). And he explained very recently that he had opposed the Administration's policy because he did not believe that a Hitler victory would make Germany a serious threat to the United States (Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 18).Google Scholar

26 Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 03 30, 1943, pp. A1510 ff.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., May 31, 1945, pp. A2608–09.

28 Ibid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., March 30, 1943, p. A1512.

29 See Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 01 19, 1944, p. A265Google Scholar for a full exposition of this position.

30 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 07 28, 1945, p. 8153.Google Scholar

31 Ibid., Nov. 29, 1945, p. 11162.

32 Ibid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., March 30, 1943, p. A1511.

33 Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 1945, p. A2413.

34 Ibid., 2d Sess., March 1, 1946, p. A1051.

35 He saw the task of international organization as essentially that of guaranteeing the status quo (Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 09 14, 1943, p. A3786).Google Scholar

36 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 47–121.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., pp. 47–63.

38 Taft, Robert A., “Equal Justice Under Law,” (Reprint of address given at Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio, 10 5, 1946), pp. 2 and 5.Google Scholar

39 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 6.Google Scholar

40 Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 03 29, 1944, p. A1586.Google Scholar

41 Supra, pp. 3–4Google Scholar. Also: “I don't believe that [the Republican Party] will stand for any permanent international police force greater than our own military forces and under the control of some international body of which we are a small minority” (Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 05 10, 1943, p. A2268).Google Scholar

42 Supra, p. 9.

43 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 03 3, 1947, p. A793.Google Scholar

44 Ibid., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 8, 1951, pp. 1121–22.

45 Ibid., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., July 11, 1949, p. 9205.

46 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 113.Google Scholar

47 See the last chapter of Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit.Google Scholar, where he makes this argument explicit.

48 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 6, pp. 114–117.Google Scholar

49 Ibid., pp. 43–44, 101.

50 Ibid., p. 79; Cong. Rec., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 01 5, 1951, p. 58.Google Scholar

51 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 37–38.Google Scholar

52 Ibid., p. 64.

53 Except for some vague proposals for ideological warfare, his book offers no clear alternative to the Truman-Acheson policy. On the contrary, it ratifies that policy as a temporary expedient.

54 Cong. Rec., 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 06 28, 1950, p. 9320Google Scholar. From an economic aspect, he did not regard the expenditures that would be required for Korea as “a tremendous factor” in the whole picture of defense costs in preparation for “a spossible all-out attack by the Russians throughout the world” (ibid., July 24, 1950), pp. 10823–24.

55 Ibid., p. 10824.

56 Ibid., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., April 13, 1951, p. A2030.

57 Ibid., Jan. 5, 1951, p. 56.

58 Except to point out that to make peace at the 38th parallel would be to reward the second aggressor (ibid., April 13, 1951, p. A2031).

59 Ibid., Jan. 5, 1951. p. 57.

60 Ibid., 81st Cong., 2d Sess., June 28, 1950, p. 9322.

61 Ibid., p. 9320.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p. 9322.

64 Ibid., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 29, 1951, p. A420.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., April 13, 1951, p. A2031.

67 Ibid., April 27, 1951, p. 4474.

68 Not only did he fail to define clearly what American interests and objectives were in Korea, he was equally unclear about Chinese and Russian interests. In April, 1951, he believed that the extension of the war to Manchuria might carry with it the possibility of bringing the Soviet Union into the war (Cong. Rec., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 04 13, 1951, p. A2031)Google Scholar. But a few weeks later he did not believe that the Russians would go to war short of virtual invasion of their territory. “I think the Russians may bring a third world war,” he explained, “if they see something like invasion of Russia, but certainly the bombing of Manchurian bases or the use of Chiang's troops is nothing that threatens even remotely any invasion of Russian territory” (ibid., May 10, 1951, p. 5175, quoting a speech given by him on April 30, 1951). “China is thousands of miles away from Russia,” he said, thereby vitiating the successes of more than two hundred years of Russian imperialism, “so anything we do in that area cannot possibly constitute a threat of invasion of Russia” (ibid., p. 5178). Even the treaty of mutual assistance between Russia and China, to be implemented in the event either of them is attacked, was no cause for concern, he felt, because “in the past the Russians have had treaties which they have ignored or violated” (ibid.).

69 As one further example, see what he has had to say about the various threats to American security since he went to the Senate. He summed up his position on Germany on Sept. 25, 1941, when he said, “The threat of an attack by Hitler is, and always has been, a bugaboo to scare the American people into war” (Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 09 25, 1941, p. A4365)Google Scholar. Yet in June of the previous year he had urged “the most heroic efforts … to meet the possible threat of an attack on our own shores” (Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 06 21, 1940, p. A4111)Google Scholar. But this fright was momentary, for two months later he had come to the conclusion that neither Germany, Italy, nor Japan would “attack the United States, and … even if they do our present forces [about 625,000 in all] can defend us against an attack across 3,000 miles of water” (Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 08 14, 1940, pp. 10307–8)Google Scholar. See also ibid., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., May 3, 1939, p. A. 1802; ibid., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 22, 1941, pp. 1282–83; “Let's Mind Our Own Business,” Current History, L. (06, 1939), p. 33.Google Scholar

As with Germany and Japan, so, too, with Russia: he persisted in the belief that the Russian threat was not a military threat, except at those moments when it was useless to deny it. At first, he believed the result of World War II of itself would assure peace for years to come (Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 05 10, 1944, p. A2292Google Scholar; ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 1945, p. A2414). It was “inconceivable” that “another madman like Hitler” could arise for generations “consvinced that he [could] conquer the world” (Cong. Rec., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 06 1, 1943, p. 5093)Google Scholar. In 1948 he did not think “the communist attack” was “in any sense … a military attack.” He saw it as a war of ideologies (Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 03 12, 1948, p. 2643)Google Scholar. It was the Russian “form of government which is a threat to the welfare of the world and of the United States” (Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 04 2, 1947, p. 3034)Google Scholar. “The theory of totalitarian perfection and efficiency [had] taken hold of many countries and made progress here in the United States.” And, he added, “a good many of the doctrines of the New Deal grew out of this general philosophy of the all-wise state” (Taft, Robert A., “The Battle Against Communism” [Address before the Executives Club of Milwaukee, 05 8, 1948, mimeographed], p. 5).Google Scholar

After Korea, he acknowledged a serious threat from “the power of Communist Russia” (Taft, Robert A., Washington Report, No. 66, 09 20, 1950)Google Scholar. But in January of the following year, he knew “of no evidence” that the Russians intended to attack (Cong. Rec., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 01 5, 1951, p. 60)Google Scholar. He continued to regard the Atlantic Pact as “a tremendous mistake” that could be “interpreted as an aggressive move” (ibid., p. 62). And he did “not believe it is at all clear that the Russians contemplate a military conquest of the world” (ibid., p. 65). He felt that “the chances [were] in favor of [Russia] not attacking” (ibid., May 10, 1951, p. 5182). And he did not regard “the Russian potential … [as being] too great in any event. …” (ibid., Jan. 5, 1951, p. 62).

70 Taft, Robert A., “The Republican Party,” Fortune, 04 1949, p. 108Google Scholar. Italics mine. The editorial subtitle epitomizes Taft's position as follows: “It will return to power … by sticking to its principles of liberty, justice, and equality—and by presenting them more effectively.”

71 Ibid., pp. 108–118.

72 See the comprehensive statements of his philosophy of government in the remarkable series of speeches he gave throughout 1939, reprinted in the “Appendix” to the Congressional Record for that year. See specially 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 05 3, p. A1802Google Scholar; ibid., May 25, pp. A2244–45; ibid., July 21, pp. A3397–99; ibid., July 26, pp. A3594–95. On July 27, pp. A3612–13, he spoke on “The American Way of Life” and said, “The basis of the American way of life has been equal opportunity to improve one's condition by one's own effort.” And again, “The Government … must prevent interference with individual and commercial liberty wherever it is threatened by the power of wealth, but it must be certain that it does not substitute for this threat from the power of wealth the threat from the power of arbitrary government itself.” See also 07 31, pp. A3689–90Google Scholar on “The Constitution—Written and Unwritten.”

73 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 02 22, 1941, p. 1281Google Scholar: “But, above all, the bill puts the President in a position where he can run the war.” See also ibid., Oct. 28, 1941, pp. 8281–82, where he complains that the bad effects of lend-lease stemmed from the way in which the Act was administered.

74 “Compulsory Military Training in Peacetime Will Destroy Government by the People,” Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 05 31, 1945, pp. A2608–10.Google Scholar

75 Ibid., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., March 12, 1948, pp. 2642–43.

76 “I would waive my other objections to the Atlantic Pact if I did not feel that it was inextricably involved with the arms program” (ibid., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., July 11, 1949, p. 9210). Earlier in the speech he had said, “… both types of assistance is beyond the economic capacity of the United States. I believe we will have to choose whether we give economic assistance or arms” (ibid., p. 9209).

77 The military budget for that year, he said, was more than 21 billion dollars. He believed that “with less money we could be secure” (ibid., Sept. 22, 1949, p. 13149).

78 In his first speech on Korea (ibid., 81st Cong., 2d Sess., June 28, 1950, p. 9223), he merely suggested it might be a usurpation of power, but it was not long before he was saying that the President had no authority to involve us in Korea (ibid., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 5, 1951, p. 59).

79 See Senate speech on presidential powers (reprinted as, “The President Has No Right to Involve the United States in a Foreign War”) in Cong. Rec., 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 03 29, 1951, pp. 2987–3003.Google Scholar See also ibid., Jan. 5, 1951, pp. 55 and 57.

80 Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 27, 1941, pp. A4839–40.Google Scholar A month earlier, he had declared that the process of defeating Hitler would probably require us “to set up a complete dictatorship in this country from which we may never return to American democracy as we have known it” (ibid., Sept. 25, 1941, p. A4365).

81 For example, see Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 60Google Scholar, where he said, “Our liberty is threatened by the Russian military strength, backed up by the fifth-column strength which the Russians are always able to develop among Communists in every nation in the world.” But on p. 114 of the same work he dismissed the military threat as follows: “… if we had only to face the military strength of Soviet Russia I think there would not be any such concern as we see today.” He then went on to emphasize the ideological threat and to question whether we would ever have “to meet the forces of communism on the battlefield.” See also footnote No. 69 supra. It is a curious thing that the more frightened one is about the domestic threat of Communism, the more likely he is to oppose efforts to counter the Soviet military threat. Senators Taft, Jenner, and McCarthy are especially notable in this respect.

82 Cong. Rec., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 05 3, 1939, p. A1802.Google Scholar

83 Taft, , A Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 101.Google Scholar

84 Cincinnati Address of May 26, 1953, from the text in The New York Times, 05 28, 1953.Google Scholar

85 Chicago Daily News, 06 5, 1953.Google Scholar

86 Quoted in Time, 11 20, 1950, p. 20.Google Scholar

87 Supra, pp. 34–35, f.n. 69.Google Scholar