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Modelling international collective responsibility: the case of grave humanitarian crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2010

HANNES PELTONEN
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Abstract

Since its popular appearance in 2001, the responsibility to protect has gained wide attention. Yet, the meaning of responsibility in the R2P report has remained unexamined. The first task of this article is to conceptualise responsibility as it seems to arise from the R2P report. It is argued that the responsibility in the report is collective in nature, and analogous to obligations erga omnes and collective responsibility to extinguish fires before the institutionalisation of fire departments. The second task is to provide a model of collective responsibility with criteria that allow dividing the burden of fulfilling the common responsibility among the members of the collective. The model bridges the conceptual level with the level of practice.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 239 - 255
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

2 UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (A/RES/60/1, 2005). para. 138–9.

3 Also the composition of the international community is left elusive. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that these aspects were consciously neglected in the document, thus allowing for better evolution of the concept(s) through use.

4 See fn. 3.

5 Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come … And Gone?’, International Relations, 22 (2008), pp. 283–98.

6 Although I suggest which actors compose the international community within the context of this article, I forgo an extensive discussion. For those who are interested, I discuss international communities in detail here: Peltonen, ‘Of Systems, Societies, and Communities: Some Thoughts for Northeast Asian Peace Studies’, Peace Forum, 24 (2009), pp. 1–16.

7 The influence of ‘good’ casuistical thinking is evident in this article. See for example, Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (London: University of California Press, 1989).

8 See for example, Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), p. 23.

9 For an excellent taxonomy of responsibility, see for example, Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002).

10 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), para. 2.15.

11 Also Evans does not address this issue. See fn. 5.

12 Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 5. See also Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), pp. 22–3.

13 Erskine, ‘Making Sense of ‘Responsibility’ in International Relations: Key Questions and Concepts’, in Erskine (ed.), Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 8.

14 Kratochwil, ‘Of False Promises and Good Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building (the Tartu Lecture)’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 1–15, p. 3.

15 The following common uses of the word ‘responsibility’ are taken from Soanes and Stevenson (eds), The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford Reference Online: Oxford University Press, 2006).

16 Pennock, ‘The Problem of Responsibility’, in Friedrich (ed.), Responsibility (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 13.

17 Soanes and Stevenson (eds), The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford Reference Online: Oxford University Press, 2006).

18 Pennock, ‘The Problem of Responsibility’, in Friedrich (ed.), Responsibility (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 12.

19 Ibid., p. 9. Some might argue that also duties require deliberation much like all rules require interpretation. While a valid point, some rules (like duties) require much less interpretation than others. The point of differentiating between responsibilities and duties is exactly that duties require significantly less deliberation. An example could come from traffic rules where it is one's duty to stop at a red light (if there is one at a crossroads) and proceed only once the light has turned green. Arguably, there is room for interpretation even in this rule. Yet, it is a different situation from one's responsibility to drive safely, a responsibility that is much more indeterminate and context dependent (Is it raining? Are there other drivers on the road? Should one answer one's mobile phone while driving?).

20 Erskine, ‘Making Sense of ‘Responsibility’ in International Relations: Key Questions and Concepts’, in Erskine (ed.), Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 8. See also Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002).

21 This is an example used in Pennock, ‘The Problem of Responsibility’, in Friedrich (ed.), Responsibility (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 7.

22 Ibid.

23 Note here also the above example of claiming responsibility and vicarious responsibility or liability. On vicarious responsibility, see for example, Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 175–7.

24 Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 [1861–73], 1868.

25 Woodside, Silbersakc, Fliehman and Fleichtner, ‘Why Absolute Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher Is Absolutely Wrong!’, The University of Dayton Law Review, 29 (2003), pp. 1–35.

26 Thus, in the example of me cutting down the tree and as a consequence you injuring yourself, the question of my liability would be determined within the existing law. A decision on this case would most likely take into consideration the sufficiency of my warnings, whether I had taken adequate precautions, and so on.

27 Donald C. Macpherson v. Buick Motor Company, Court of Appeals of the State of New York, 1916.

28 Winterbottom v. Wright, Court of Exchequer, 1842.

29 See also for example, Lewis's doubt that moral responsibility can ever be transferred in Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), p. 26.

30 Goldberger and Zipursky, ‘The Moral of Macpherson’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 (1998), pp. 1733–847, pp. 1749–50.

31 Ibid., p. 1769.

32 It is worth noting that a similar transition is yet to take place with regard to duty of rescue in the Anglo-American common law systems, where such a general duty does not appear to exist. See for example, Denton, ‘The Case against a Duty to Rescue’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 4 (1991), pp. 101–32. On the other hand, it seems that the no-duty tradition is based on historical decisions that no longer represent good law. See for example, Lake, ‘Bad Boys, Bad Men, and Bad Case Law: Re-Examining the Historical Foundations of No-Duty-to-Rescue Rules’, New York Law School Legal Review, 43 (1999), pp. 385–450.

33 On conceptualisation and its problems, see for example, Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

34 Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (London: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 27–8.

35 Miller and Makela, ‘The Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility’, Metaphilosophy, 36 (2005), pp. 634–51, pp. 634–5. Emphasis in original. See also for example, May, ‘Collective Responsibility, Honor, and the Rules of War’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 36 (2005), pp. 289–304, p. 297.

36 Lewis, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), p. 32.

37 Cooper, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), p. 45.

38 Downie, ‘Collective Responsibility’, in May and Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), p. 47. Emphasis in original.

39 Feinberg, ‘Collective Responsibility’, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

40 McGary, ‘Morality and Collective Liability’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 20 (1986), pp. 157–65.

41 See for example, Held, ‘Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 471–81. See also Velasquez, ‘Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do’, Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 2 (1983), pp. 1–18.

42 Bates, ‘The Responsibility of ‘Random Collections’’, Ethics, 81 (1971), pp. 343–9. See also French, ‘The Corporation as a Moral Person’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979), pp. 207–15. Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and “Quasi-States”’, in Erskine (ed.), Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

43 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 165.

44 UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (A/RES/60/1, 2005), para. 139.

45 Curiously, though, some delegates to the UN 2008 budget committee argued that the responsibility to protect concept was never adopted by the General Assembly. See Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come … And Gone?’, International Relations, 22 (2008), pp. 283–98, p. 288.

46 Cane's primary thesis is that responsibility should be analysed in relational terms, namely in terms of the role responsibility plays in practical reasoning and regarding how we should behave toward others. See Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002).

47 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), para. 2.29; 2.31.

48 Ibid., para. 2.31.

49 Ibid., See also para. 2.32.

50 Ibid., para. 2.14; 2.15.

51 Ibid., para. 2.14.

52 Clearly, one is still required to alarm the fire department, and do what one can without risking oneself, or others, before the fire department arrives.

53 There have been some calls to form an international ‘911’ to respond to humanitarian crises. Perhaps the most sophisticated of these proposals is the SHIRBRIG. See Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade at {http://www.shirbrig.dk}. On the Security Council's responsibilities, see for example, Article 24 of the UN Charter.

54 UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (A/RES/60/1, 2005), para. 139.

55 Hoe, ‘Intervention, Hailed as a Concept, Is Shunned in Practice’, New York Times, 20 January 2008. See also fn. 44.

56 The responsibility to protect is not only about intervention for humanitarian purposes, but the likely possibility of some form of intervention being necessary, as has been the case historically, is a central part of the argument.

57 See for example, Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 17.

58 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, International Court of Justice, 1970, pp. 33–4.

59 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).

60 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice, 1996, p. 23.

61 See for example, Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 96.

62 ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kreća’, para. 101, pp. 765–66 in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice, 1996.

63 ‘Declaration of Judge Oda’, para. 4, p. 626 in Ibid.

64 This is not to say that the responsibility to protect is an obligation erga omnes.

65 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), para. 2.14. See also Foundation A. in ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Core Principles’ in the same report.

66 Ibid., para. 2.29.

67 Ibid., para. 6.28.

68 Note in this context how also the Security Council has the primary but not the sole responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. See Article 24.1 in UN, Charter of the UN (1945).

69 Right Authority F. in ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Core Principles’.

70 Ibid.

71 See for example, Article 8 of UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).

72 See fn. 66.

73 Also fire engines can break down. This is obviously a small possibility which is minimised with there being multiple fire engines in a department and several departments in a city.

74 Note also how under the UN Charter, the right of self-defence remains unimpaired until the Security Council has taken necessary measures. See Article 51 in UN, Charter of the UN (1945).

75 The UN Charter envisioned that member states would make available the necessary personnel, equipment, finances, and other assistance at the call of the Security Council. The reality has been much different, though. See Articles 43, 45, and 47 in Ibid.

76 Some would object, because there is no clear legal responsibility. Instead of entering that debate, the purpose has been to build on the R2P report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which both acknowledge the existence of an international responsibility to protect victims of grave humanitarian crises. Thus, it is assumed for heuristic purposes that the responsibility exists, whether as a moral, political, or other kind of responsibility. See also fn. 44.

77 For a number of definitions, see ‘What Is the International Community?’, Foreign Policy, September–October (2002), pp. 28–46. But see also for example, Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, ‘International Community' after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 81 (2005), pp. 31–52; Ellis, ‘On the Possibility of ‘International Community’, International Studies Review, 11 (2009), pp. 1–26.

78 See for example, Annan, ‘Problems without Passports’, Foreign Policy, September–October (2002), pp. 30–1. But for contrasting arguments, see also Peltonen, ‘Of Systems, Societies, and Communities: Some Thoughts for Northeast Asian Peace Studies’, Peace Forum, 24 (2009), pp. 1–16; Ellis, ‘On the Possibility of ‘International Community”’, International Studies Review, 11 (2009), pp. 1–26.

79 One should note that there is no difference in the ‘weight’ or preference among the criteria in the current context. Thus, at this point the criteria serve to demonstrate what should be taken into consideration at the minimum as well as the higher argument that the collective responsibility can be practically shared among individuals. Further research would be required to ‘formalise’ the model or to consider which criteria should be given priority.

80 Note here for example the logic used for determining the UN membership payments that focuses mainly on a member's ability to pay by taking into consideration a number of economic factors.

81 It is laudable that Iceland has participated in peacekeeping operations despite not having standing armed forces.

82 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN, ‘1.02 Billion People Hungry: One Sixth of Humanity Undernourished – More Than Ever Before’ (Rome 19 June 2009). Accessed 8 February 2010 at {http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/}.

83 Again, this is not to argue that the evolution has been the same in both cases, or that the international level is at a same point in the evolution as fire departments.