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Two views of Germany: Nevile Henderson vs. Vansittart and the Foreign Office, 1937–1939

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Aaron L. Goldman
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Extract

On April 30, 1937 Sir Nevile Henderson arrived in Berlin and assumed charge of the British Embassy as His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. There appeared to be nothing unusual about the appointment which seemed on the surface to reflect the new more active attempts to approach the leaders of the Third Reich by Neville Chamberlain who knew that he would shortly become Prime Minister. What was unusual about the choice was the fact it was made by Sir Robert Vansittart, then Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office and approved by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Both men soon regretted the grave decision and Vansittart, as if to try to rectify his error, spent an enormous amount of energy during the next two and a Jialf years severely critizing Henderson's recommendations, evaluations and actions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , October 1980 , pp. 247 - 277
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1980

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References

page 247 note 1 There is however no foundation for the belief that Chamberlain chose Henderson as an instrument of appeasement, nor in fact is there any indication that he played a role in Henderson's selection at all. Chamberlain took office in June 1937, when Stanley Baldwin retired. Taylor, A. J. P., Origins of the Second World War (New York, 1961), p. 153.Google Scholar

page 247 note 2 Eden, Anthony, Earl of Avon. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Facing the Dictators (Boston, 1962), p. 570.Google Scholar

page 247 note 3 Colvin, Ian, None So Blind; A British Diplomatic View of the Origins of World War II (New York, 1965), p. 146.Google Scholar

page 248 note 1 D. G. Watt, ‘Sir Nevile Henderson Reappraised’, Contemporary Review (March 1962). Watt believes that Vansittart overvalued “personal relations at the top” implying the Permanent Undersecretary felt that somehow Henderson might be able to establish some kind of rapport with the Nazis.

page 248 note 2 Colvin, op. cit. p. 146. The other two candidates were Sir Percy Lorraine, Minister at Ankara and Sir Miles Lampson, Minister in Cairo. Watt suggested that the very able Ralph Wigram, head of the Central Department at the Foreign Office was the obvious choice but he died of overwork in 1936. Watt op. cit. It has also been suggested that Vansittart favoured a political appointee who would deal directly with the Prime Minister and avoid the Foreign Office. Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard, The Appeasers (New York, 1963), p. 62Google Scholar. This not explain why he did not choose one of the other able career diplomats who were being considered. In any case, even if this was his motivation it backfired completely because Henderson did circumvent the Foreign Office to deal directly with the Prime Minister and others presenting ideas and attitudes that were unpalatable to Vansittart.

page 248 note 3 Taylor, op. cit. p. 153. Vansittart and Henderson had been on good terms for many years and they corresponded quite a bit when Henderson was Minister to Yugoslavia. In February 1935, Vansittart referred to himself as “an old fridhd, as an admirer and as a sharer of many of your views”. FO800/268 Henderson Papers, 13 February 1935. In 1936, at a time when the Permanent Undersecretary had been severely criticized for his role i n the Hoare-Laval affair, Henderson came to his support giving him his sympathy in a “possibly impossible and ungrateful task”. It is likely that Vansittart remembered this when the time came for promotions. FO800/268, Henderson Papers, 29 January 1936.

page 249 note 1 Henderson, Nevile, Water Under the Bridges (London, 1945), pp. 23Google Scholar, 111–112, 171, 186–187, Dictionary of National Biography, 1941–1950 (Oxford, 1959), p. 377.

page 249 note 2 Cowling, Maurice, The Impact of Hitler; British Politics and British Policy 1933–40 (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 158–159CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement 1930—1937 (London, 1969), pp. 9Google Scholar, 19, 27, Colvin, op. cit. pp. 50–51, 103, 119.

page 250 note 1 Northedge, F. S., The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers, 1916–1939 (London, 1966), pp. 447Google Scholar, 481–482.

page 251 note 1 Sir Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937–1939 (New York, 1940), pp. 6–8.Google Scholar

page 251 note 2 Watt, op. cit. p. 152.

page 251 note 3 Gilbert and Gott, op. cit. p. 62.

page 251 note 4 The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937–40 (London, 1970), 23 April 1937, p. 41.Google Scholar

page 251 note 5 Henderson, Water under the Bridges, p. 209.

page 252 note 1 Ibid. pp. 212—213.

page 252 note 2 C5316/270/18 in FO 371/20736, Memorandum on British Policy towards Germany, Sir N. Henderson, 10 May, 1937.

page 253 note 1 Ibid. Minutes, 30 July, 1937.

page 253 note 2 Ibid. Note on Sir N. Henderson's Memorandum of 10 May, 1937, 13 October, 1937.

page 253 note 3 Ibid. The Times, 2 June, 1937.

page 254 note 1 Britain, Great, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 324, 7 June 1937Google Scholar, Col. I937–9B, 9 June, 1937, Col. 1737.

page 254 note 2 C4124/270/18 in FO 371/20735, 9 Jwie, 1937.

page 254 note 3 The Times, 29 April 1938.

page 254 note 4 Kirkpatrick, Ivone, The Inner Circle, Memoirs of Ivone Kirkpatrick (London, 1959), p. 91.Google Scholar

page 254 note 5 Dilks, David (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (New York, 1972), p. 43Google Scholar. According to Ian Colvin, Henderson's staff complained that he bullied subordinates and was unpopular in Argentina,, op. cit. p. 210.

page 255 note 1 Henderson told United States Ambassador William Dodd that Britain should agree to German expansion in the Danube-Balkan region. He wrote Maxwell Garnett of the League of Nations Union and disagreed with a pamphlet he had written. Henderson insisted Germany did not want to destroy the League or occupy channel ports and asserted that until she was united Europe would not be quiet. He also made remarks to the Austrian Minister in Berlin about the future of Austria which were not taken kindly in Vienna. C5541/270/18 in FO 371/20711, Dodd letter to Phipps, 1 July 1937, and C5377/270/18 in FO 371/20736. Henderson letter to M. Garnett of the League of Nations Union, 14 July 1937, and C5541/3/18 in FO 371/20711, Minutes by Strang and Vansittart, 1 July 1937.

page 255 note 2 Ibid. Minute by Vansittart, 1 July 1937.

page 255 note 3 Ibid. Letter by Vansittart to Eden, 12 August 1937. The Foreign Office letter to Henderson warned him against being “imprudent” and expressing controversial views in writing. His “injudicious remarks” exposed the government to “grave inconvenience”, strayed “beyond the duties of his office”, and showed disregard for his responsibilities. The Ambassador was warned that it was dangerous with the current unstable conditions in Europe for him to use language “which might give the impression” that the British government's policy was “halfhearted or uncertain”. Instead of signing the letter and sending it Eden decided to ask Henderson to come to London for a talk in September. Ibid, draft of letter from Eden to Henderson written by the Foreign Office, August, 1937. No record of that talk exists but it can be assumed that Eden made use of the letter to provide guidelines for expressing his apprehension over the Ambassador's practice of speaking indiscreetly.

page 256 note 1 Eden op. cit. p. 577.

page 256 note 2 Ibid. pp. 581—582.

page 256 note 3 The Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax, The Life of Lord Halifax (Boston, 1966), pp. 366–367.Google Scholar

page 256 note 4 Henderson, Failure of a Mission op. cit. op. 97.

page 257 note 1 Birkenhead, Halifax, op. cit. pp. 367–370, Eden, op. cit. pp. 584–585. Hitler had also suggested that if Britain wanted to improve relations she could do so by satisfying German colonial claims.

page 257 note 2 Ibid. p. 585.

page 257 note 3 R7812/188/12 in FO 271/21132, Minutes by Sir R. Vansittart, 9 December 1937. Once again a letter was composed at the Foreign Office for Eden to sign, asserting that Henderson had expressed views akin to those held by the German government. The Ambassador was requested once more to be prudent and cautious in his remarks, “a prime requisite of our diplomacy in these dangerous days”. This letter too was not sent as Halifax preferred to talk personally to Henderson when the latter came to London in late December. Ibid. Draft of letter to Henderson, December 1937.

page 257 note 4 C951/951/18 in FO 371/21706, 7 February 1938.

page 258 note 1 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 21 February 1939, p. 152.

page 258 note 2 Gilbert, Felix, ‘Henderson and Perth’ in Craig, Gordon and Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, ii (New York, 1953), p. 548Google Scholar. Because of his reputation for careless talk and his well known views on Germany Henderson became the target of fervent anti-appeasers who sometimes published questionable information about him. In one case the News Department at the Foreign Office successfully convinced the News Chronicle of London not to published personal attack by Vernon Bartlett on Henderson. It alleged that he had urged Dodd to persuade Washington to grant a large American loan to Hitler and told the Austrian Minister in Berlin to accept anschluss with Germany because it was inevitable. C5139/1495/18 in FO 371/20747, 9 July 1937. In another case the small but influential London news-sheet The Week spoke of a plan the Ambassador had to get Yugoslavia to withdraw from the Little Entente thereby isolating Czechoslovakia. It also charged that Sir Nevile was attempting to have Ribbentrop replaced as German Ambassador in London by Ulrich von Hassel who would be more effective in influencing British policy since Ribbentrop's efforts to do this had failed. The Ambassador denied the story and called it “The Week's fiction”. N2177/382/15, N1317/382/15, N2860/382/15, 3 May 1938. An article in the American magazine Newsweek a few months later asserted that Henderson had told foreign correspondents that Germany had the right to annex Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia. C13709/135/18 in FO 371/21676, 11 November 1938.

page 258 note 3 Craig and Gilbert, op. cit. p. 543.

page 258 note 4 Colvin, op. cit. pp. 203–204.

page 258 note 5 C1502/42/18, 4 March 1938.

page 258 note 6 Middlemas, Keith, The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany I937S9 (New York, 1972), pp. 271, 277.Google Scholar

page 259 note 1 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 24 February 1939, pp. 151–152.

page 259 note 2 C1657/42/18, 5 March 1938.

page 259 note 3 Kirkpatrick, op. cit. pp. 90–91. The Prime Minister wrote a letter to Henderson in February 1939, expressing such an optimistic view of the future that Halifax who was shown the letter felt compelled to write his own letter to Sir Nevile which suggested Chamberlain had been too sanguine. DBFP, Third Series, Vol. IV. Mr. Chamberlain to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin), 19 February 1939, p. 592.

page 259 note 4 Watt, op. cit.

page 259 note 5 Colvin, Ian, The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York, 1971), p. 92.Google Scholar

page 260 note 1 Eden, op. cit. p. 578. In February 1939, Chamberlain expressed his disagreement with the “pessimists” at the Foreign Office to American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy. Henderson's positive prognostications suited him much better. Aster, Sidney, 1939: The Making of the Second World War (New York, 1973), P. 56.Google Scholar

page 260 note 2 Cowling, op. cit. p. 283.

page 260 note 3 Colvin, Chamberlain Cabinet, p. 89.

page 260 note 4 Ibid. pp. 90–91.

page 260 note 5 C1237/42/18 in FO 371/21655, 19 February 1938. Henderson letter to Cadogan.

page 260 note 6 Colvin, None So Blind, op. cit. p. 195.

page 260 note 7 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 22 April 1938, p. 70.

page 260 note 8 Ibid. 16 February 1938, pp. 47–48. Vansittart's penchant for writing extensive and sometimes dramatic minutes in many different subjects became burdensome to both Cadogan and Halifax. As Cadogan told his diary: “Van is becoming tiresome…developing the technique of writing minutes on every paper he can lay his hands on and thus trying to become a super Permanent Undersecretary”. He would have to make a remonstrance to Halifax about it. “Why will Van be such an ass?” As Cadogan described it Vansittart sent minutes to Halifax “snarling at some of Nevile H's telegrams”. The Foreign Secretary then handed them “gloomily” to the Permanent Undersecretary who kept them two or three days and returned them saying, “I'm very stupid: I can't remember what you told me to do about this”. Halifax then sadly replied, “I think perhaps we might burn it now”. Ibid. 9 April 1938, 2 April 1938, p. 67.

page 261 note 1 Colvin, Chamberlain Cabinet, p. 102.

page 261 note 2 R2389/137/3 in FO 371/22314, 12 March 1938.

page 261 note 3 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, Henderson letter to Halifax, 13 April 1938, pp. 624–625.

page 261 note 4 C2777/1941/18, Henderson letter to Halifax, 1 April, 1938.

page 262 note 1 Ibid. Minutes by Sargent, Strang and Vansittart.

page 262 note 2 Oliver Harvey Diaries, op. cit. 22 April 1938, p. 129.

page 262 note 3 Eden, op. dit. p. 570.

page 262 note 4 Ibid. p. 582.

page 262 note 5 Henderson, Failure of a Mission, op. cit. pp. 8, 28.

page 263 note 1 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. IV, 23 February 1939. Henderson letter to Halifax, p. 593.

page 263 note 2 Ibid. Vol. I, Letter from Henderson to Sargent, 18 July 1938, p. 592.

page 263 note 3 Ibid. Henderson letter to Halifax, May 1938, p. 639.

page 263 note 4 C8294/240/18 in FO 371/20737, Henderson to Sargent, 23 November 1937.

page 263 note 5 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. IV, Letter from Henderson to Halifax, 18 February 1939, p. 590.

page 264 note 1 Ibid. Vol. I, Henderson to Halifax, 20 March 1928, p. 681. Ibid. Henderson to Halifax, 19 April 1938, p. 623. Henderson Papers, FO 800/269, 4 May 1937, C6600/1941/18 in FO 371/ 21726, 2 July 1938, DBFP, Third Series, Vol. II, Henderson letter to Halifax, 12 August 1938, p. 83. Henderson to Halifax, 22 August 1938, pp. 131, 133, Henderson Papers, FO 800/ 269, 20 September 1938, Henderson letter to Halifax.

page 264 note 2 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, 17 April 1938, p. 624. Henderson to Halifax, 10 May 1938, p. 273. C6600/1914/18 in FO 371/21726, 2 July 1938, DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, 18 July 1938, p. 590., Henderson letter to Cadogan, 22 July 1938, pp. 617–618, DBFP, Third Series, Vol. II, Henderson to Halifax, 22 August 1938, p. 132.

page 264 note 3 Ibid. Third Series, Vol. I, Letter to Cadogan, 22 July 1938, p. 618.

page 265 note 1 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. II, 12 August 1938, Henderson letter to Halifax, p. 84.

page 265 note 2 Ibid. Vol. II, 22 August 1938, Henderson to Halifax, p. 131.

page 265 note 3 R1096/160/12 in FO 371/22336, 25 January 1938.

page 265 note 4 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, Henderson to Halifax, 7 May 1928, p. 260, 9 May 1938, p. 264, 10 May 1938, p. 273.

page 266 note 1 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. II May 1938, p. 75.

page 266 note 2 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, Halifax letter to Henderson, 12 May 1938, pp. 627–628.

page 266 note 3 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. II, Halifax letter to Henderson, 5 August 1938, pp. 54–56.

page 266 note 4 Ibid. Vol. 1, Henderson to Halifax, 26 May 1938, p. 382.

page 266 note 5 Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. II (Washington, D.C., 1949)Google Scholar, Minute by the State Secretary (Weizsäcker), 1 June 1938, pp. 376–377.

page 266 note 6 Ibid.

page 266 note 7 Ibid. Memorandum by SS Untersturmführer Baumann, 15 September 1938, p. 769.

page 266 note 8 Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (Hamden, Conn., 1970), p. 357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 267 note 1 CAB23/94, 20 August 1938.

page 267 note 2 CAB23/95, 37 (38), 12 September 1938. Unlike his predecessors, Henderson attended the Nuremburg Party Rallies in 1937 and 1938 as a friendly gesture to the Hitler regime. Dictionary of National Biography 1941–1950, op. cit., p. 377. In 1938 Henderson asked Foreign Office for authority to remain at the Nuremburg Rally as long as it suited him. He argued that his presence there might have some restraining value and that it would provide an opportunity to make contact with Goering, Neurath and possibly Hitler. If anything derogatory was said in his presence he would leave. Henderson was authorized to make the plans he felt best. C91651/1941/18 in FO 371/21734, 2 September 1938.

page 267 note 3 Cabinet Paper C, P. 196 (38), Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. G10238G/1941/18 in FO 371/21739, 11 September 1938.

page 267 note 4 DBFPy Third Series, Vol. II, Halifax to Henderson, 10 September 1938, p. 285.

page 267 note 5 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 10 September 1938, p. 96.

page 268 note 1 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. II, Henderson to Halifax, 20 September 1938, p. 425, 27 September 1938, p. 574, 28 September 1938, p. 592.

page 268 note 2 DBFP, Vol. Ill, Henderson letter to Halifax, 6 October 1938, p. 615.

page 268 note 3 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 20 October 1938, p. 122.

page 268 note 4 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. I, Henderson to Halifax, 18 February 1939, pp. 120–122.

page 269 note 1 C2762/53/18 in FO 371/23006, 23 February 1939. Vansittart established a network of contacts with Germans who provided him with critical information regarding the German government's intentions and its rearmament plans. See A. P. Young, The ‘X’ Documents (ed.) (London, 1974). After maintaining contact with Karl Goerdeler and the anti-Nazi resistance however, Sir Robert came to feel that it was elitist and nationalist desiring Hitler's program of expansion without Hitler. Vansittart continued to hold these views during World War II when the British government felt the same way and refused to deal with the German resistance.

page 270 note 1 C2762/53/18 in FO 371/23006, Report by Professor T. P. Conwell-Evans.

page 270 note 2 Aster, 1939, pp. 57–59.

page 270 note 3 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 24 February 1939, p. 151.

page 270 note 4 C2533/15/18 in FO 371/22966, 28 February 1939, Henderson letter to Halifax.

page 270 note 5 C2914/7/12 in FO 371/22896, 10 March 1939.

page 271 note 1 Commons, Vol. 345, 22 March 1939, Col. 1260, 6 April 1939, Col. 3032, Vol. 346, 18 April 1939, Col. 340–431.

page 271 note 2 Colvin, None So Blind, op. cit. pp. 295–296.

page 271 note 3 Cadogan Diaries, op. cit. 14 March 1939, p. 156.

page 271 note 4 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. IV, Henderson to Halifax, 15 March 1939, p. 595.

page 271 note 5 Trotter, Ann, Britain and East Asia, 1933–1937 (London, 1975), pp. 6–10Google Scholar, 212–223; Endicott, Stephan Lyon, Diplomacy and Enterprise, British China Policy, 1933–1937 (Vancouver, 1975), pp. 180–182Google Scholar. On Fisher's policies in relation to the Foreign Office, see further Beloff, Max‘The White Hall Factor: The Role of the Higher Civil Service’ in Peele, Gillian and Cook, Chris (eds.), The Policies of Reappraisal, 1918–1929 (London, 1975), pp. 211–212.Google Scholar

page 272 note 1 Oliver Harvey Diaries, 3 May 1939, p. 286.

page 272 note 2 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. V, Henderson letter to Halifax, 4 May 1939, pp. 422–424.

page 272 note 3 Ibid. Third Series, Vol. VI. Henderson letters to Halifax, 17 June 1939, pp- 706–710.

page 272 note 4 DBFP, Vol. VI, Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax, 13 June 1939, pp. 56–58. C8484/ 53/18 in FO 371/23020, Minute by Makins, 16, 17 June 1939.

page 272 note 5 C7096/54/18 in FO 371/23018, 21 May; 1939, C8757/54/18 in FO 371/23030, 21 May 1939, Minutes by Vansittart.

page 272 note 6 Harvey Diaries, op. cit. 27 May 1939, p. 293.

page 273 note 1 Ibid. 9 June 1939, p. 302.

page 273 note 2 Ibid. Harvey letter to Halifax, 15 July 1939, p. 15.

page 273 note 3 Feiling, op. cit. p. 402.

page 273 note 4 DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VII, Henderson to Halifax, 23 August 1939, pp. 161–163; Henderson to Halifax, 25 August 1939, p. 229–230; Henderson letter to Halifax, 20 August 1939, pp. 386–388; Henderson to Halifax, 29 August 1939, pp. 376–377; Vansittart minute, 30 August 1939, p. 355; Henderson to Halifax, 30 August 1939, p. 393; Henderson to Halifax, 30 August 1939, pp. 426–427.

page 274 note 1 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. VII, Record of the interview, between the Führer and the British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson at the Berghof on 23 August, 1939, pp. 213–214.

page 274 note 2 CAB23/100, 43 (39), 26 August 1939.

page 274 note 3 Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet, op. cit. p. 240.

page 274 note 4 Harvey Diaries, op. cit. 27 August 1939, pp. 307–308.

page 274 note 5 Gilbert and Gott, op. cit. pp. 288–289, 298.

page 275 note 1 Jedrzejewicz, Waclaw, Papers and Memoirs ofJoseph Lipski Ambassador of Poland: Diplomat in Berlin, 1933–1939 (New York, 1968)Google Scholar; Henderson conversations with the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Berlin, Henryk Malhomme, 30 August 1939, p. 570.

page 275 note 2 Gilbert and Gott, op. cit. pp. 305—306.

page 275 note 3 Final report by the Right Honourable Sir Nevile Henderson on the circumstances leading to the termination of his mission to Berlin, 20 September 1939, Cmd. 6115.

page 276 note 1 Colvin, None So Blind, op. cit. pp. 346–347.

page 277 note 1 Bullock, Alan, ‘Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War’, in Robertson, E. M. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1971), p. 193.Google Scholar

page 277 note 2 Colvin, None So Blind, op. cit. p. 345.

page 277 note 3 Watt, op. cit. p. 154.