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American Exceptionalism and Social Security: Complementary Cultural and Structural Contributions to Social Program Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Charles Lockhart
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Although scholars routinely agree that a relative absence of socialism marks one way in which the United States is exceptional, they have argued over why we are distinct in this way. As representatives of an enduring comparative public policy issue, two “camps” of analysts have offered broad, competing explanations resting on cultural and structural variables, respectively. This article implements a strategy for demonstrating: (1) specific cultural and structural independent variables are applied most appropriately to explain specific aspects of policy development, and (2) cultural and structural contributions are thus complementary rather than competing. I proceed by focusing on an exception to the “laggard” character of the American welfare state, the unusual success of the social security program. Dealing with the obverse of the usual “why-America-lags” concern provides a more observable dependent variable, enabling us to highlight the actual operation of distinct cultural and structural forces. I then show how this strategy can be applied to broader questions of American exceptionalism and public policy development.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , Summer 1991 , pp. 510 - 529
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1991

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References

1. I want to thank Peter Hall for stimulating my thoughts on this matter. I have also benefitted from comments Richard Ellis, Gregg Franzwa, Peter Hall, Ed Harpham, Hugh Heclo, Ira Katznelson, Dean Mann, and Theda Skocpol offered on previous drafts of this article. I am especially grateful to Gary Freeman in this regard. A 1989 NEH Summer Seminar on political cultures provided an opportunity for me to revise and refine the article. I am particularly grateful to Aaron Wildavsky, the seminar director, for both this experience and his subsequent support of my interest in cultural theory.

2. There is an immense literature on American exceptionalism. Seymour Lipset, Martin, “Why No Socialism in the United States?” in Radicalism in th Contemporary Age, ed. Bialer, Seweryn and Sluzar, Sophia, vol. I of Sources of Contemporary Radicalism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), pp. 31–149Google Scholar, provides a usefu overview and source of citations.Additionally, Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955)Google Scholar; Roelofs, H. Mark, Ideology and Myth in American Politics: A Critique of a National Political Mind (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976)Google Scholar; and Hofstadter, Richard, The America Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Knopf, 1967)Google Scholar focus on various cultural distinctions. Others focus on various structural peculiarities: Turner, Frederick Jackson, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1962)Google Scholar — a structural contingency; Katznelson, Ira, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google Scholar —societal structure; and Skowronek, Steven, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar —state structure.Further, scholars disagree as to whether there is more to exceptionalism than uniqueness (i.e., something exemplary). See, forexample, Bell, Daniel, “American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of Civil Society,” Public Interest 95 (Spring 1989): 38–56.Google Scholar

3. The term is Wilensky’s, Harold L.. See his The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).Google Scholar

4. The categories cultural and structural clearly interact, fade into one another, and thus overlap to some degree. Nonetheless, distinctions are possible. By cultural I refer in this article to persons' preferences with respect to varying patterns of social relations. The term structural denotes a broader, more motley set of factors. The most basic subdivision distinguishes structural contingencies (e.g., the Great Depression, demographic trends, etc.) and institutions and their interrelations (e.g., the electoral system, patterns of interaction among bureaucracies, etc.).

5. King, Anthony, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 3 (07 and 10 1973) 291–313 and 409–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. Huntington, Samuel P., American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar See also Roelofs, Ideology and Myth in American Politics; and Lipset, “Why No Socialism.”

7. Thompson, Michael, Ellis, Richard, and Wildavsky, Aaron, Cultural Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990)Google Scholar; Douglas, Mary, Cultural Bias (London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1978).Google Scholar

8. Aaron Wildavsky, “Resolved, That Individualism and Egalitarianism Be Made Compatible in America: Political Cultural Roots of American Exceptionalism” (Paper presented at a conference on American exceptionalism, Nuffield College, Oxford, April 1988).

9. I refer here particularly to orientations toward government. As the history of racism in America clearly reveals, hierarchy has influenced certain aspects of American life.

10. See Ellis, Richard J. and Wildavsky, Aaron, Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership From Washington to Lincoln: A Cultural Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1989)Google Scholar; and Richard Ellis, American Political Cultures, unpublished manuscript.

11. See Thompson, et al. , Cultural Theory, introduction and chaps. 1–2Google Scholar, for extensive working definitions of individualism, egalitarianism, and hierarchy. Briefly, individualists, following Locke and Smith, see humans as selfinterested, self-regulated and possessing roughly equal rational capacities. Accordingly they prefer a limited state that maximizes self-regulated accumulation. Egalitarians, following Rousseau and Marx, perceive humans as naturally good and fundamentally equal. Ideally, they wish to avoid both complex markets and state hierarchies that stratify people, thus perverting their naturally good nature. Hierarchists, following Plato and Burke, view people as naturally flawed and unequal. They thus favor reliance on pervasive institutions through which the soundest persons guide the development and improvement of those less able and refined. Further, the distinctions I make here between American individualists and egalitarians are similar to those J. David Greenstone makes between empiricist liberalism and substantive standards liberalism. See his superb “The Transient and the Permanent in American Politics: Standards, Interests, and the Concept of Public,” in Public Values and Private Power in American Politics, ed. Greenstone, J. David (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 3–33.Google Scholar Greenstone's concepts do not have the explanatory power of cultural theory behind them. Nonetheless, they evince a subtleness and flexibility that I wish my own terms emulated more fully.

12. Elsewhere egalitarians have successfully allied with hierarchists to form contemporary social democracies, but the evidence of the unique American example suggests that alliances with individualists are less supportive of these egalitarian preferences. See Vanneman, Reeve and Cannon, Lynn Weber, The American Perception of Class (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

13. Orloff, Ann Shola and Skocpol, Theda, “Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920,” American Sociological Review 49 (12 1984): 726–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Quadagno, Jill, The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).Google Scholar

14. Wilensky, Welfare State and Equality. This focus on structure has also been the predisposition of the later “policy sectors” approach. See Rose, Richard, “The Program Approach to the Growth of Government,” British Journal of Political Science 15 (01 1985): 1–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Katzenstein, Peter J., Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

15. See particularly, Lowi, Theodore J., “Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? A Federal Analysis,” in The Costs of Federalism, ed. Golembiewski, Robert T and Wildavsky, Aaron (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984): 37–54.Google Scholar But this orientation reveals itself early on in Lowi's work. See his “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics 16 (07 1964): 677–715CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and The Politics of Disorder (New York: Praeger, 1981)Google Scholar. See also Mcconnell, Grant, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf 1960)Google Scholar; and Schattschneider, E. E., Party Government (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1977).Google Scholar

16. Lipset, “Why No Socialism.”

17. I accept Lipset's point for purposes of this article. But as I have already indicated, I recognize that various senses of socialism are broader than and distinct in many ways from social policy, the welfare state, actions on the part of governments to organize markets generally, or even social democracy.

18. Rose, Richard, “How Exceptional Is American Political Economy,” Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 91–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. Skocpol, Theda, TCU Research Fund Lecture, 5 03 1986.Google Scholar

20. See Freeman, Gary, “National Styles and Policy Sectors: Explaining Structured Variation,” Journal of Public Policy 5 (1986): 467–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. See Patterson, James T., America's Struggle Against Poverty, 1900–1980 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

22. This point was developed first by Hugh Heclo in a comparative context. See his Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).Google ScholarKatz, Michael has since documented a similar pattern in the United States. See In the Shadow of the Poorhouse A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic, 1986).Google Scholar

23. See Lockhart, Charles, Gaining Ground: Tailoring Social Programs to American Values (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), chaps. 5 and 8.Google Scholar

24. See Freeman, Gary and Adams, Paul, “The Politics of Social Security Expansion, Retrenchment, and Rationalization,” in The Political Economy of Public Policy, ed. Stone, Alan and Harpham, Edward J. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), pp. 241–61Google Scholar; Harpham, Edward J., “Fiscal Crisis and the Politics of Social Security Reform,” in The Attack on the Welfare State, ed. Champagne, Anthony and Harpham, Edward J. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1984), pp. 9–35Google Scholar; and Light, Paul, Artful Work: The Politics ofSocial Security Reform (New York: Random House, 1985).Google Scholar

25. Program benefits were originally (1935) slated to begin in 1942. In 1939 the initiation date was moved up to 1940 but not in an effort to rush assistance to Depression-era elderly.

26. See Altmeyer, Arthur, The Formative Years of Social Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).Google Scholar As we shall see below social security's fit with individualism remains only partial. Also we cannot attribute social security's popularity entirely to its design features. Coughlin, Richard M., Ideology, Public Opinion, and Welfare Policy: Attitudes Toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980)Google Scholar, suggests that pensions for the elderly enjoy greater popularity than some other social programs across advanced industrial societies regardless of the specifics of their design features.

27. Although not its replacement rate or the proportion of selected former earnings that benefits replace.

28. Hochschild, Jennifer L., What's Fair? American Beliefs About Distributive Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

29. Lindblom, Charles E. makes a related point in “The Science of‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959): 83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. See Altmeyer, Formative Years.

31. These individual, contributory accounts are one factor distinguishing social security from unemployment insurance, an employer-based program that differs as well by serving a working-aged population.

32. See Ball, Robert M., “The American System of Social Security, “Journal of Commerce 20 (15 06 1964): 17.Google Scholar

33. See Altmeyer, Formative Years; Ball, “American System"; Brown, J. Douglas, “The American Philosophy of Social Insurance,” Social Service Review 30 (03 1956): 1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Douglas, Paul H., Social Security in the United States: An Analysis and Appraisal of the Federal Social Security Act (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936)Google Scholar; and Witte, Edwin E., The Development of the Social Security Act (Madison: University Wisconsin Press, 1962).Google Scholar

34. See Aberbach, Joel D., Putnam, Robert D., and Rockman, Bert A., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 122–24Google Scholar; Free, Lloyd A. and Cantril, Hadley, The Political Belief of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 15–40Google Scholar; and Light, Artful Work.

35. See the selections by Orloff, Ann Shola and also Amenta, Edwin and Skocpol, Theda in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, ed. Weir, Margaret, Orloff, Ann Shola, and Skocpol, Theda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

36. Heclo, , Modem Social Politics, pp. 301–22.Google Scholar

37. Katz, In the Shadow.

38. The only major exception to this generalization is that portion of the 1939 amendments dealing with the shift from a reserve to a pay-as-we-go system. The initiative for this change lay in the Congress. See Altmeyer, , Formative Years, pp 88–89Google Scholar; and Quadagno, Jill S., “Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935,” American Sociological Review 49 (10 1984): 632–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. Derthick, Martha, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1979), p. 50.Google Scholar

40. See Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic, 1973 chap. 16Google Scholar; Lowi, Theodore J., The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969)Google Scholar; and McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy.

41. In part this was the result of conscious though not very deep analysis. The commission that eventually examined poverty problems for President Johnson denied that aspects of the social insurance model — contributions, for instance — were relevant to programs directed at the victims of social disadvantage. See President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs [Heineman Commission], Poverty Amid Plenty: The American Paradox — Background Papers (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 165–66Google Scholar, for the Commission's view and Lockhart, Gaining Ground, chaps. 5 and 8, for its limitations. Additionally, the growth of need-based programs in the 1960s–1970s period represents the growing influence of political elites sympathetic to egalitarian concerns.

42. See Moynihan, Daniel P., The Politics of a Guaranteed Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973)Google Scholar; and Shapiro, Harvey D., “Welfare Reform Revisited: President Jimmy Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income,” in Welfare: The Elusive Consensus — Where We Are, How We Got There, and What's Ahead, ed. Salamon, Lester M. (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 173–218.Google Scholar

43. Anderson, Martin, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1978).Google Scholar

44. See Murray, Charles, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980 (New York: Basic, 1984).Google Scholar

45. Mead, Lawrence M., Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Free Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Glazer, Nathan, The Limits of Social Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

46. In the case of food stamps the peculiar coalition that provides the basis for the program may limit program executives in their initiatives. See Mary Weaver, “The Food Stamp Program: A Very Expensive Orphan,” in Champagne, and Harpham, , Attack on the Welfare State, pp. 111–29.Google Scholar

47. Cates, Jerry R., Insuring Inequality: Administrative Leadership in Social Security (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48. Although program executives were less than elated about this change, social security did acquire administrative responsibility for the limited aspects of the guaranteed income proposals that were realized, the federalization of public assistance for the elderly, blind, and disabled through Supplementary Security Income. But this step represented social security acquiring administrative responsibility for a need-based program rather than transforming public assistance by building particular social insurance elements into it.

49. In fact, while vertical redistribution has never been an explicit objective of social security, the program has had a much greater vertical redistributive effect than other, markedly smaller programs that have explicitly claimed this objective.

50. On the coalition compare with Coyle, Dennis and Wildavsky, Aaron, “Requisites of Radical Reform: Income Maintenance Versus Tax Preferences,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 7 (Fall 1987): 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the individualist an hierarchical reactions, respectively, see Murray, Losing Ground; and Mead, Beyond Entitlement or Glazer, Limits of Social Policy.

51. See Bawden, D. Lee, editor, The Social Contract Revisited: Aims and Outcomes of President Reagan’s Welfare Policy (Washington, D. C.: Urban Institute, 1984).Google ScholarEven social security suffered some loss of support from individualists during the 1980s. See Achenbaum, Andrew W., Social Security: Visions and Revisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Berkowtiz, Edward D., editor, Social Security After Fifty: Successes and Failures (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987)Google Scholar. Leonard, Herman B., Checks Unbalanced: The Quiet Side of Public Spending (New York: Basic, 1986)Google Scholar; and Weaver, Carolyn, The Crisis in Social Security: Economic and Political Origins (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

52. Freeman and Adams, “Politics of Social Security"; Harpham, “Fiscal Crisis"; and Light, Artful Work.

53. See Altmeyer, Formative Years; Ball, “American System”; Brown, “American Philosophy”; Douglas, Social Security; and Witte, Development of Social Security.

54. See Wildavsky, Aaron, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, “American Political Science Review 81 (03 1987): 3–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Elkins, David J. and Simeon, Richard E. B., “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” Comparative Politics 11 (01 1979): 127–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55. Altmeyer, Formative Years; Ball, “American System”; Brown, “America Philosophy”; Douglas, Social Security; and Witte, Development of Social Security.

56. See Mead, Beyond Entitlement; and Glazer, Limits of Social Policy for the hierarchical view; and Murray, Losing Ground for the individualistic perspective

57. Compare with Turner, , The Frontier in American History, pp. 1–38Google Scholar, especially 37–38.

58. Compare with Elkins and Simeon, “What Does Political Culture Explain?”