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1848: Theory and Practice of the German juste milieu
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
As everyone knows, the failure of the German revolution of 1848 was the loss of a great opportunity.* If the revolution had succeeded, German unification might have been consummated on a popular basis, rather than through Bismarckian authoritarianism. The result could have been a German nation-state more closely in step with the liberal-democratic age that was dawning in western Europe. Subsequent German and European history might then have been much happier than it actually turned out to be. For, by thwarting liberalism and delaying democracy, the collapse of this revolution helped to make Germany the European problem child she has been in this century.
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- Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1973
References
* This article was originally delivered at the Duquesne History Forum (1971).
1 Meinecke saw 1848 as one of three such lost opportunities: “The Year 1848 in German History: Reflections on a Centenary,” The Review of Politics, X (1948), 475–76Google Scholar. The others occurred in 1819 and 1866.
2 The belligerent nationalism of the German '48ers is most strongly emphasized in SirNamier, Lewis, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals (first published by Oxford University Press, 1946).Google Scholar
3 See, for example, Hamerow, Theodore, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany 1815–1871 (Princeton, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Noyes, Paul, Organization and Revolution: Working-Class, Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849 (Princeton, 1966).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 “Crypto-absolutism” is a term used by Huber, Ernst Rudolf, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (4 Vols.; Duesseldorf, 1957–1970), III, 3Google Scholar, ascribing it to the “democratic opponents” of German constitutionalism. The strong contrast between what would have been in 1848 and what actually came about in 1871 is assumed by nearly everyone. For a sample, see the following: Heffter, Heinrich, Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 467Google Scholar; Holborn, Hajo, A History of Modern Germany (3 Vols.; New York, 1959–1969), III, 114Google Scholar; and Medlicott, W. N., Bismarck and Modern Germany (New York, 1965), pp. 71–72.Google Scholar
5 Section II, “Die Reichsgewalt,” contains 61 paragraphs.
6 Paragraphs 75 and 77.
7 Paragraphs 77 and 102–5. The unclear phrase in the latter Paragraph (“sowie ueberhaupt voelkerrechtliche Vertraege insofern sie das Reich belasten”) was stuck in by Beseler “salve redactione” after much fruitless discussion in the constitutional committee without explanation or clarification: see Huebner, Rudolf, ed., Aktenstuecke und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung aus dem Nachlass von Johann Gustav Droysen (Osnabrueck, 1967Google Scholar: “Neudruck der Ausgabe 1924”), p. 181. But the Paragraph was clearly understood to exclude most treaties, and the plenum even exempted postal treaties: see Wigard, Franz, ed., Stenographische Berichte ueber die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main (9 Vols.; Frankfurt, 1848–1849), VIII, 6034.Google Scholar
8 Paragraph 83.
9 Paragraph 103.
10 Paragraph 102–1.
11 Paragraphs 73, 74, 126–i and 192 all refer to the right to impeach ministers, as will be explained below.
12 According to Paragraph 197, in cases of war or riot the Reich government could suspend the fundamental rights concerning arrest, search and assembly; but it had to secure parliamentary approval “immediately” if the parliament was in session, or else within 14 days if it was not in session.
13 Huber, , Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, II, 839Google Scholar, compares this to the famous Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.
14 Paragraph 101.
15 Paragraphs 104, 106 and 108.
16 See the minutes of the constitutional committee: Huebner, , ed., Aktenstuecke und Aufzeichnungen, pp. 179, 251, 535, 784Google Scholar; also, the plenum debates: Wigard, , Stenographische Berichte, VI, 4120, VIII, 6030–33Google Scholar; and, on the attitudes of liberal leaders, Bammel, Ernst, “Der Pakt Simon-Gagern und der Abschluss der Paulskirchen-Verfassung,” in Herrmann, Alfred, ed., Aus Geschichte und Politik; Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ludwig Bergstraesser (Duesseldorf, 1954), pp. 68, 85.Google Scholar
17 Quoting Carr, William, A History of Germany 1815–1945 (New York, 1969), p. 58Google Scholar. Similar statements can be found in many places: for instance, Craig, Gordon, Europe Since 1815 (New York, 1961), p. 139Google Scholar and Loewenberg, Gerhard, Parliament in the German Political System, (Ithaca, 1967), p. 5Google Scholar. For a more general discussion see Pflanze, Otto, “Juridical and Political Re sponsibility in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in Krieger, Leonard and Stern, Fritz, eds., The Responsibility of Power (Garden City, 1967), pp. 162–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 Two examples may suffice: first, the proposal made by Robert Blum and Wilhelm von Truetzschler for the provisional central power established in June 1848 (rejected by the committee appointed to examine such proposals by a majority of 13 to 2: Wigard, , Stenographische Berichte, I, 357, 359)Google Scholar; second, the bill entitled “Provisorisches Gesetz ueber die Verantwortlichkeit der Minister” introduced by the democrat Wedekind on 18 May, 1849, which was never brought to a vote (ibid., IX, 6638–39, especially articles 13 and 14).
19 On the genesis of this idea see Huber, , Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, I, 102–05, 145–59 and II, 477–830Google Scholar; and Frauendienst, Werner, “Das preussische Staatsministerium in vorkonstitutioneller Zeit,” Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, CXVI (1960), 104–77.Google Scholar
20 Paragraph 126–i.
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22 Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States.
23 Paragraphs 88, 89 and 90.
24 Paragraph 100—though that did not apply to the power of the purse, which belonged to the lower chamber (Paragraph 103).
25 Though it was exercised not by the Emperor alone but by the Bundesrat: see Articles 7 and 17 of the constitution of 1871.
26 The second sentence of Article 17 is the so-called Lex Bennigsen, which provides for the “Gegenzeichnung des Reichskanzlers, welcher dadurch die Verantwortlichkeit uebernimmt.” But there is no provision for impeachment or trial.
27 Article 6.
28 Parliamentary control over the budget, for instance, was more explicit in the constitution of 1848 (Paragraphs 102–2 and 103) than in that of 1871 (Articles 67–73); the earlier document gave the legislature the right to conduct its own investigations (Paragraph 99), a right denied it in the Bismarckian constitution; the Reichstag deputies of 1848 were to be paid (Paragraph 95), those of 1871 were not.
29 See Starzinger, Vincent, Middlingness (Charlottesville, 1965).Google Scholar
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31 Staatslexikon, article “Constitution,” III, 760.Google Scholar
32 The Casino Party was commonly called Right Center, the Wuerttemberger Hof Left Center. The Landsberg and the Augsburger Hof were splinters from these two original center groups.
33 In September of 1848 the center groups together numbered 245 deputies, a clear majority of the 434 whose party membership can be ascertained: see table in Eyck, Frank, The Frankfurt Parliament 1848–1849 (London, 1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
34 That is, 23 of the 30-member committee, whose members are listed in Wigard, , Stenographische Berichte, I, 88Google Scholar. The party affiliation of the deputies is given in Schwarz, Max, MdR: Biographisches Handbuch der deutschen Reichstage (Hannover, 1965).Google Scholar
35 At that time Eisenstuck, a member of the Deutscher Hof, was chosen second vice president.
36 To be exact: six of the fourteen men who held ministerial posts in 1848–49 were not assembly deputies; but of the remaining eight five belonged to the Right Center, one to the Left Center, and only two to the Right. Of the eight state secretaries, six were members of the Right Center and two belonged to the Left Center.
37 So argues Huber, , Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, II, 628ff.Google Scholar
38 The assembly did pass one vote of no confidence very late in the game, on May 17, 1849. It condemned the Graevell ministry for its counterrevolutionary behavior. And Graevell did, in fact, resign a few days later. But he was replaced by the even more reactionary Wittgenstein, which is hardly a demonstration of the power of parliament over the executive. It proves the opposite, if anything. The debate over the various formulations of this no-confidence vote is instructive. It shows the reluctance of the majority to challenge the ministry even in this extreme situation. See Wigard, , Stenographische Berichte, IX, 6618–31.Google Scholar