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Constitutional Crisis in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Devolution Controversy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

The United Kingdom, already beleaguered in the mid-1970's by a number of serious problems—economic, social, political, diplomatic and even climatic—in addition has had to contend with a far-reaching constitutional crisis. Involving the subject of devolution of power (better known as home rule), it has been described as “the most crucial constitutional issue which has confronted the United Kingdom since it came into being.” The controversy over devolution has reached a new level of intensity since November, 1975, when the government, in an effort to resolve the dispute, published a White Paper entitled Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales. This article examines the following aspects of the devolution issue: its background, why it has emerged at this time, why the White Paper was issued, reasons for the hostile reaction to the White Paper, the prospects for parliamentary passage of devolution legislation, and the issue's political repercussions and implications, both domestic and international.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1977

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References

1 Editorial in the Daily Telegraph, 03 31, 1976, p. 16Google Scholar.

2 Cmnd. 6348 (London: HMSO, November 1975). For background on earlier official publications on the subject, see Drucker, H. M., “Pedigree for the White Paper,” New Edinburgh Review, 02, 1976, pp. 28Google Scholar.

3 In Wales, roughly one voter in four favors some form of devolution, and one in two is opposed to such change; in Scotland, at least three in four voters support devolution, and one in seven is opposed.

4 Fenton, James, “When the Devolution Comes,” New Statesman, 01 23, 1976, p. 86Google Scholar. (Fenton's is a tongue-in-cheek view.)

5 Kellas, James, “Devolution in British Politics” (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the U. K. Political Studies Association, University of Nottingham, 03, 1976), pp. 47Google Scholar; for survey data, see pp. 17–19.

6 Rose, Richard, The Future of Scottish Politics: A Dynamic Analysis (Edinburgh, 1975), pp. 89Google Scholar.

7 Craven, Edward, “Introduction,” in Regional Devolution and Social Policy, ed. Craven, E. (London, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the SNP view, Scotland is an ideal size for self-government; e.g., see the Dundee, Courier, 11 29, 1975, p. 4Google Scholar.

8 Editorial, The Scotsman, 06 7, 1976, p. 6Google Scholar.

9 Ionescu, Ghita, Centripetal Politics: Government and the New Centres of Power (London, 1975), p. 113Google Scholar.

10 From a Washington Post editorial, in the International Herald Tribune, November 28, 1975, p. 6.

11 For a radical view of the oil factor, see Nairn, Tom, “Old Nationalism and New Nationalism,” in The Red Paper on Scotland, ed. Brown, G. (Edinburgh, 1975)Google Scholar.

12 Harvie, Christopher, “The Devolution of the Intellectuals,” New Statesman, 11 28, 1975, pp. 665666Google Scholar.

13 Times (London), 04 7, 1976, p. 2Google Scholar.

14 Glasgow Herald, April 1, 1976, p. 6.

15 Calculated in terms of the major parties' share of the total electorate, that share has declined from 80 percent in 1951 to 55 percent in October, 1974. See Crewe, Ivor, Alt, Jim, and Sarlvik, Bo, “The Erosion of Partisanship, 1964–1975” (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the U. K. Political Science Association, University of Nottingham, 03, 1975)Google Scholar.

16 Rose, , Future of Scottish Politics, pp. 4, 15–16.Google Scholar Referring to the number of parties now active in Scottish politics, Rose maintains that the “existence of so wide a variety of [electoral] choices only argues for greater instability” in Scottish politics (p. 20).

17 Fairgrieve, Russell, Daily Telegraph, 05 15, 1976, p. 2Google Scholar.

18 Mackintosh, John P., “Labour and Scotland,” New Statesman, 01 16, 1976, p. 55Google Scholar.

19 Adapted from Rose, , Future of Scottish Politics, pp. 2425Google Scholar.

20 In the words of one writer, the SNP has “drawn a metaphysical distinction between self government and separatism, but the whole spirit of their argument is separatism” (Wood, David, The Times, 01 19, 1976, p. 13)Google Scholar. A recent Gallup Poll shows that only 26 percent of Scots favor independence (Daily Telegraph, May 4, 1976, p. 10). Thus the Labour party's current campaign slogan in Scotland is “Devolution Not Separation” (which some-how seems less catchy than the SNP's 1974 slogan, “It's Scotland's Oil!”).

21 The Liberal party has long advocated home rule, on the basis of creating a federal structure for the U. K.; but with only about 8 percent of the Scottish vote in the two 1974 elections (its best showing since World War Two), the party is not an influential factor in the current Scottish political scene.

22 By late 1975 opinion surveys indicated that the SNP actually had overtaken Labour; since then, however, Labour has regained the lead in the polls.

23 Mackintosh, “Labour and Scotland.”

24 “The End of Labour's Covenant,” New Statesman, November 21, 1975, p. 629.

25 Watkins, A., “Willie Ross for King,” New Statesman, 11 28, 1975, p. 662Google Scholar.

26 Buchan, Norman, The Guardian, 03 22, 1976, p. 10Google Scholar.

27 MacPherson, Samuel, “Wake Up, Mr. Wilson,” Spectator, 12 6, 1975, pp. 721722Google Scholar.

28 “Devolve and Rule?” The Economist, February 14, 1976, p. 17.

29 “Lest the Axe Fall,” The Economist, January 17, 1976, p. 12; “Keeping the Politicians Apart,” The Economist, February 7, 1976, p. 26.

30 “The Devolution Fling,” The Economist, November 29, 1975, p. 13.

31 “A Spectator's Notebook,” Spectator, January 24, 1976, p. 7.

32 Nonetheless, in such an eventuality the SNP expects to win a majority of both Assembly seats and Scottish seats in the Commons, and to continue pressing for greater Assembly powers until independence is attained by legal means. See Leigh, David, Times (London), 03 I, 1976, p. 2Google Scholar.

33 In such an eventuality the SNP, according to one scenario, would then have a “mandate” to proceed with a Scottish version of UDI (as the Sinn Fein did in Ireland in 1918). Presumably England would then have only two alternatives, “concession or occupation.” See Harvie, “The Devolution of the Intellectuals.” But the SNP, as noted earlier, is not united on such issues.

34 See, e.g.,Mackintosh, John P., “Scotland for Aye,” New Statesman, 03 5, 1976, p. 281Google Scholar; Jenkins, Peter, The Guardian, 01 16, 1976, p. 12Google Scholar; Baur, Chris, Financial Times, 01 13, 1976, p. 16Google Scholar.

35 The Conservatives' devolution proposal in effect calls for an elected “third chamber” of Parliament, in Edinburgh, to process but not to pass bills dealing with Scotland. It lacks full party support, and is generally regarded as the least acceptable of all the non-nationalist proposals.

36 Fringe groups appear to be emerging in England as well, such as the English National Party.

37 Paterson, Peter, International Herald Tribune, 04 12, 1976, p. 7Google Scholar.

38 Kellas, , “Devolution in British Politics,” p. 15Google Scholar.

39 In his argument, Professor Alan Thompson concludes that Scotland should remain “part of an effective UK defence system whatever future arrangements are made for devolution” (see The Scotsman, February 20, 1976, p. 13).

40 Article by ProfessorErickson, John, The Scotsman, 03 9, 1976Google Scholar. Erickson states that “No act of politics can make Scotland ‘contract out’ from its sea and air spaces, together with the responsibility for policing them” (p. 10). Arguments such as Thompson's and Erickson's presumably are aimed at the SNP, which supposedly has plans for an independent Scottish defense policy (and which, incidentally, opposed U. K. entry into the EEC during the 1975 referendum on the subject in Britain).

41 The allocation which the EEC finally agreed on is more favorable to Scotland (indirectly, of course, through the U. K. allocation) than the previous one, and the change is said to have been influenced in part by the devolution issue in general and by the Scottish position in particular. See MacLeod, Alexander, The Scotsman, 07 9, 1976, p. 9Google Scholar, and the editorial on p. 8, ibid.

42 As one editorial noted, “Britain and France cannot complain about disproportional representation in the EEC Parliament when they tolerate it in their own political system” (The Scotsman, February 18, 1976, p. 10).

43 Marten, Neil, Times (London), 02 19, 1976, p. 14Google Scholar.

44 “The Turbulent Provincials Turn on Their Masters,” The Economist, January 3, 1976, pp. 15 ff.