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Ideas, tradition and norm entrepreneurs: retracing guiding principles of foreign policy in Blair and Chirac's speeches on Iraq

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2010

ØIVIND BRATBERG
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Abstract

The significance of ideas to foreign policy analysis remains contested, despite a plethora of empirical studies applying ideational frameworks. Drawing on social constructivism, this article proposes a causal understanding where ideas derived from tradition define the political space for contemporary debates and effect foreign policy behaviour. This ideational approach is substantiated by a historical study of guiding principles in British and French foreign policy, which establish a set of baseline expectations for the analysis of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac's speeches on Iraq. The empirical study shows that whereas Chirac largely stayed within a French ideational framework, Blair applied a more complex combination of ideas from both traditions. Conceptualising Blair as an aspiring (but ultimately unsuccessful) norm entrepreneur is a fruitful interpretation of this role.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , January 2011 , pp. 327 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

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16 McLeod, ‘L'approche constructiviste’, p. 78;

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20 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52 (1998), pp. 887–917.

21 The following reviews of post-war British and French foreign policy draw upon extensive use of secondary sources. For the purpose of this article, the reviews have been abridged; a more elaborate account is given in Bratberg, Grand Nations.

22 In the words of Lord William Rees-Mogg (interview with author, London 10 November 2004), Britain's foreign policy follows ‘a pragmatic and liberal tradition […] in the sense that it defends the liberal causes of the world, but with a clear conscience of the limitations of its power – of anyone's power – to make the world a better place’.

23 FCO, UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO. White Paper, Command 6052, published 12 February 2003; Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities. White Paper, Command 6762, published 28 March 2006.

24 Christopher Tugendhat and William Wallace, Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

25 Thus, Britain became a main benefactor of American aid through the Marshall Plan from 1947. In the military domain, there were British aspirations that the US would help sustain British commitments overseas, a concern that was brought to the fore by emerging expansionism on the part of the Soviet Union. This reached a crucial point in 1947, as British requests for American help in Greece and Turkey worked as rationale for the Truman doctrine, which would offer American help to peoples subdued under the Communist threat.

26 Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation (London: Routledge, 1974), p. 85.

27 Paul Sharp, Thatcher's Diplomacy. The Revival of British Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 6.

28 Acheson quoted from his speech at the Military Academy, West Point, 5 December 1962. Accessed through Oxford Dictionaries on 19 June 2008 at: {http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=quot&freesearch=dean+acheson&branch=14123648&textsearchtype=exact}.

29 Tugendhat and Wallace, Options for British Foreign Policy, p. 62.

30 Oliver J. Daddow, ‘Euroscepticism and the Culture of the Discipline of History’, Review of International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 309–28; Piers Ludlow, ‘Us or Them? The Meaning of Europe in British Political Discourse’, in Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds), The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention Within and Between Nations (Oxford: Berg, 2002), pp. 101–24; William Wallace, ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom’, International Affairs, 67:1 (1991), pp. 65–80.

31 Andrew Gamble, Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

32 Tugendhat and Wallace, Options for British Foreign Policy, p. 2.

33 Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850–1986: Delusions of Grandeur (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), p. 118.

34 David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society. New Demands and Old Politics (London: Jonathan Cape, 1988), p. 221.

35 Christopher Hill, ‘The Historical Background: Past and Present in British Foreign Policy’, in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds), British Foreign Policy. Tradition, Change and Transformation (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 25–49, pp. 28–9.

36 Notably, the liberal belief in free trade, a cherished goal of British foreign policy, was also the material interest of a burgeoning industrial class, as Victorian Britain profited strongly from export-driven trade. At the same time, self-sufficiency was never considered an option in this country raised in the virtue – and necessity – of exchange.

37 Wyn Rees, ‘The Anglo-American Security Relationship’, in Stuart Croft (ed.), British Security Policy. The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 143–60, p. 145.

38 William Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, 82 (2005), pp. 53–68; Paul D. Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997–2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

39 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April 1999. Accessed on 7 August 2007 at: {http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=829&kaid=128&subid=187}.

40 Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension of Labour's Foreign Policy’ (London: the Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), pp. 27–31.

41 More fundamentally, France has been a laboratory of constitutions. The quest for constitutional perfectionism marks a deep contrast to the British political system, which almost 800 years after the Magna Carta has yet to be laid down in a written constitution.

42 Philip G. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France. French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 4–5.

43 Philip C. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur. Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 2.

44 This particular French perspective is reflected in de Gaulle's suggestion of a NATO triumvirate as well as his prospects for the European Community (notably the so-called Fouchet Plan suggesting French-German dominance). Furthermore, de Gaulle allowed himself a relentless pursuit of French interests even within the EC, as shown by France's boycott of Council meetings of the mid-1960s.

45 Jolyon Howorth, ‘Consensus and Mythology: Security Alternatives in Post-Gaullist France’, in Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds), France in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 16–34, p. 16.

46 Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, p. 68.

47 Alistair Cole, François Mitterrand. A Study in Political Leadership (London: Routledge, 1994).

48 Mark Wise, ‘France and European unity’, in Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds), France in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 35–73, pp. 39–40. Notably, the Revolution and following warfare marks the beginning of morally justified French expansionism. Later supra-national initiatives were typically in the vein of St. Simon; democratic federations for the promotion of peace, nevertheless on the basis of universal rights embedded in the Revolution.

49 Robert Aldrich and John Connell, ‘Beyond the Hexagon: France in World Politics’, in R. Aldrich and J. Connell (eds), France in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1–15, p. 14.

50 Charles Thumerelle and Philippe G. Le Prestre, ‘France: The Straitjacket of New Freedom’, in Le Prestre (ed.), Role Quests, pp. 131–60, p. 135.

51 Thierry Tardy, ‘La France et l'ONU, entre Singularité et Ambivalence’, Politique Étrangère, 67 (2002), pp. 931–47, p. 932.

52 Michael J. Glennon, ‘The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law’, Foreign Affairs, 78:3 (1999), pp. 2–7; Norman Bowen, ‘Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: the French Foreign Policy Discourse’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 16 (2005), pp. 94–116.

53 These dimensions are inductively derived from the set of ideas represented in the table. They are thus not based upon any form of statistical inference.

54 Craig McLean and Alan Patterson, ‘A Precautionary Approach to Foreign Policy? A Preliminary Analysis of Tony Blair's Speeches on Iraq’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8 (2006), pp. 351–67; Stephen B. Dyson, ‘Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair's Iraq Decisions’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2 (2006), pp. 289–306.

55 Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus, Textens Mening och Makt. Metodbok i Samhällsvitenskapelig Textanalys (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000), p. 154.

56 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (London: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 68.

57 Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley and Nelson Philips, ‘Discourse analysis and content analysis: two solitudes?’, Qualitative Methods, 2:1 (2004), pp. 19–22.

58 Klaus Krippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, second edition (London: Sage, 2004), p. 87.

59 With both Blair and Chirac, roughly two thirds of all ideas extracted from the speeches adhered to either the French or the British foreign policy tradition as these had been defined. The coding scheme is available from the author on request.

60 Declaration at the outbreak of war (Paris, 20 March 2003). Author's translation.

61 A manifestation of this was found in the speeches by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac to their respective diplomatic corps in January 2003. Both underlining a great-power heritage, the two leaders nevertheless diverged consistently on the ideas or values to be promoted through the maintenance of a global role. An interesting contrast to the high comparability of Blair and Chirac is found in speeches by the French and British foreign ministers, which were originally intended to be analysed as part of the broader government discourse on Iraq. This had to be abandoned due to poor comparability. Relevant speeches by the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, were given almost exclusively to a parliamentary audience while statements by his French counterpart, Dominique de Villepin, were from a range of non-parliamentary settings.

62 This is the most evident with regards to Britain, which was behind the design of all the Arab Gulf states except for Persia and held a colonial mandate over the Iraqi territory till independence in 1932. France has been present by intimate commercial and strategic ties, historically via the bridgehead represented by Syria. The perceived importance of French participation in conflict resolution was reflected in President François Mitterrand's statement at the eve of the 1991 Gulf war: ‘La France ne peut pas être la Suisse’.

63 Thus, Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development and Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons, were among the political casualties of the Iraq issue. Both resigned during 2003 in protest against their government's policy in Iraq. In one of the fundamental parliamentary votes over Iraq, 139 Labour MPs voted against its government on the case for invasion.

64 Pernille Rieker, ‘Power, Principles and Procedures. French Foreign Policy Towards the USA (2001–2003)’, Journal of International Politics, 42 (2005), pp. 264–80; Jonathan Spyer, ‘Europe and Iraq: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, 11 (2007), pp. 94–106.

65 The belief that both ideational traditions could be shown to either support or oppose invasion was supported by a separate analysis of parliamentary debates in the two countries. See Bratberg, Grand Nations.

66 Twenty-three speeches by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, were analysed. All speeches were accessed on 10–12 February 2005 from the website service of 10 Downing Street: {http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3109.asp}.

67 Weapons of mass destruction, a concept frequently applied in the debates over Iraq, refers to atomic, biological and chemical weapons, all inhibited by international law.

68 Speech at Foreign Office conference for British diplomats (London, 7 January 2003).

69 Speech at TUC conference (Blackpool, 10 September 2002).

70 This idea accounts for the ‘French’ predominance in Blair's arguments on this dimension, as references to Europe occurred only rarely in his speeches.

71 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘The History of a Lesson: Versailles, Munich and the Social Construction of the Past’, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), pp. 499–519. The issue of political culture was reflected well in Blair's affirmation of parliamentary legitimacy, made explicit in the House of Commons debates on 24 September 2002 and 18 March 2003.

72 Speech to the House of Commons (Westminster 24 September 2002).

73 Twenty-five speeches by the President, Jacques Chirac, were analysed. All speeches were accessed on 16–18 February 2005 from the presidential website service: {http://www.elysee.fr/index.php}. All quotes presented are the author's translations.

74 Surprisingly, the President also equalled Blair in referring to the importance of Atlantic alliance. This lends credence to a certain flexibility, as his tending of Atlantic partnership was particularly prevalent before Anglo-American audiences – in interviews with New York Times (9 September 2002), Time Magazine (16 February 2003) and French television (10 March 2003).

75 Interview with Le Figaro (Paris, 20 January 2003).

76 Speech for the Algerian national assembly (Alger, 3 March 2003).

77 Press conference on Iraq (London, 25 March 2003).

78 Interview with Time Magazine (Paris, 16 February 2003).

79 Interview with New York Times (Paris, 9 September 2002).

80 Interestingly, cursory reading of speeches by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw hints towards a stronger preponderance of Atlantic partnership and national interest, hence a more traditional outlook, than in speeches by the Prime Minister.

81 In light of the former prime minister's appearance before the Chilcot inquiry on 29 January 2010, this summary of his advocacy for invasion remains valid. Moreover, while Blair's position is consistent, the same can also be said about public opinion in Britain: criticism is directed not only towards the flawed argument of weapons of mass destruction but also towards the supposedly pernicious combination of moralist interventionism and expansionist realpolitik which inspired Blair's position towards Iraq.

82 Dyson, ‘Personality and foreign policy’.

83 I am grateful to the second reviewer for raising these points.

84 Speech by James Ramsay MacDonald at a mass meeting in the Albert Hall (London, 8 January 1924), on the eve of Labours' first accession to government. Reproduced in Hildegerd Gauger and Hermann Metzger, British Political Speeches and Debates from Cromwell to Churchill (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954), pp. 34–7.

85 Hill, ‘The Historical Background’, p. 30.

86 Moreover, where international references were made, in France these pointed equally to Europe and the international community, while Blair's speeches turned exclusively towards the latter. Finally, where Chirac's speeches on Iraq turned largely towards arguments on principle, in Britain historical experience and perceived effects of policy were more frequently evoked. This was particularly evident in parliamentary debates, where Blair was speaking to an assembly well-dressed in historical precedence and, notably, the concept of appeasement.

87 I am grateful to the first reviewer for raising this point.

88 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics’, p. 897.