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The British Cabinet's decision for war, 2 August 1914

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

K. M. Wilson
K. M. Wilson
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
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Extract

On Sunday 2 August 1914 the Liberal prime minister, Asquith, received a note from Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne in which the Conservative leaders offered their ‘unhesitating support’ to the Government in any measures it might consider necessary for the object of supporting France and Russia. Of this communication the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, wrote in his memoirs: “The message was first read and then laid aside; it could have no influence on our discussion. ” In a recent article, Donald Lammers has concluded that “the state of our information does not justify ascribing a high or determining importance to Conservative statements and actions in connection with the British decision to go to war”. In doing so he has added his name to those of Robert Blake, Roy Jenkins, Keith Robbins, Samuel Williamson and Cameron Hazlehurst, who have in his words maintained that “the Conservative letter counted for almost nothing and the relentless march of events almost everything in the way of changing or settling ministerial minds” in the European crisis of late July and early August 1914.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 1975 , pp. 148 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1975

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References

1. Grey, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years (London, 1925), ii, pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Blake, R., The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), pp. 222–3Google Scholar.

page 148 note 2 Lammers, D., ‘Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War: 1914’, Journal of British Studies, xii (1973), pp. 137–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 148 note 3 E.g. Watt, D. C., ‘The British Reactions to the Assassination at Sarajevo’, European Studies Review, i (1971), p. 247Google Scholar; Ritter, G., The Sword and the Sceptre (London, 1972), ii, pp. 62–63Google Scholar.

page 148 note 1. Grey, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years (London, 1925), ii, pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Blake, R., The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), pp. 222–223Google Scholar.

page 148 note 2. Lammers, D., ‘Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War: 1914’, Journal of British Studies, xii (1973), pp. 137–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 148 note 3. E.g. Watt, D. C., ‘The British Reactions t o the Assassination at Sarajevo’, European Studies Review, i (1971), p. 247Google Scholar; Ritter, G., The Sword and the Sceptre (London, 1972), ii, pp. 62–63Google Scholar.

page 148 note 4. Churchill to Lloyd George, undated Cabinet note (?2) Aug. 1914. Churchill, Randolph S., Winston S. Churchill, Companion Vol. ii (London, 1969), p. 1996Google Scholar. Lammers’ article was an attempt to test Mayer's ideas about the ‘domestic causes’ of the First World War against what happened in England. It is not my object to maintain that such political factors in the British decision for war as I discuss constitute in themselves domestic causes of the war. They are not, i n my opinion, of that order. They do not support the contentions that the domestic status quo was precarious; that Britain was in a pre-revolutionary condition; that politics had become polarized at the expense of a centre vital for compromise and accommodation; that recourse to war was entertained for internal political purposes by members of social, political and economic groups who felt their status to be threatened.

page 148 note 1. Asquith to the King, 30 July, Crewe to the King, 2 Aug. 1914 in Spender, J. A. and Asquith, C., Life of H. H. Asquith Lord Oxford and and Asquith (London, 1932), ii, pp. 81–82Google Scholar; P.R.O. CAB 37/120/95; J. A. Pease Diary, 29 July 1914, Gainford MSS.; Kautsky, K., Outbreak of the World War - German Documents (New York, 1924), no. 676Google Scholar; Blake op. cit. p. 224.

page 148 note 1 Burns Diary, 29 July 1914; Burns MSS. B.M. Add. MSS. 46336.

page 148 note 2 Pease Diary, 31 July 1914. I am most grateful to Lord Gainford and to Dr Cameron Hazlehurst for permitting me to quote from the Gainford MSS. Cameron Hazlehurst is preparing an edition of the Pease Diary for publication.

page 148 note 3 Hazlehurst, Cameron, Politicians at War (London, 1971), pp. 88–90Google Scholar; Morley, John, Memorandum on Resignation (London, 1928), p. 5Google Scholar.

page 148 note 4 Burns Diary, 1 Aug. 1914, Add. MSS. 46336.

page 148 note 5 Note by Runciman, Runciman MSS.; Masterman later described the day as ‘the Fateful Sunday’: Masterman to Runciman, 14 Feb. 1915, Runciman MSS.

page 148 note 6 Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H . W.British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914(London, 1926-1938 and cited below as B.D.)Google Scholar, xi, no. 487; Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 7 Spender an d Asquith, op. cit., ii, p. 82; Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914; Morley, op. cit., p. 21 ; Burns' letter of resignation to Asquith is dated 2 Aug. 1914: Burns MSS. 46282; see also his Diary for 2, 3 Aug. ibid. 46336.

page 148 note 8 A. Murray's Diary, 1 Aug. 1914, quoted in Hazlehurst, op. cit. p. 91.

page 148 note 1 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 2 Riddell, Lord, War Diary (London, 1933), p. 6Google Scholar. 3. Memo, by Runciman, 2 Aug . 1914, Runciman MSS.

page 148 note 4 Chamberlain, A., Down the Years (London, 1935), p. 99Google Scholar; Colvin, I., Life of Lord Carson (London, 1936), iii, p. 19Google Scholar; Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 5 .Chamberlain, op. cit. p. 97; Colvin, op. cit. p. 15.

page 148 note 6 Riddell, , op. cit. p. 3; Viscount Samuel, Memoirs (London, 1945), p. 104Google Scholar.

page 148 note 7 Samuel's letter to his wife of 2 Aug. 1914 recording these efforts is printed in Lowe, C. J. and Dockrill, M. L., The Mirage of Power (London, 1972), iii, pp. 489–91Google Scholar; on Samuel see ibid., i pp. 150–1 and Hazlehurst, op. cit. pp . 93–97. Grey took up the theme of ‘a conditional rupture’ with Lichnowsky on 3 Aug.: Kautsky, op. cit. no. 764.

page 148 note 8 SeeLovell, R. I., ‘England is Draw n in - July and August 1914’ in McKay, D. C. (ed.), Essays in the History of Modern Europe (New York, 1936), pp. 149–67Google Scholar.

page 148 note 1 B.D. xi, nos. 521, 525, 547.

page 148 note 2 ibid. no. 523.

page 148 note 3 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 4 Samuel, op. cit. p. 104; Pease Diary, 2, 3 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 5. Hazlehurst, op. cit. p.101; Morley, op. cit. pp. 27–28.

page 148 note 6 Scott, C. P. Diary, 4 Aug. 1914 in Wilson, T. (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. 1911–28 (London, 1970), p. 96Google Scholar.

page 148 note 7 Memo, by Runciman, 2 Aug. 1914, Runciman MSS.

page 148 note 8 Hobhouse to Burns, 7 Aug. 1914, Burns MSS. Add. MSS. 46303 fo. 72. In Apr. 1916 Haldane wrote a memo on the events of 1906–15. Of Sunday, 2 Aug. 1914 he wrote: “it was evident to (Grey) and to me that the country would almost certainly be unable to keep out of the war… I saw that if we kept out and if Germany was allowed to occupy the northern coasts of France our turn would come two or three years later, when without a friend in the world we should probably go down against a tremendous combination.” Haldane MSS. 5919, pp. 153–4.

page 148 note 9 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 1 Masterman, L., C. F. G. Masterman (London, 1939), p. 265Google Scholar; Owen, F., Tempestuous Journey(London, 1954), p. 265Google Scholar; Riddell, op. cit. pp. 5–6.

page 148 note 2 Robbins, Keith, Sir Hdward Grey (London, 1971), n. 67 to ch. 14, pp. 402–3Google Scholar; Spender and Asquith, op. cit. ii, pp. 85, 101 .

page 148 note 3 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 4 B.D. xi, nos. 293, 303.

page 148 note 5 ibid, nos, 348, 382–3.

page 148 note 1 Or the impression they made on the Conservatives: see Henry Wilson's Diary, 1–3 Aug. 1914 and Chamberlain, op. cit.

page 148 note 1 B.D. xi, nos. 465, 468, 473, 486. On a telegram from Villiers in Brussels which arrived at 1.25 p.m. 2 Aug., Clerk minuted: “It is impossible for the German troops to get out of Luxemburg without crossing Belgian territoryexcept through a narrow bottleneck into France.” ibid. no. 476. The same thought may have inspired Lloyd George's supposed readiness to remain at peace if Germany would consent to limit her occupation of Belgian territory to the extreme southerly point of Belgium, and the presence of the phrase ‘substantial violation’ in the Cabinet's final formula. T. Wilson, op. cit. p. 96. For German denials of the reports see Kautsky, op. cit. nos. 731, 742, 744. In his diary for 3 Aug. Pease recorded: “News not very reliable as to war operations.”

page 148 note 3 Spender, and Asquith, , op. cit. ii, p. 84; Birkenhead, F.E. (London, 1959), p. 241Google Scholar.

page 148 note 4 Riddell, op. cit. p. 3; Morley, op. cit. p. 20. Morley also remembered that on the morning of 3 Aug. Asquith had started the proceedings of the Cabinet by saying “with some emphasis that nothing would induce him to separate from Grey”. ibid. pp. 26–27.

page 148 note 5 Probably with a view to achieving the same effect the Conservatives seem to have been approached in the summer of 1911. T. Wilson, op. cit. p. 62. There is another parallel with 1911 in that Lorebura had then taken the resignation of Grey as enough to break up the Cabinet. ibid. p. 56.

page 148 note 1 Riddell, op. cit p. 6.

page 148 note 2 Owen, , op. cit. pp. 264–5; Asquith, Memories and Reflections (London, 1928)5 ii, p. 20Google Scholar.

page 148 note 3 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 4 Morley, op. cit. p . 25; Pease to his wife, 3 Aug. 1914, Pease MSS. box 521; Chirol, of The Times, recounted a story that the King had told Asquith, when the latter informed him that in view of dissensions in the Cabinet ministers might have to resign collectively, that in that case he would send for Asquith and Lansdowne and charge them with the formation of a National Defence Government. Chirol to Hardinge, 4 Aug. 1914, Hardinge MSS. vol. 93.

page 148 note 5 Addison, C., Four and a half Years (London, 1934), i, p. 35Google Scholar.

page 148 note 6 Pease to Trevelyan, 5 Aug 1914, Charles Trevelyan MSS. 59.

page 148 note 7 Runciman to Trevelyan, 4 Aug. 1914, ibid. 33.

page 148 note 1 Morley, op. cit. p. 26; also Pease Diary, 3 Aug. 1914: “Grey said he felt some responsibility for the resignations and felt it acutely …”.

page 148 note 2 Pope-Hennessy, J., LordCrewe (London, 195 5), p. 144Google Scholar; on Lloyd George see Lloyd George t o Churchill, 13 Sept. 1911 in R, S. Churchill, op. cit. Companion vol. ii, part 2, pp. 1125–6, and C. P. Scott, Diary, 27 July 1914 in T. Wilson, op. cit. p. 92; on Churchill see Churchill to F. E. Smith, 1 Aug. 1914 in Birkenhead, op. cit. p. 241.

page 148 note 3 See above note 7.

page 148 note 4 Sir Arthur Nicolson, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, when providing his colleague Hardinge with “the secret history of what passed on the two to three days prior t o August 3” dubbed this appeal “a happy inspiration on the part of Cambon”. Nicolson to Hardinge, 5 Sept. 1914, Hardinge MSS. vol. 93.

page 148 note 5 Morley, op. cit. p. 15; the Pease Diary confirms Morley's impression that the neutrality of Belgium “was secondary to the question of our neutrality in the struggle between Germany and France; and to our liability to France under the Entente”. ibid. p. 10.

page 148 note 6 Burns Diary, 2 Aug. 1914, Add. MSS. 46336 and memo by Burns in ibid. 46308 fo. 163.

page 148 note 7 Pease Diary, 2 Aug. 1914. For a belated admission of this by Simon, see C. P. Scott Diary, 3–4 Sept. 1914 in T. Wilson, op. cit. p. 103.

page 148 note 8 Burns Diary, 3 Aug. 1914, Add. MSS. 46336. This was a note drawn up by Loreburn, the then Lord Chancellor and Harcourt dated 29/11/11 and shown by Morley to Asquith, Grey and Haldane. It ran: “1. That at no time has the Cabinet decided whether or not to give either military or naval assistance to France in the event of her being at war with Germany. 2. That at no time has the British Government given any promise of such assistance to France. 3. That the Cabinet was not informed till the end of October of any naval and military preparations being made to meet the contingency of war this summer or autumn, nor was any plan for a landing of troops on the Continent at any time communicated to or approved by the Cabinet.” This was the ‘Note B’ of Burns' diary entry of 3 Aug. 1914; the Cabinet resolution of 15 Nov. 1911 was the ‘Note A’ of his entry of 2 Aug. 1914. Both Notes are to be found in Burns MSS. 46308, fos. 163–4. This extant copy is dated 11 Jan. 1917 and was taken by Burns from a memo supplied in Harcourt's hand. Burns’ instructions in the Diary: ‘see Note A’, ‘see Note (B)’ are integral parts of the text, not insertions or later additions. Another version of the Cabinet resolutions exists in Asquith to the King, 16 Nov. 1911, Asquith MSS. vol. 6.

page 148 note 1 Morley, op. cit. p. 18.

page 148 note 2 Lowe and Dockrill, op. cit. iii, pp. 489–90.

page 148 note 3 It reveals much of the previous day's discussions and of the thinking of the Cabinet that Pease, in his first attempt to expand and clarify his account, inserted the word ‘alleged’ in front of ‘moral obligation’, before crossing it out and settling for “our moral obligation justifying our giving support to France …”. Pease Diary, 3 Aug. 1914. Similarly, when on 4 Aug. the Cabinet were discussing what the Blue Book should contain, Pease recorded that he urged that as much as possible should be conveyed “so that those who were hesitating to come to the support of the Government should not make up their minds and take a hostile view now, without a full understanding of the German intention to force war on Belgium and run the risk of our internal differences preventing our support being given to France and in the interest of small independent States”. ibid. 4 Aug. 1914.

page 148 note 4 Addison, op. cit. i, p. 35; no. 85 in the British Blue Book is no. 293 in B.D. xi. 5. Hazlehurst, op. cit. p. 98.

page 148 note 1 Lammers, op. cit. p. 161; T. Wilson, op. cit. pp. 96–98.

page 148 note 2 Morley, op. cit. p. 23; on Harcourt see Harcourt to Thomas, 5 Aug. 1914, quoted in Hazlehurst, op. cit. p. 114.

page 148 note 3 Morley, op. cit. p. 14; Morle y to J. A. Spender, 6 Aug. 1914, Spender MSS . Add, MSS. 46392.

page 148 note 4 Charles Trevelyan's mem o of events leading to his resignation. Trevelyan MSS. 59.

page 148 note 5 See Hazlehurst, op. cit. p. 112, no. 3; Morley, op. cit. p. 20; Hankey's description of Simon, years later, was “the miserable time-server”. Roskill, S., Hankey, Man of Secrets (London, 1974), iii, p. 75Google Scholar.

page 148 note 6 Grey t o Runciman, 2 Oct. 1911, Runciman MSS.; Pease to his wife, 2, 3 Aug. 1914, Mrs Pease to J. A. Pease, 4 Aug. 1914, Gainford MSS. boxes 521; 91.

page 148 note 1 Lowe and Dockrill, op. cit. iii, p. 489.

page 148 note 2 Lammers, op. cit. p. 158.

page 148 note 3 He wrote, in pencil, at the top of his diary entry for 2 Aug. 1914: “See B.L.'s letter to P.M.” Add. MSS. 46336.

page 148 note 4 Memo by Runciman, 2 Aug. 1914, Runciman MSS.

page 148 note 5 L. Masterman, op. cit. p. 265.

page 148 note 6 Certainly Morley could tell Almeric Fitzroy on 2 Aug. that “the high-handed action of Germany was weakening the efforts of the peacemakers in the Cabinet”: Fitzroy, A., Memoirs (London, 1925), ii, pp. 559–560Google Scholar; and certainly Bryce could not deny that “Germany has played her cards badly” (Bryce to C. P. Scott, 3 Aug. 1914, Bryce MSS. E31); Gilbert Murray was reported as feeling it “very difficult to oppose Government action when the German Government has plainly run amok” (Mair to C. P. Scott, 4 Aug. 1914 in T. Wilson, op. cit. p. 95).

page 148 note 7 ibid. p. 106; and see Loreburn to Scott, 2 Sept. 1914 and Edwin Montagu to Scott, II Aug. 1914 in C. P. Scott MSS. uncat.