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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 1985
The problem of strategy in the nuclear age is simple–how to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Unfortunately, the solution to the problem is far from simple, Philip Lawrence's belief that students of strategic studies do not appreciate the moral, political and military complexities of the issues is both unfair and unscrupulous. To be sure, strategic studies like most disciplines has its fair share of crazies. But to label such extremists as models of the discipline is akin to blaming all politicians for the horrors-of Hitler or Pol Pot. Students of strategy have shown themselves to be far more sophisticated, and the problems they analyse are more complex, than Lawrence admits. Strategic studies deserves a better press.
1 Lawrence, Philip K., ‘Nuclear Strategy and Political Theory: A Critical Assessment’, Review of International Studies, 11 (04 1985), pp. 105–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 See the review of two Colin Gray books by Ken Booth, Journal of Strategic Studies, Summer 1984.Google Scholar
3 For example, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959);Google ScholarFreedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London, 1981);Google ScholarKen Booth, , Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London, 1979);Google ScholarMichael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge, 1981).Google Scholar
4 Segal, Gerald, Moreton, Edwina, Freedman, Lawrence and Baylis, John, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (London, 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 For a more sophisticated view of the ‘high priests’ of strategy see Michael Mandelbum, The Nuclear Future (London, 1983)Google Scholar and Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983).Google Scholar
6 Garnett, John, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics (London, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 Measor, Nicholas, ‘Game Theory and the Nuclear Arms Race’ in Blake, Nigel and Pole, Kay(eds), Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers and Nuclear Strategy (London, 1983)Google Scholar. Also by the same editors, Objections to Nuclear Defence: Philosophers on Deterrence (London, 1984).Google Scholar
8 See a peculiar, but provocative treatment of this issue in Ian Forbes, ‘People or Processes’, Politics, vol. 4 no. 2, 10 1984.Google Scholar
9 Goodwin, Geoffrey (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence (London, 1982)Google Scholar and Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1983)Google Scholar as just two examples of serious scholarship on these subjects. For a more general critique of strategic studies concepts see Prins, Gwyn (eds.) The Choice: Nuclear Weapons versus Security (London, 1984)Google Scholar especially chapters by Raymond Garthoff and Michael MccGwire.
10 10. Freedman, Evolution of Strategy, for a full analysis.
11 Jervis, Robert, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Cornell, 1984).Google Scholar