Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
J. A. Hobson died on April Fools’ Day in the first year of the Second World War. This, and a whimsical anecdote from A. J. P. Taylor, might appear to be enough to justify the portrayal of Hobson as an idealist. This paper critically assesses the work of J. A. Hobson and its relation to idealism as a category of international relations thought. An examination of Hobson’s writings on international relations shows that there are three distinct strands of thought, three modes of idealism. These modes of idealist thought differ on fundamental propositions about international relations as well as in their prescriptions for a reformed world order. In short, consideration of Hobson’s work destabilizes the monolithic category of idealism in international relations. Put another way, idealism blurs important distinctions in Hobson’s work.
A version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Annual Convention, Washington, DC, 10–14 April 1990. The author wishes to thank Peter Wilson, Martin Ceadel, Michael Banks, Ronen Palan and tw o anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
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