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Gerald Segal's paper is an attempt at a scathing indictment of my analysis of some of the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in strategic studies. By way of a riposte I shall deal with the general and specific points which Segal makes, but more significantly I will show that he ignores the most fundamental arguments advanced in my paper.
1. Howard, M., ‘On Fighting a Nuclear War’ in M. Howard, The Causes of Wars (London, 1984), p. 147. My italics.Google Scholar
2. See Michael Howard's remarks concerning counterforce strategy in ‘Surviving a Protest', Ibid., p. 123.
3. MccGwire, M., ‘The Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence’ in Prins, G. (ed.), The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security (London, 1984), p. 95.Google Scholar
4. I make this point to support the contention that the issues I have addressed are central to strategic studies today. As Raymond Aron has remarked, strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment in history from the problems the events pose quoted in Garnett, J., ‘Strategic Studies and its Assumptions’ in J. Bayliss, et al, Contemporary Strategy (London, 1976, p. 5).Google Scholar
5. See Booth, K., ‘The Evolution of Strategic Thinking’ in Bayliss, et al, op. cit., p. 36.Google Scholar
6. See Garnett, op. cit., p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. M. MccGwire, op. cit., pp. 81–2.
9. Ibid., p. 94.