Hostname: page-component-cc8bf7c57-j4qg9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-12T01:55:19.189Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

F. Triska  and
Howard E. Koch Jr
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

WithinTheLast decade, the United Nations has undergone three modifications which, taken separately, are quite significant; together, they represent a true metagenesis of the Organization.

The first modification paralleled a development which had occurred in the League of Nations: both organizations were designed to be led, if not controlled, by the powerful members permanently seated in the League's Council and the United Nations' Security Council. In both organizations, however, the less powerful member states, in spite of the constitutional provisions, have persisted in endeavoring to assert themselves and have sought in numbers a balance to, and — whenever feasible — a substitute for, the authority lodged with the few strongest nations. The ultimate acquisition of prestige by the Assembly of the League of Nations was their success.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , April 1959 , pp. 417 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1959

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See, for example, Aspaturian, Vernon V., “The Metamorphosis of the United Nations”, The Yale Review, XLVI (Summer 1957)Google Scholar; Ball, Margaret M., “Bloc Voting in the General Assembly”, International Organization, V (02 1951)Google Scholar; Howard, Harry N., “The Arab-Asian States in the United Nations”, The Middle East Journal, VII (Summer 1953)Google Scholar; Keynes, Mary Knatchbull, “The Arab-Asian Bloc”, International Relations, I (10 1956)Google Scholar; Scalapino, Robert A., “Neutralism in Asia”, The American Political Science Review, XLVIII (03 1954)Google Scholar; Wint, Guy, “South Asia: Unity and Disunity”, International Conciliation (11 1954) (No. 500)Google Scholar; and Henderson, William, “The Roots of Neutralism in Southern Asia”, International Journal (Toronto), XIII (Winter 1957-1958)Google Scholar.

2 Nehru, Jawaharlal, Glimpses of World History (New York, 1942), p. 638Google Scholar.

3 China, India, Iran, Japan, Liberia and Siam (1920), Ethiopia (1923), Iraq and Turkey (1932), Afghanistan (1934), and Egypt (1937).

4 Asian Relations Organization, Asia and Africa in the Modern World, ed. by Poplai, S. L. (New Delhi, 1955), p. 1Google Scholar.

5 The presidential address of the Forty-Second Congress (1927) advocated Federation in the following terms: “In the conflict between Europe and Asia, Asia has been worsted because Europe could take concerted action against her piecemeal and defeat her in detail. The only hope of success in our efforts to check the forces of European Imperialism and Capitalism lies in Eastern nations coming closer and taking a more intimate interest in the problems facing them”. Indian National Congress, Congress Presidential Addresses, Second Series (Madras, 1934), p. 846Google Scholar.

6 The thirteen included China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Japan, Palestine, Persia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Indo-China, and Syria. This was the first time that the Indian National Congress participated in an international conference. As the representative of India in the League of Nations was an appointee ot the British Government, Indian nationalists considered him to be merely an additional British representative.

7 International Press Correspondence (Vienna), Vol. 7, No. 16 (02 25, 1927), 331Google Scholar.

8 An interesting discussion of the conflict between Great Britain and the United States over the future of the European colonies appears in: Dulles, F. R. and Ridinger, G. E., “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt”, Political Science Quarterly, LXX (03 1955), 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Churchill, Winston, The Hinge of Fate: History of the Second World War, Vol. IV, (Boston, 1950), 219Google Scholar.

10 “Report to President Roosevelt by William Phillips, U. S. Ambassador to India”, cited in: Thayer, Philip W., ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asid (Baltimore, 1956), p. 273Google Scholar.

11 Ibid.

12 Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Thailand, Burma, Ethiopia, and Liberia.

13 Early Arab-Asian cooperation is discussed in: Egyptian Society of International Law, Egypt and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group set up by the Egyptian Society of International Law (New York, 1957), pp. 73–75Google Scholar.

14 The authors are indebted to Dr. Muhammad H. El-Farra, Chief of the United Nations Section of the Arab States Delegations Office, for his assistance in clarifying a number of points concerning the Asian-Arab and Asian-African Groups.

15 A resolution of the Council of the Arab League, concerning the Moroccan and Tunisian cases before the United Nations, refers to the meetings of the Asian-African bloc, and is dated September 7, 1953. Ibid., p. 139. Other sources suggest that the Africans did not participate in group meetings until 1954.

16 The members of the Asian-African alignment consider themselves a “group” rather than a “bloc”. The authors use the “group”, “bloc”, “coalition” and “alignment” interchangeably, except in the following passage where it has been necessary, because of the position of Turkey, to draw a distinction between “group” and terms which imply a voting alignment.

17 On March 7, 1957, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah served notice that Ghana could not assent to submergence in any inter-regional group, but wished to pursue a policy designed “to give Africa an African personality”. Ghana looked to a closer association with other independent African states, and to this end desired the holding of a conference with Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and Liberia, to which the Union of South Africa might be invited “as a gesture”. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15427. Ghana's Pan-African policy produced two conferences which were held at Accra last year. Recently in the press, reference has been made to the “African bloc”.

18 Laos often plays the strictly neutral role of a small power surrounded by powerful neighbors. Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma has referred to his country as the Switzerland of the East, adding: “Our country has no intention of joining any bloc, even the neutralist bloc. Neutrality is more neutral than neutralism”. The Economist, CLXXX (09 22, 1956), 968Google Scholar. The position of Laos in relation to France has caused it to vote independently of the coalition, even on certain colonial questions.

19 Reference here is made to the various arrrangements and pacts in force today in the Asian and Arab areas, some of which are mutually antipathetic, others not: the Arab League (Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan); SEATO (the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States [1954]; the now questionable Baghdad Pact (Turkey and Iraq [February, 1955], Britain [April], Pakistan [September], Iran [October], and the United States [which joined its military commission in June, 1957].)

Mention should also be made of the British Commonwealth, which includes Malaya, Ceylon, Pakistan, India, and Ghana. Among the ten independent and sovereign members, Commonwealth ties cease to be a consideration when “European” interests are in conflict with “Asian-African” interests, as in the invasion of Egypt in 1956 and the Anglo-American intervention in the summer of 1958.

20 Lawrence, T. E., Oriental Assembly, ed. Lawrence, A. W. (London, 1947), p. 72Google Scholar.

21 “The economic life of the Union shall be planned with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of improving the material conditions of the people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the Union and strengthening its defensive capacity”. Section 41 of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, adopted September 24, 1947 and entered into effect on January 4, 1948. In practice Burma, like most of the Asian and African countries, has applied such controls to only a limited sector of its economy.

22 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Burma Socialist Party, Socialism (Rangoon, 1954), p. 1Google Scholar, cited in Trager, Frank N. and Associates, Burma, III (New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1956), 1207–08Google Scholar.

23 Nehru's letter circulated confidentially among his friends and was later reprinted in the Journal of the Indian Congress Party. Reprinted in The New York Times Magazine, September 7, 1958, p. 13.

24 Ibid., pp. 110–111.

25 This fear was expressed by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Bandarnaike, S. W. R. D., who claimed to have “always had doubts whether the system is quite suitable to some of our countries”, adding that in several Asian countries the democratic apparatus was incompatible with local conditions. “Ceylonese Wary of Party System”, New York Times, 10 22, 1958, p. 6Google Scholar.

26 Thayer, , op. cit., p. 63Google Scholar.

27 United States, Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI (01 14, 1957), 50Google Scholar.

28 The San Francisco Examiner noted that although India had received much assistance from the United States, including $200, 000, 000 in wheat to relieve famine conditions “…India does not even pretend to be our friend”, concluding that such behavior should be a factor in determining the country's future eligibility for aid. San Francisco Examiner, April 28, 1954, p. 28.

29 Secretary Dulles characterized neutrality as a principle “which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to t h e fate of others”. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV (06 18, 1956), 999–1000Google Scholar.

30 October 9, 1958, p. 14.

31 Triska, Jan F. and Slusser, Robert M., “Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet View”, American Journal of International Law, LII (10, 1958)Google Scholar.

32 “The Red Widow's Mite”, The Nation, November 8, 1958, p. 338. Italics in the original.

33 Anderwood, Paul, “Yugoslavs Think China Crisis Ebbs”, New York Times, 09 21, 1958, p. 6Google Scholar.

34 “Soviet is opposed at Cairo Parley”, New York Times, December 9, 1958, p. 11.

35 Former Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan warned in a statement issued on November 23, 1956, during the height of the crisis, that certain interested powers, “taking advantage of the noble sentiments and emotions aroused in support of a Moslem country, … are attempting to create disorder and confusion in the Middle East and are seriously threatening its security and stability”. Keesing's, 15231.

36 The Arab World (Beirut), No. 804 (01 22, 1957), p. 1Google Scholar. The replacement of British and French imperialism by that of the United States was anticipated in one unofficial Egyptian publication which carried a cartoon entitled “Vanguards of the Assault”, portraying Uncle Sam, equipped with a large whip, standing over the Suez Canal, and waving the victorious French and British away, saying, “ … Fine! Go home, boys!” Dirasat Sufiyetiyya (Soviet Studies) (Cairo, 1957), p. 87Google Scholar.

37 Despite the Arab states' insistence on a clean break with Israel, seven members of the bloc have some form of relations with that country. Burma, Japan, and Thailand maintain legations, and Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Philippines have consulates on Israeli territory. Israel maintains legations in Burma, Japan, and Thailand, consulates in India, Liberia, and the Philippines. Of these countries, Burma's relations with Israel have been the closest, cemented by an Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in June, 1957. Ghana, also, has been developing close commercial relations with Israel.

38 Editorial entitled “Bandung Conference and Islam”, Islamic Review, June 1955, p. 5.

39 The “guest-list” was the subject of considerable debate. The inclusion of Communist China was agreed upon in exchange for the addition of Japan and the exclusion of Israel. No invitations were to be extended to North or South Korea, nor to the Chinese Government on Formosa. See Keynes, Mary Knatch-bull, “The Bandung Conference”, International Relations, I (10, 1957), 362 ff.Google Scholar The presence of Communist China was pressed by India, first, because an indication of China's future peaceful role in Asian affairs could be formalized by assurances given at a conference of Asian states and, secondly, because it was hoped that the easing of certain East-West disputes might be achieved in the Bandung atmosphere. It is worth noting, in this connection, that at the preliminary Bogor Conference in December, 1954, the presence of Communist China was made acceptable to the Western-oriented countries (and vice-versa presumably) by the insertion of a paragraph in the Bogor Communique to the effect that a state's acceptance of the conference did not imply any change of view regarding the status of another participating state, one of a number of necessary accommodations. Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers, 1954, The Bogor Conference (Ministry of Education, Republic of Indonesia, 1954), p. 27Google Scholar.

40 In the preparation of the present study, an analysis was made of Asian-African voting behavior on the basis of approximately 250 roll call votes in the General Assembly and its seven main committees. Space and the analysis is used here only for purposes of generalization and illustration and does not permit a detailed discussion of voting trends. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Miss Clara Reed, a graduate of the International Relations Program at Stanford, for her assistance in the process of recording votes.

41 It has been noted that in India the view that the United Nations was “nothing but the old League of Nations resurrected” found considerable currency at the time of the San Francisco Conference. Indian Council of World Affairs, India and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group set up by the Indian Council of World Affairs (New York, 1957), p. 24Google Scholar.

42 Concerning trusteeship, an Indian newspaper commented: “The conception of Trusteeship, as conceived by the founders of the U.N.O., should have been acceptable if it were part of a widening system of freedom for the dependent peoples. But, on the contrary, its whole aim seems to be to maintain the status quo through a new technique of administration”. Ibid. The eleven original signatories were: Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Philippines, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Afghanistan and Thailand were admitted in November and December, 1946, respectively, which brought the total Asian-African membership to thirteen.

43 Interest in UN membership questions was intense during the meetings at San Francisco in 1945. In the course of discussions on the subject of membership, the Egyptian delegate insisted that “the tendency should be to make the Organization include in due time all the members of the community of nations”, a remark that was characteristic of Asian-African opinion. U. S. Department of State, Conference Series, The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25–June 26, 1945: Selected Documents (Washington, 1946), p. 112Google Scholar. The paucity of Asian representation in the U.N. received further mention in the meetings of the First Asian Relations Conference which convened shortly after the First Session of the General Assembly. An Indian delegate commented: “The United Nations Organization from which she [India] had just returned was over-represented with the West and the East suffered neglect. She believed this was not intentional but due to the prevailing circumstances. She therefore pleaded for internal unity in Asia when only the United Nations would represent not just the voice of a few powerful countries but of the whole world”. Asian Relations, being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March–April, 1947, published under the auspices of the Asian Relations Organization (New Delhi, 1948), p. 75Google Scholar.

44 In most Asian or Asian-African conferences, UN membership has been a prominent issue. The Colombo Conference (May, 1954), for example, called for the admission of Communist China. The Bandung Conference produced a declaration in its final communique requesting the Security Council to recommend admission for Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, and unified Vietnam. On this occasion, no similar recommendation was made with respect to Communist China — presumably this omission was necessary to preserve what has become known as the “Bandung atmosphere”. The so-called “package-deal” solution to the membership stalemate in the UN has been attributed by some to the influence of the conference, and in a statement to the Asian-African group in the UN (on the occasion of the first anniversary of Bandung) the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, asserted that the admission of the sixteen states brought the UN closer to the “ideal of universality”. He urged the admission of Communist China, Japan, Outer Mongolia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, as well as Malaya when it became independent. Asian Recorder, April 28–May 4, 1956, p. 812.

45 Thus, at a meeting of the Special Committee on the Admission of New Members in May, 1953, the Philippines (despite its Western orientation) and Egypt favored a Soviet plan for a “package deal” to permit immediate acceptance of outstanding applications, and submitted a memorandum (A/2400, Annex 7) recommending admission for fourteen applicant states, including five from the Soviet “sphere” and four from Asia and Africa. During the 10th Session of the General Assembly, fourteen members of the bloc were among the twenty-eight powers jointly responsible for the introduction of the resolution which opened the door to sixteen states – the resolution was unanimously supported by the Asian-African states in the vote on December 8, 1955.

46 Parenthetically, it should be noted that the question of the admission of Israel to United Nations membership was not one on which adherence to the principle of universality could have been expected to guide the policies of all members of the group. Of the fifteen Asian-African delegations voting on the resolution (273 (III), May 11, 1949), twelve voted in opposition to admission. Thailand abstained and only the Philippines and Liberia voted in favor.

47 Draft Resolution A/1365, voted on September 19, 1950. In favor: Afghanistan, Burma, India, and Pakistan; opposed: Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, the Philippines, Thailand; Abstaining: Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

48 General Assembly Resolution 903 (IX), as submitted by the United States, adopted on September 21, 1954. There were six abstentions: Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.

49 The figure for 1950 is based on the vote taken on Draft Resolution A/1365. See above, note 34. The second figure is drawn from the vote on the recommendation of the General Committee rejecting the Indian request that the matter of Chinese representation be placed on the agenda of the Thirteenth Session (Item 63, First Report of the General Committee, A/3926). Voting against the recommendation: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, Sudan, U.A.R., Yemen. Abstaining: Laos, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia. Voting in favor: Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaya, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand.

50 Thirteen-power resolutions concerning the admission of North Korea (A/SPC/L.15 & Adds. 1 & 2) and Viet Nam (A/SPC/L.16 & Adds. 1 & 2). Three members of the Asian-African group joined in sponsoring the resolutions: Iraq, Japan, Philippines. Except for Liberia, which voted for the first and abstained on the second, the voting on the resolutions was identical. In favor: Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand. Against: none. Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Libya, Malaya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Absent: Laos.

51 General Assembly Resolution III (II), 11 13, 1947Google Scholar. The six Arab states abstained primarily for reasons that were extraneous to the subject of the resolution.

52 General Assembly-Resolution 377 (V), 11 3, 1950Google Scholar. Lebanon did not participate while India abstained because of its objections to the creation of t h e Collective Measures Committee.

53 See Text of the Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference, Section E, Paragraph 1, New York Times, April 25, 1955, p. 6. The reapportionment of seats was also seen as necessary elsewhere. On a proposal to increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council, made by Argentina in October, 1947, a n Indian delegate felt that more equitable distribution of seats was required rather than a simple increase in numbers. His proposal (A/C.2 & 3/58) to reallocate seats in the Council was not adopted, for certain representatives feared that a precedent would be set affecting all UN organs. See United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947–1948, p. 95Google Scholar.

54 Report of the Special Political Committee, A/3781. Passed in plenary meeting; in favor: 49, against: 1, abstaining: 7 (December 6, 1957). Pakistan and the Philippines abstained, Morocco was absent.

55 Seventeen-power proposal, A/C.2/L.365. Defeated in Second Committee, in favor: 29; against: 46; abstaining: 1. Iran, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand opposed the proposal. Jordan, Nepal, and Saudi Arabia (a sponsor) were absent. The Soviet Union voted in favor, the Western “Big Three” against (October 10, 1958).

56 Report of the Special Political Committee, A/4022. Passed in plenary meeting; in favor: 52; against: 9; abstaining: 17 (December 10, 1958). Of the Asian-African group, in favor: Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Tunisia; against: none; abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, U.A.R., and Yemen.

57 Hamilton, Thomas J., “Europe Views the U.N. with Many Misgivings”, New York Times, 08 4, 1957Google Scholar.

58 The United States, in attempting to see its way out of the dilemma, frequently resorts to abstaining on votes on colonial issues. This practice has invited criticism from within the country, as in the case of Algeria before the Thirteenth Session which occasioned Senator Kennedy, John F. to label United States policy as being neutralist. New York Times, 11 24, 1958, p. 7Google Scholar.

59 The position of the West on the Palestine question was responsible for the Arab abstentions on these resolutions. India and Afghanistan joined the Arabs in abstaining on the Balkans resolution of October 21, 1947, while Iraq, in this instance, voted with the Western powers.

60 Wint, Guy, “South Asia: Unity and Disunity”, International Conciliation, 11, 1954 (No. 500), 165Google Scholar.

61 Asian-African states which made nonmilitary contributions were: India (field ambulance unit, supplies), Lebanon (financial support), Liberia (rubber), Pakistan (wheat). States contributing to the Korean Emergency Relief Program were: Burma, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952, Annex 1, Summaries of Military and Relief Assistance for Korea (as of 15 January, 1952), pp. 249–253.

62 General Assembly Resolution 376 (V), October 7, 1950. Abstaining: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, India, and Indonesia.

63 First Committee, Draft Resolution (A/C. 1/641), submitted jointly by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, on December 12, 1950.

First Committee, Draft Resolution (A/C.1/642), submitted jointly by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, on December 12, 1950.

64 Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Syria (December 5, 1950).

65 General Assembly Draft Resolution (A/2031), submitted by the Soviet Union, January 11, 1952. None voted in favor. Voting (with the West) against: Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

66 General Assembly, Resolution 804 (VIII), December 3, 1953. Against, none. In favor: Ethiopia, Iran, Liberia, the Philippines, Thailand. Abstaining: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Not participating: India and Lebanon.

67 There have been, quite naturally, disagreements among the neutralists themselves, depending upon the issue, circumstances, and point in time. Berma, it may b e remembered, abstained from voting on resolutions concerned with the Hungarian situation in the Second Emergency Session of the General Assembly in 1956, but voted with the West in the Eleventh Session which followed immediately thereafter. In explaining his Government's position, the Burmese delegate was led to comment: “There, but for the Grace of God, go we”. New York Times, December 16, 1956.

68 During the Second Emergency Session of the General Assembly (1956), the Hungarian situation was over-shadowed by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, at least in the mind of many Asian-Africans. Nehru was led to comment that the crisis in Hungary was “viewed almost with relief” by those wishing to draw attention from the invasion of Egypt. Keesings, 15, 309. Nonetheless, the coalition, which had been nearly unanimous on measures to end hostilities in the Middle East, divided on the question of Hungary. The U. S. resolution [1004(ES-II)] condemning the use of Soviet forces and calling for their withdrawal was supported by seven Asian-African states, while thirteen abstained from voting.

During the resumption of the Eleventh Session in September, 1957, the thirty-seven-power resolution [1133(XI)] concerning the report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary was supported by eighteen members of the bloc; the abstentions dwindled to nine (Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen).

69 Western anxiety over its waning influence in the General Assembly has led to a reconsideration of ways of endowing this body with some of the controls possessed by the great powers in the Security Council. The British Foreign Office has been reported to be considering a “voting reform” in which a number of additional votes would be assigned to states in the General Assembly proportionate to their financial contribution to the United Nations’ budget, or possibly on a comparative basis of their gross national product. Hamilton, Thomas J., “U. N. Now in Disfavor in London and Paris”, New York Times, 07 14, 1957Google Scholar.

70 Keynes, Mary Knatchbull, “The Arab-Asian Bloc”, International Relations, I (10, 1956), 249Google Scholar.