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Structural realism and Dulles's China policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2011

WOOSEON CHOI
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Abstract

The Eisenhower administration's tough containment policy toward China has been conventionally viewed as an unsensible policy resulting from domestic political pressures or ideology. Refuting the conventional explanations, this article argues that during the early Cold War, the US superiority in bipolarity drove China to balance the United States in Asia. Dulles, the architect of the China policy, made accurate assessments of the power structure in Asia and the inevitable enmity with China. Driven by structural imperative, he decided to pursue containment to maintain the favourable balance of power in Asia by retarding the relative power growth of China allied with the Soviet Union and secondarily by accelerating their conflict through harder pressure on a weaker China. This case long considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory actually demonstrates how powerfully distributions of power shape alliance behaviours of states in the anarchic international system.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 119 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2011

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References

1 For important domestic political arguments, see Morgenthau, Hans, ‘John Foster Dulles (1953–1957)’, in Graebner, Norman A. (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twenties Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961)Google Scholar ; Politics in the Twenties Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 416–419Google Scholar ; ‘The US and China’, in Tsou, Tang (ed.), China in Crisis, Vol. 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968)Google Scholar ; Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 257–261Google Scholar . Also see, Graebner, Norman, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950 (New York: Ronald Press, 1956)Google Scholar . For ideological arguments, see Barnett, Doak, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977)Google Scholar ; A New US Policy Toward China (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1971)Google Scholar ; Dulles, Foster Rhea, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949–1969 (New York: Harlan Davidson Inc., 1972)Google Scholar ; Hoopes, Townsend, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973)Google Scholar ; Qing, Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and US-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007)Google Scholar . For the argument combining domestic political and ideological factors, see Hinton, Harold, China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972)Google Scholar ; Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975)Google Scholar .

2 Morgenthau, ‘John Foster Dulles’; Politics in the Twenties Century, pp. 416–9; ‘the US and China’.

3 Snyder, , Myths of Empire, p. 261 and ConclusionGoogle Scholar .

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5 Recently, many realist scholars have downplayed the effects of structure and emphasised that domestic factors systemically intervene in foreign policymaking and often override structural factors. For representative works, see Snyder, , Myths of EmpireGoogle Scholar ; Christensen, Thomas, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)Google Scholar ; Schweller, Randall, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)Google Scholar ; Zakaria, Fareed, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)Google Scholar . For a review of neo-classical realism, see Rose, Gideon, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (October, 1998), pp. 144–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar . In contrast, Mearsheimer argues that state behaviours are primarily determined by structural factors in anarchy. For his structural analysis of state behaviours based on offensive realism, see Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001)Google Scholar . Waltz also emphasises structural factors in his analysis of state behaviours although he argues that domestic factors also should be considered in explaining specific behaviours. See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar ; ‘Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar . For a classical balance of power analysis, see Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Knopf, 1967)Google Scholar .

6 Morgenthau, ‘John Foster Dulles’, p. 301.

7 Morgenthau, Hans, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1952), p. 15Google Scholar .

8 Morgenthau, , Politics in the Twenties Century, p. 416Google Scholar ; ‘the US and China’, p. 102.

9 Morgenthau, ‘John Foster Dulles’, p. 301.

10 Snyder, , Myths of Empire, pp. 292–293Google Scholar .

11 Ibid., p. 258.

12 Ibid., p. 297.

13 Ibid., p. 257.

14 Ibid., pp. 256, 261.

15 Barnett, , China and the Major Powers in East Asia, pp. 178–179Google Scholar .

16 Ibid., p. 179.

17 Ibid., p. 162.

18 Qing, , From Allies to Enemies, p. 175Google Scholar .

19 Ibid., pp. 201–3, 292.

20 Ibid., pp. 183, 295.

21 Ibid., p. 298.

22 Mayers, David, Cracking the Monolith: US Policy toward the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–55 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986)Google Scholar ; Gaddis, John Lewis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 174–193Google Scholar ; ‘The American “Wedge” Strategy, 1949–1955’, in Harding, Harry and Ming, Yuan (eds), Sino-Soviet Relations 1945–1955: A Joint Assessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington: A Academic Resources Imprint, 1989)Google Scholar ; Chang, Gordon, Friends and Enemies: the US, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), chaps 3–7Google Scholar ; Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, ‘A House Divided: The US, The Department of State, and China’, in Cohen, Warren and Iriye, Akira (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)Google Scholar ; Ross, Robert and Jiang, Changbin (eds), Re-examining The Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge: The Harvard University Asia Center, 2001)Google Scholar . For an important argument combining power and ideological factors, see Yahuda, Michael, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995 (New York: Routledge, 1996)Google Scholar .

23 I define power as material capabilities. I measure power in terms of economic and military capabilities. Economic capability is important to measure long-term ups and downs of states and their ability to wage attrition war. However, military capability makes more important impact on power balance because it poses a more immediate threat to other states. See Mearsheimer, , The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 3Google Scholar . I also measure power balance at global and regional level. It is difficult to measure the relative importance between them. However, for regional powers such as China, regional balance is more critical because it poses a direct threat to their security.

24 Perceptions matter in measuring power structure. For various perceptive reasons of miscalculation, see Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar ; Wohlforth, William, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar . For the argument emphasising the importance of contexts in determining the different effectiveness of power resources, see Baldwin, David, ‘Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies’, World Politics, 28 (1970)Google Scholar . However, state leaders have very strong incentives to measure power structure as accurately as possible to defend national security under the intense power competition in anarchy although they still make miscalculations.

25 Mearsheimer, , Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 74Google Scholar .

26 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1989), p. 53Google Scholar ; Rosenberg, David Allen, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, in Miller, Steven E. (ed.), Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 134, 137–142Google Scholar . Actually, the importance of the quantitative gap was becoming increasingly controversial as the absolute number of both sides and the destructive power of the weapons increased. However, both sides did not reach to a clear Mutual Assured Destruction situation by the late 1950s. Thus the numerical superiority was still important due to the presumed vulnerability of the weapons to a first strike during this period.

27 NIE 11-56, ‘Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces through Mid-1959’ (6 March 1956), RG 263, Records of the CIA (CIA), Entry 29, National Intelligence Estimates Concerning the Soviet Union 1950–1961 (Second Set), Box 2, The National Archive (NA); International Institute for the Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance, 1961–1962 (London: IISS, 1961)Google Scholar .

28 NIE 11-8-59, ‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack through mid-1964’ (9 February 1960), RG 283, CIA, Entry 29, NIE Concerning the Soviet Union 1951–1983 (Second Set), Box 5, NA.

29 See Polmar, Norman (ed.), Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and Missiles (Annapolis: Nautical Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1979)Google Scholar ; Rosenberg, ‘the Origins of Overkill’.

30 In 1948, Soviet manpower strength was 2,874,000 including ground forces in contrast to about 1,500,000 of US manpower. See Evangelist, Matthew, ‘Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised’, International Security, 7:3 (Winter 1982/3), pp. 286–288Google Scholar .

31 After the Korean War, the number of US armed forces was maintained at the level of 2,800,000 until the early 1960s. NIE 100-5-59, ‘Implications for the Free World and the Communist Bloc of Growing Nuclear Capabilities’ (3 February 1959), ibid., Box 3.

32 Rosenberg, ‘the Origins of Overkill’; Poole, Walter S., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. IV, 1950–1952 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier Inc., 1980)Google Scholar . NIE 65, ‘Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957’ (16 June 1953), RG 263, CIA, Entry 29, NIE Concerning the Soviet Union 1950–1961 (Second Set), Box 2, NA; NIE 100-5-59.

33 Poole, Walter S., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950–1952; Military Balance, 1962–1963Google Scholar ; NIE 11-3-55, ‘Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action through 1960’ (17 May 1955), RG 263,CIA, Entry 29, NIE Concerning the Soviet Union 1950–1961 (Second Set), Box 2, NA.

34 The Soviet Union deployed about 100 full strength divisions in eastern Europe and western Russia. This formidable Soviet military power compelled western European states to ally with the US. Matthew Evangelist, ‘Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised’, pp. 288, 300.

35 NIE 11-14-16, ‘Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964–1970’ (10 December 1964), RG 263, CIA, Entry 19, NIE Concerning Soviet Military Power 1950–1984 (Second Set), box 16, NA; Military Balance 1968–69; Whiting, Allen S., Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 89–90Google Scholar ; Robinson, Thomas W., ‘The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict’, in Kaplan, Stephen (ed.), Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 287Google Scholar . During the Korean War, the US ground forces in Asia increased to 9 divisions including 1 marine division. After 1954, the forces were reduced to 3 army divisions and 1 marine division (about 150,000). The total number of US armed forces in Asia was about 280,000.

36 NIE 80, ‘Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea’ (3 April 1953), RG 263, CIA, Entry 29, NIE Concerning the Soviet Union 1950–1961 (Second Set), Box 1, NA; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee 1951–56, Vol. XVIII: US Policy in the Far East Part 2, pp. 498–9.

37 The Soviet T/O&E indicates that 85 per cent of their medium bomber force was concentrated in Europe. NIE 65, ‘Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957’.

38 Zhang, Shu Guang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–58 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 251Google Scholar . Later in his talk with Kissinger, Zhou Enlai revealed his similar perception by stating that ‘there is the fact that twenty-five years after the Second World War, your hands are stretched out too far … After 25 years it's no longer possible for the US to exercise a position of hegemony’. ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Zhou and Kissinger (Philosophy)’ (9 July 1971), Nixon Presidential Material Project (NPMP), NSC Files, File for the President-China Materials, Box 1032, Polo I Peking MemCons (by Subject) (9–11 July 1971), p. 9, NA. Foreign Minister Chi also remarked in 1972, ‘[I]n the 1950's the economic and military strengths of the US expanded enormously. In the words of the 1971 Foreign Policy Report, the US had “indisputable superiority in strategic strength”’. ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Rogers and Chi’ (24 February 1972), NPMP, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-Far East, Box 91, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials (February 1972), p. 2, NA.

39 Acheson and other policymakers pursued an accommodation policy to form an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralise it, from late 1949 to June 1950. The policy of the Truman administration was based on the calculation that the Soviet Union was the predominant power in Asia and its stronger power would push China to the US side despite the ideological differences. ‘Progress Report on NSC 48/5’ (25 September 1951), Foreign Relations of the US(FRUS) 1951, VI, p. 82Google Scholar . Since late 1950 following the military confrontation with China in Korea, the US had largely pursued containment policy in practice. However, the policy consisted of ad hoc measures adopted at the war contingency. Furthermore, the Truman administration failed to clearly define the policy objective during this period mainly because Acheson still thought that the US and China had common power interests against the Soviet Union and they had to be exploited at least in the long run. Thus various objectives of Titoist detachment, containment, and regime change were simultaneously laid out without a consistent logic in NSC 48/5, the basic policy directive until 1952. See Choi, Wooseon, ‘Structure and Perceptions: American Policy toward China (1949–1950)’, Security Studies, 16:4 (Fall 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; ‘Memorandum of the 91st NSC Discussion’ (17 May 1951). Also see President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files-Meetings, Box 220, The Harry S. Truman Library; ‘NSC 48/5, US Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia’ (17 May 1951), FRUS 1951, VI.

40 State Department estimate was that ‘[i]n its most general features the Sino-Soviet relationship may be compared to that between Great Britain and the US. Compelling considerations of military security cement the alliance of the two countries. There are strong ties of trade and similarity of political institutions’. ‘Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the US Delegation to the Geneva Conference: The Sino-Soviet Relation and Its Potential Sources of Differences’ (6 April 1954), FRUS 1952–54, XIV, p. 401. Also see ‘the Sino-Soviet Alliance’ (Undated, 1955), RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs 1945–1955, C0012, Reel 40, NA.; ‘US Policy toward China’ (12 June 1957), RG 59, State Department Central Files, China: Foreign Affairs 1955–1959, LM 153, Reel 5, NA. Another estimate assesses that ‘the interests of both as well as the ideological gulf which separates both from the non-Communist world, will continue to dictate policies of hostility against the West. The contribution which each makes to the military security of the other may assume even greater importance if the Western alliance is able to add substantial military power in Germany and Japan to its present strength.’ NIE 11-3-55, p. 9.

41 Dulles had formed his basic ideas of China policy before he became secretary of state. ‘Letter from Dulles to Bowles’ (25 March 1952), Chester Bowles File, Dulles Papers, Box 58, Mudd Library, Princeton University; ‘Letter from Dulles to Bowles’ (1 May 1952), Ibid. Also see, ‘Memorandum prepared by John Foster Dulles’ (18 May 1950), FRUS 1950, I, pp. 314–16; ‘Memorandum of Conversation between British Ambassador and Dulles’ (3 August 1950), RG 59, Records of the PPS, Box 14, NA. For his early view on the pressure strategy to split the Sino-Soviet alliance, also see ‘Memorandum of Luncheon Meeting with George Yeh and Wellington Koo’ (19 November 1952), Dulles Papers, Box 58, Mudd Library.

42 For evidence showing the thinking of American leaders behind policy decisions, I mainly use records of internal policy discussions and secret policy documents rather than public statements. Considering the nature of those internal discussions and analyses made for policy decisions, they can be considered serious and genuine policy analyses rather than mere justifications for policy although we still need to discern the effects of ideology in those discourses.

43 NSC 148, ‘US Policy in the Far East’ (6 April 1953), FRUS 1952–1954, XII, p. 287Google Scholar .

44 ‘Staff Study on Basic US objectives toward Communist China’, ibid., pp. 295–6.

45 NSC 166/1, ‘US Policy towards Communist China’ (6 November 1953), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, p. 281Google Scholar .

46 ‘Memorandum of Discussion of the 139th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (5 November 1953), ibid., p. 270.

47 NSC 166/1, p. 280.

48 NIE 47, ‘Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia through Mid-1953’ (31 October 1952), RG 263, CIA, Entry 29, NIE Concerning the Soviet Union 1950–1961 (Second Set), Box 1, p. 1, NA.

49 ‘NSC Staff Study on US Policy toward Communist China‘, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pp. 295–296Google Scholar .

50 Ibid., p. 297.

51 For the NSC discussion on the war option, see ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (27 January 1955), FRUS 1955–1957, III, pp. 138–139Google Scholar .

52 On the US policy objective, Dulles cogently stated that ‘[w]e hoped, as probably the UK does, that ultimately there will come about sufficient independence between Peiping and Moscow as to create the beginning of a balance of power relationship. As a result the US would not have to be so fully involved in the Far East as it now is. With Japan weakened by the last war and the two Communist powers closely allied, it was necessary for the US to put its power into the scales’. ‘Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State’ (7 February 1955), RUS 1955–1957, II, p. 236Google Scholar .

53 Specifically referring to US preponderance in ‘air and naval power and atomic weapons’, Dulles estimated that a major war ‘would mean the use of atomic weapons which would lead to the total devastation of Chinese communications and other facilities, leaving 600,000,000 Chinese destitute, and in ruin.’ ‘the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan’, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pp. 545–546Google Scholar . For massive retaliation doctrine, see Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American Security Strategy During the Cold War,rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), chaps 5–6Google Scholar ; Bowie, Robert and Immerman, Richard, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), chap. 12Google Scholar .

54 ‘NSC Staff Study’, pp. 302–3.

55 Ibid., pp. 296–7.

56 ‘Minutes on Second Restricted Tripartite Meeting of the Heads of Government, Bermuda’ (7 December 1953), FRUS 1952–1954, V, p. 1809Google Scholar . Also see, Mayers, , Cracking the Monolith, pp. 119–120Google Scholar .

57 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 169th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (5 November 1953), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, p. 268Google Scholar .

58 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 193rd Meeting of the National Security Council’ (13 April 1953), ibid., pp. 409–10. For Eisenhower's interest in Chinese Titoism, see ‘Memo, Meeting with T. F. Tsiang’ (10 June 1953), Wellington Koo Papers, Box 219, Butler Library, Columbia University. Also see Chang, , Friends and Enemies, p. 87Google Scholar .

59 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (18 August 1954), idid., pp. 526–40.

60 Ibid., p. 534. On another occasion, Dulles said, ‘Some people argued that if you accept the Communist regime on the mainland, it would be possible to wean it away from the Soviet Union. This was risky advice. The US must avoid enhancement of the power position of the Chinese Communist regime in the absence of a break between Moscow and Peiping.’ ‘Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State’ (31 January 1956), FRUS 1955–1957, III, pp. 291–292Google Scholar .

61 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council’, p. 534.

62 ‘Memorandum of Conversation with the President’ (22 December 1954), Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 1, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Eisenhower Library); ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (12 September 1954), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, p. 621.Google Scholar

63 Revisionist interpretations of Eisenhower have posited that he rather than Dulles was in firm control of American foreign policy. See Divine, Robert, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar ; Greenstein, Fred, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1982)Google Scholar ; Ambrose, Stephen, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)Google Scholar . Eisenhower was clearly in control as the final decision maker. In China policy, however, Eisenhower largely followed the lead of Dulles except crisis management.

64 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 226th Meeting of the National Security Council’ (1 December 1954), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pp. 971–975Google Scholar .

65 NSC 5429/5, ‘Current US Policy toward the Far East’. (22 December 1954), FRUS 1952–1954, XII, pp. 1062–1068Google Scholar .

66 The China policy in NSC 5416/5 was reaffirmed by the NSC in 1959. See NSC 5913/1, ‘Statement of US Policy in the Far East’ (25 September 1959), FRUS 1958–1960, XVI, pp. 134–144Google Scholar .

67 See ‘Letter from John Foster Dulles to Chester Bowles’ (25 March 1952); ‘Letter from John Foster Dulles to Chester Bowles’ (1 May 1952).

68 During 1953–4, when the GOP held the majority by narrow margins in both Houses, the balance between the Republican internationalists and the Republican right was largely maintained. After that, the latter was gradually weakened. And in the 1958 election, the number of the Republican right was greatly reduced. On the other hand, Democrats maintained a slim majority in both Houses since 1955. After 1959, they dominated both Houses. Importantly, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HAFC) were heavily represented by internationalists throughout the period. See Reichard, Gary, Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson Inc., 1988)Google Scholar ; Kepley, David, The Collapse of the Middle Way: Senate Republicans and Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1948–52 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988)Google Scholar ; Divine, David, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1975)Google Scholar ; Reichard, Gary, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty Third Congress (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975)Google Scholar ; Reinhard, David, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983)Google Scholar .

69 Most influential leaders of both parties including chairmen of the SFRC and the HFAC were supportive of the Eisenhower administration throughout this period. Reichard, Reaffirmation of Republicanism; Reinhard, Republican Right.

70 For a study based on the congressional record of roll call voting during 1953–4, see Reichard, Reaffirmation of Republicanism.

71 See the series of Monthly Survey, RG 59, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Boxes 12 and 13, NA.

72 For opinion polls on various policy issues, see the series of Monthly Survey; the series of Special Report on American Opinion, RG 59, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Box 33, NA.

73 For McCarthyism, see Griffith, Robert, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970)Google Scholar ; Latham, Earl, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Fried, Richard M., Men Against McCarthy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976)Google Scholar .

74 The core members of the China bloc were Senators Knowland (R), Smith (R), Bridges (R), Jenner (R), and Representative Judd (R).

75 The prime mover of the Committee was Representative Judd. Other active congressional members in early years were Senator Smith, Senator Sparkman (D), and Representative McCormack (D). After 1955, Senator Douglas (D) and Representative Walter (D) replaced Sparkman and McCormack in the Steering Committee. The Committee concentrated its activities on the campaign against the UN admission of Communist China. It claimed that 53 member of the Congress signed for the campaign in 1953 and 77 (23 in the Senate) in 1955. Bachrack, Stanley, Committee of One Million: ‘China Lobb’ Politics, 1953–1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976)Google Scholar ; Koen, Ross, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: The McMillan Company, 1960)Google Scholar .

76 See ‘telephone Call from Senator Knowland’ (27 April 1955), Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Series, Box 3, Eisenhower Library; ‘telephone Call from Senator Hickenlooper’ (27 April 1955), ibid; ‘telephone Calls from Congressmen Judd’ (26 April 1955), ibid. Knowland stated in his 1954 article, ‘We must not fool ourselves into thinking we can avoid taking up arms with the Chinese Reds. If we don't fight them in China and Formosa, we will be fight them in San Francisco, in Seattle, and in Kansas City’. Cited in Graebner, , New Isolationism, p. 120Google Scholar . Jenner also said that ‘All American policy must start from a firm decision to reestablish the legitimate anti-Communist government on the China mainland’, Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 99, Pt. 8, pp. 11,000–1Google Scholar .

77 On power of the China bloc, Dulles said to Yeh, Foreign Minister of Taiwan, that ‘there was a group of senators quite dedicated to anything which would help the Chinese Government position. But actually this group constitutes a minority of the Senate.’ ‘Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)’ (27 October 1954), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, p. 798Google Scholar .

78 After the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Eisenhower revealed his firm strategic choice by stating that the containment policy should be maintained until changes occurred within the Sino-Soviet alliance and that ‘[h]e felt these were inevitable but realized that the policy we were following might not be popular. There were some who want to give in; other who want to attack.’ Cited in Gaddis, Long Peace, p. 187.

79 Interestingly, as the power relations basically remained the same, US policymakers continued to base their policy on a similar estimate of the converging interests of China and the Soviet Union even after their split. In this regard, Rusk stated in 1962 that ‘[w]e should not suppose that the basic power relations, seen worldwide, is changed yet in terms of this rivalry between Moscow and Peiping, because if there were an all out confrontation with either Moscow or Peiping by the West or by the US, it would be very doubtful that either Moscow or Peiping could afford to see the other submerged in a struggle with the US. In other words, they have an underlying basic power interest in the existence of the other in somewhat like their present form … If this break should move to the point of completion … then it may be this split could work very dramatically to our advantage.’ ‘Briefing on World Situation’ (15 January 1962), Executive Sessions of the SFRC, Vol. XIV, p. 68Google Scholar .

80 For the study of the impact of cultural ideologies on foreign policy, see Hunt, Michael, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987)Google Scholar . Various theories have tried to explain the effects of ideational factors on perceptions of interest and policy decisions. For the effects of belief systems or operational codes, see Leites, Nathan, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951)Google Scholar ; Little, Richard and Smith, Steve, Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988)Google Scholar ; George, Alexander, ‘Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: the “Operational Code”’, in Falkowski, Lawrence, (ed.), Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1979)Google Scholar ; Ole Holsti, The ‘Operational Code’ as an Approach to the Study of Belief Systems, Final Report to the National Foundation, Grant SOC 75–15368, Duke University; ‘the Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles’ Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970). For psychological approach, see Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics. For the study of the impact of instrumental and normative ideas on policy, see Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar . For constructive theories of the relationship between cultural meanings and state behaviours, see Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Campbell, David, Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992)Google Scholar . For an excellent study of how discourses construct national interests, see Weldes, Jutta, Constructing National Interests: The US and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)Google Scholar . Policymakers understand the world through their own ideational frameworks. Thus ideology and culture cannot but affect their perceptions of reality and tend to strongly influence their ultimate goals. In deciding major security policies, however, competition for survival in anarchy tends to force state leaders to perceive reality and interests as objectively as possible and to come up with realistic options to protect state interests. State leaders sometimes fail do so for ideological or other reasons. In most cases, however, their decisions of practical policy goals and means tend to be guided by their rational assessments of conditions rather than ideology or cultural ideas because major policy failure can be fatal in anarchy. Thus the structural conditions of international system make state leaders realistic enough not to submit important security concerns to ideological or cultural preferences. These conditions make the effects of ideology and culture on major security policies limited in most cases. Further, ideology and culture are too broad factors in explaining and predicting specific policy choices. Different policies are mostly explained by specific strategic conditions and calculations of policymakers.

81 Krasner, Stephen, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 6–34Google Scholar .

82 See Qing, , From Allies to Enemies, pp. 293Google Scholar .

83 ‘Letter from Dulles to Bowles’ (25 March 1952). For Eisenhower's similarly pragmatic but more sanguine view that China can be induced by practical economic gains, see Qing, , From Allies to Enemies, p. 173Google Scholar ; Chang, , Friends and Enemies, p. 82Google Scholar .

84 Johnson, U. Alexis, The Right Hand of Power (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1984)Google Scholar ; Young, Kenneth, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The US Experience, 1953–1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968)Google Scholar ; ‘Memorandum of Conversation with the President’ (5 August 1955), Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 3, Eisenhower Library. Also see Chang, , Friends and Enemies, pp. 156–157Google Scholar .

85 ‘Talk with Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office’ (February 1955), cited in Chang, , Friends and Enemies, p. 207Google Scholar . In another conversation, Dulles said that he hoped that ‘China could play an independent role in Far Eastern international affairs and contribute to a stable balance of power.’ ‘Memorandum of Conversation with George Yeh and Wellington Koo’ (14 November 1952), Dulles Papers, Box 58, Mudd Library, Princeton University.

86 Mayers, , Cracking the Monolith, p. 118Google Scholar .

87 NSC Staff Study, ‘Basic US Objectives toward Communist China’, (6 April 1953), FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, p. 534Google Scholar .

88 Gaddis, ‘the American “Wedge” Strategy’, p. 170.

89 Dulles, John Foster, War or Peace (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950), pp. 227, 245Google Scholar .

90 Zhang, , Deterrence and Strategic Culture, p. 220Google Scholar . During the first Taiwan Straits crisis, Mao was extremely cautious to avoid direct conflicts with the US forces. He postponed the plan to attack the Dachens several times after August 1954. Only after the Nationalist troops had evacuated did the Chinese occupy the Dachens. Ibid., pp. 198–9, 218–9. During the 1958 crisis, Chinese immediately backed down after Dulles had issued a stern warning of nuclear retaliation on 4 September. At the Supreme State Council meeting held after Dulles's blackmail, Mao expressed concern about the possible recklessness of the predominant US power. He anticipated that if the US decided to launch an attack against China, it would ‘probably be a nuclear strike’. Ibid., p. 251. Also see Kalicki, J. H., The Pattern of Sino-American Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975)Google Scholar ; He, Di, ‘the Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands’, in Cohen, and Iriye, (eds), The Great Powers in East AsiaGoogle Scholar ; Divine, Eisenhower, p. 65Google Scholar ; Rushkoff, Bennett, ‘Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955’, Political Science Quarterly, 96:3 (Fall 1981), pp. 465–480CrossRefGoogle Scholar .