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Why discourse matters only sometimes: effective arguing beyond the nation-state

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2010

DIANA PANKE
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Abstract

Pre- and post-agreement discourses are an integral part of international relations. Yet, they only matter sometimes as an empirical analysis of European judicial discourses shows. State of the art Habermasisan and social psychology approaches on effective arguing cannot sufficiently explain variation in the success of discourses. This requires a fine-grained perspective: Only if actors share yardsticks fitting to the issue at stake, they can commonly assess the quality of arguments and incrementally develop a consensus. If such issue-specific reference standards are absent, actors talk at cross-purposes and dissent prevails. The article empirically illustrates the importance of intersubjective validity for the effectiveness of discourses and tests its central claim against alternative constructivist and rationalist explanations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 145 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

1 For example, N. Deitelhoff and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), pp. 167–79; T. Risse, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area’, Politics and Society, 27 (1999), pp. 529–59.

2 For example, N. Deitelhoff and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise’, pp. 167–79.; R. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1993).; T. Risse, ‘“Let's Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 54 (2000), pp. 1–39. J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organization, 55 (2001), pp. 553–88. H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that. Reflections on the Relationship of Communicative Action and Rationalist Theory in Analysing International Negotiations’, European Journal of International Relations, 10 (2004), pp. 395–435.

3 N. Deitelhoff and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise’, pp. 167–79.

4 K. Raustiala and A. M. Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 538–58.

5 J. M. Smith, ‘The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts’, International Organization, 54 (2000), pp. 137–80.

6 M. Zürn and C. Joerges (eds), Law and Governance in Postnational Europe. Compliance Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

7 M. Mendrinou, ‘Non-Compliance and the European Commission's Role in Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3 (1996), pp. 1–22.

8 J. Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’, International Organization, 56 (2002), pp. 609–43.

9 F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, Modern Law Review, 56 (1993), pp. 19–54.

10 The data stem from the Commission's annual reports on the implementation of EU law (c.f. {http://europa.eu/generalreport/en/rgset.htm} chapters XXIII). It encompasses all infringement cases for the EU-12 member states that have been opened after 1978, have reached the ECJ and have been terminated before 31 January 2000. The total number of ECJ cases is 2343, of which 1092 have been withdrawn before a Court judgment. The duration of non-compliance is measured by the days between the ECJ judgment and the termination of the case. The European Commission is responsible for the latter and bases its decision on its assessment of compliance with the judgment.

11 C.f. ECJ rules of procedure Art 40, interview former member of the ECJ, June 2005, interview European Commission, October 2005; N. G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986). R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). Interview European Commission, October 2005, interview former member of the ECJ, June 2005; C. Gulmann, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Court of Justice’, Scandinavian Studies in Law (1980), pp. 187–204.

12 L. J. Conant, Justice Contained. Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

13 Although there is no empirical evidence for such informal bargaining in publicly accessible materials (protocols of European Advocate Generals, ECJ judgments), this alternative explanation is tested in part V.

14 In this mode of action, actors are consciously motivated to become persuaded by good arguments J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1 Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995); H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that’ p. 402ff.; H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that’, p. 402ff.

15 J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Deitelhoff and H. Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise’ p 167ff.

16 These approaches assume that contextual variables accelerate the quantity of argumentative speech acts, which automatically translates into persuasion so that arguing is effective, once it takes place. (T. Risse, ‘Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und die Theorie Internationaler Beziehungen – Warum empirisch nichts so heiß gegessen wird, wie es theoretisch gekocht wurde’, in G. Hellmann, K. D. Wolf and M. Zürn (eds), Forschungsstand und Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland (2002), pp. 1–26).

17 There is one important exception: The ECJ can issue financial penalties since 1993 (Art. 228 ECT) if states fail to comply with its first judgment.

18 J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply?’, p. 553ff.

19 Ibid., pp. 562–3.

20 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1’, p. 45.

21 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns.Band 1’, p. 26–7, 114ff.

22 J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992).

23 H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice.

24 R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 33–50.

25 J. Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1, pp. 412–39.

26 An example for a mismatch would be a narrow interpretational method applied to a complex problem. Interpreting different articles or paragraphs with the wording method can lead to completely different interpretations of the whole norm. Yet, the wording technique of interpretation cannot solve the problem of which article or paragraph (and their associated interpretations) should be given priority.

27 Interview ministry of finance, October 2004.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 T. A. Börzel, Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union. Why There is (Not) a Southern Problem (London: Ashgate, 2003); C. Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

31 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005, interview Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft, March 2005.

32 In 1990 alone, the government spent 34,300,000 DM on the improvement of drinking water quality in the new Länder (Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 05.12.1991’: 5465).

33 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992. European Commission Against the Federal Republic of Germany Regarding the Incomplete Legal Transposition of Directive 80/778; C-237–90’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992 (1992), pp. I-05973; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs on 12 February 1992. Incorrect Legal Transpotision of Directive 80/778 by the Federal Republic of Germany; C-237/90’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1992 (1992), pp. I-05973.

34 Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005.

35 Federal Ministry for Health, ‘Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zu Trinkwasser, 09.07.1992’.

36 The empirical analysis rests on a broad range of material including interviews, protocols of the ECJ case, parliamentary speeches, newspaper articles and texts of relevant legal norms. ECJ cases are often politically sensitive and issues can be classified. Accordingly, some interviewees hesitated to give detailed information on micro processes of persuasion and adaptations. Therefore, much of the evidence for policy adaptations and underlying justifications is based on primary sources rather than interviews.

37 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’. p. 24.

38 ‘The German Government goes on to argue that the directive does not require the incorporation in domestic legislation of the obligation of notification laid down by Article 9(1) and Article 10(3) of the directive on the ground that that obligation ensues directly from the directive. The obligation for the Länder to notify the Federal Government is not imposed by the directive […]’. (European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’: 25).

39 Interview ministry of health, October 2005; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Umweltrecht ist noch nicht Umweltschutz. Der Ministerialbürokratie fehlen Überwachungs- und Kontrollmöglichkeiten’, February 28, 1992; European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’:p. 25.

40 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 25: (‘The obligation for the Laender to notify the Federal Government is not imposed by the directive and would, in any event, be otiose in that it already ensues from the principle of loyalty towards the Federation (Grundsatz des bundesfreundlichen Verhaltens).’).

41 Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005; European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 23.

42 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 23.

43 Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’, p. 16.

44 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 29.

45 Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’; p. 16. European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 23.

46 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, pp. 1–2, 29. Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’; p. 16; Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005.

47 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 19.04.1991. Anfrage zu Wasserversorgungsanlagen in den neuen Bundesländern’, p. 396.

48 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005.

49 Sozialdemokratische Partei, ‘Antrag zur Sanierung der Trinkwasserversorgung in den neuen Bundesländern, 06.11.1991’.

50 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll 12/64 vom 05.12.1991’, pp. 5455–468.

51 Ibid.

52 Sozialdemokratische Partei, ‘Antrag zur Sanierung der Trinkwasserversorgung in den neuen Bundesländern, 06.11.1991’.

53 For reasons of space, this article focuses on the communicational requirements. The other issue (‘states of emergency’ as precondition for exceptions) was solved early in the judicial discourse. The advocates shared the narrow wording method that fitted the low complexity of the problem at stage from early on and Germany quickly shifted into compliance. C.f. Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’. p. 11.

54 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 31.

55 Interview Bundesverband der deutschen Gas-und Wasserwirtschaft, March 2005.

56 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment’. p. 4–5.

57 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’.

58 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005.

59 Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’, p. 18.

60 Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’, p. 18. Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005.

61 Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’. p. 18.

62 Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005, Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’. p. 19.

63 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 28, Interview ministry of health, October 2005.

64 Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’, p. 20.

65 Interview Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft, March 2005, Interview ministry of health, October 2005.

66 The ECJ also followed this line of argumentation and ruled in its judgment on November 1992 that the DWD required complete reports of all granted exceptions (European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment’, pp. 29, 31). The ECJ usually issues judgments, if legal changes are not completed during ongoing judicial discourses. Thus, Court judgments do not necessarily indicate that preceding judicial discourses failed.

67 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’.

68 Interview former member of the European Commission, March 2005.

69 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005, European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 25; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General, 12 February 1992’, pp. 17, 19.

70 The ministry could have relied on the (broader) systematic argument that the federal loyalty principle precludes the legalisation of any explicit information rules (as argued in the early stage of the discourse), in order to defend its initial position. But this argument would not have exactly addressed the issue at stake, would not have been compatible with the professional opinions of the advocates, and would hardly have been accepted by the European enforcement authorities. Hence, after the judicial discourse produced an interpretation that was intersubjectively valid among the advocates of the parties, it would have been irrational (since most likely unsuccessful) and inappropriate of the German government to use a deviating argument any longer.

71 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 24.11.1992’, pp. 12/5968.

72 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 24.11.1992’, pp. 12/5968; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 22.04.1993’, pp. 13027–48. ‘[…] for ecological reasons and reasons of health protection and health care the government puts strong emphasis on the modernization of drinking water facilities […]’ (own translation) Bundesregierung, ‘Antwort Bundesregierung; BMG (federführend) 18.01.1993. Wasserversorgung; Trinkwasser; Abwasser’, 12/4143, p. 10.

73 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 21.09.1994’, pp. 21641–57. Interview ministry of the environment, September 2005.

74 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005, Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 22.04.1993’, pp. 13027–48.

75 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 19.08.1988’, p. 2799; Bundesregierung, ‘Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Frau Kiehm und der Fraktion der SPD – Schadstoffbelastung Wasser’, 11/2285 (1988).

76 Gesundheitsministerium, ‘Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zu Trinkwasser, 09.07.1992’.

77 In addition, the government invested 11,000,000 DM in laboratories of water providers and other institutes, in order to enable them to comprehensively check the quality of drinking water (Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 5.02.1992’, p. 55; Bundestag, ‘Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für Gesundheit' 07.12.1992’, p. 4).

78 The comprehensive and quick legal adaptation is remarkable. The DWP draft required the approval of the Bundesrat, because implementation issues as competencies of the Länder were at stake. However, especially CDU governed Länder opposed comprehensive reporting requirements (Bayern, ‘Antrag 24.09.1992’; Bundesrat, ‘Plenarprotokoll 25.09.1992’). Even the Bundesrat’s Committee for Health proposed scope restrictions to the informational requirements in the governmental draft DWP (Bundesratsausschuss für Gesundheit, ‘Empfehlungen zur Allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschrift über Trinkwasser, 14.09.1992’, p. 2, Bundesrat, ‘Plenarprotokoll 25.09.1992’, p. 487). The Kohl-government managed to pass the DWP against this scepticism and prescribed communicational requirements for deviations from all parameters for geogen and for meteorological reasons. The DWP ensured the comprehensive collection of information on exceptions and derogations from local authorities to the federal ministry for health. It did not encompass windows of opportunities for future less demanding norm interpretations; did not entail unspecified or ambiguous new concepts and did not create overlaps with other bodies of law, but resembled a demanding form of compliance. (Bundesgesundheitsministerium, ‘Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zu Trinkwasser, 09.07.1992’, pp. 1, 6).

79 Bundesregierung, ‘Antwort Bundesregierung; 18.01.1993’, 12/4143; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 22.04.1993’, pp. 13027–48.

80 Estimations went up to 100,000,000,000 DM for the instauration of the water supply and the sewerage disposal in the new Länder (Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 16.01.1992’, p. 5971).

81 Interview ministry of the environment, September 2005; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 05.12.1991’, pp. 5455–68; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 14.01.1993’.

82 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005.

83 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005.

84 Even after the European Commission had closed the case, the government did not shift back towards a less demanding and less costly form of compliance, but maintained its new policies (Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 04.03.1993’, pp. 12355C-21360D., Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 20.01.1994’, pp. 17766–96.).

85 X. Dai, ‘Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism’, International Organization, 59 (2005), pp. 363–98; A. Börzel, Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union. Why There is (Not) a Southern Problem (London: Ashgate, 2003).

86 Bundesregierung, ‘Antwort Bundesregierung; BMG (federführend) 18.01.1993.’ Wasserversorgung; Trinkwasser; Abwasser’, 12/4143; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 14.01.1993’, pp. 12, 131.

87 Interview Greenpeace, June 2005.

88 Green Party, ‘Motion for a Resolution on Drinking Water’, 27 September 1989, p. 2.

89 Interview ministry of the environment, September 2005; T. Börzel, Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union’.

90 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General’.

91 According to the directive-immanent teleological line of reasoning, communicational requirements had to be legally prescribed. Otherwise, the Commission could not fulfill its monitoring function; European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 28; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General’, pp. 17ff.

92 Hence, Germany argued that its drinking water legislation sufficiently ensured reports on derogations to the central state, rendering an explicit legal act irrelevant; European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’, p. 25.

93 J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply?’, p. 563.

94 R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik and A. M. Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational’, International Organization, 54 (2000), pp. 457–88.

95 G. W. Downs, ‘Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 19 (1998), pp. 319–44.

96 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft wirft Bundesregierung Untaetigkeit vor’, 30 November 1992.

97 Bundesregierung, ‘Unterrichtung der Bundesregierung 06.09.1994. Politik für eine nachhaltige, umweltgerechte Entwicklung’, pp. 849–91; interview ministry of the environment, September 2005.

98 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 16.01.1992’ pp. 5967–71; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 5.02.1992’, p 55.

99 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005, interview Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft, March 2005.

100 Interview former member of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, May 2005.

101 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 16.01.1992’, pp. 5967–71; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 5.02.1992’, p. 55; Bundesratsausschuss für Gesundheit, ‘Empfehlungen zur Allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschrift über Trinkwasser, 14.09.1992’, p. 484/1, Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 22.04.1993’, pp. 13027–48, interview ministry of the environment, September 2005.

102 J. Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance’, pp. 609–43.

103 Interviews former members of the ECJ, June and October 2005; N. G. Onuf, World of Our Making; H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice; R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation.

104 M. L. Busch and E. Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law’, pp. 1–19.

105 M. A. Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’, International Organization, 51 (1997), pp. 99–134.

106 European Court of Justice, ‘Court Judgment of 24 November 1992’; Advocate General, ‘Opinion of the Advocate General’.

107 Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 16.01.1992’, pp. 5967–71; Bundestag, ‘Plenarprotokoll vom 5.02.1992, p. 55.

108 Interview Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft, March 2005, interview ministry for the environment, October 2004.

109 Moreover, the institutional logic of judicial discourses should theoretically prevent strategic rational governments from posing restrictions on their advocates. The only change to pursue national interests at least partially before the ECJ is to convince the European advocate and the ECJ judges of the superiority of the state’s norm interpretation. Merely repeating one and the same argument, regardless of the arguments of the other party, or sticking to a judicial method which does not fit to the interpretational problem will neither convince other advocates nor the ECJ judges. In order to be persuasive, it is essential to engage in judicial argumentation and to flexibly react to the arguments of others. Hence, if governments restrict the freedom of maneuver of their advocates, they risk to be unpersuasive and to end up with suboptimal outcomes.

110 Jönsson and J. Tallberg, ‘Compliance in Post-Agreement Bargaining’, European Journal of International Relations, 4 (1998), pp. 371–408; N. Deitelhoff, Überzeugung in der Politik. Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie internationalen Regierens (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006); J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998).

111 H. Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that. Reflections on the Relationship of Communicative Action and Rationalist Theory in Analysing International Negotiations’, European Journal of International Relations, 10 (2004), pp. 395–435.