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From the Geneva Protocol to the Greco-Bulgarian dispute: the development of the Baldwin government's policy towards the peacekeeping role of the League of Nations 1924—1925

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

P. J. Beck
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Extract

The League of Nations was a new factor to be considered during the formulation of any country's foreign policy after 1919, even if it was an experiment which has often been dismissed as doomed to failure on account of the desire of the great powers to limit its evolution.1 The refusal to allow the ex-enemy states to join the League immediately, as well as the non-membership of the United States and of Russia, meant that initially Britain and France emerged as the dominant members of the League and as the leading ‘producers’ of security, and thus they have received a large part of the blame for thwarting the League's development. In particular, in the case of Britain, the Conservative Party was regarded as less sympathetic to the League than the Labour Party, and consequently a Conservative government, such as that of Stanley Baldwin from 1924–1929, which rejected the Geneva Protocol, has been interpreted as a restrictive, even harmful, influence upon the League.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , April 1980 , pp. 52 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1980

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References

page 52 note 1 The great powers are criticised by Walters, F. P., A History ofthe League of Nations (Oxford 1952)Google Scholar; this view persists in later works on the subject e.g. Dexter, B., The Tears of Opportunity — The League of Nations 1920–1926 (New York, 1967).Google Scholar

page 52 note 2 This view was argued strongly by Philip Noel-Baker in a letter written to the author, dated 17 June 1971; Noel-Baker stresses the wide differences between Conservative and Labour policies towards the League, while arguing that the hostility of the majority of the Conservative party was largely responsible for the destruction of the League.

page 53 note 1 Henig, R., The League ofNations (Edinburgh, 1973), pp. 44–62Google Scholar; Thorne, G., The Limits Foreign Policy. The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London, 1972), pp. 101–123Google Scholar; Smith, M., ‘The League of Nations and International Polities’, British Journal of International Studies, ii (1976), pp. 311–323CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 54 note 1 Cabinet Paper 2170(20) by Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1920, CAB.24/115. Cabinet(CAB.) and Foreign Office(FO.) documents are located at the Public Record Office. Chamberlain to Clark Kerr, 15 Dec. 1928, FO.800/263; Chamberlain to F. S. Oliver, 3 Aug. 1933, AC.40/5/84. The Austen Chamberlain (AC.) Papers are at Birmingham University, and are quoted by kind permission of the Librarian.

page 54 note 2 Chamberlain to Mary Carnegie, 11 Sept. 1924, AC.4/1/1254.

page 54 note 3 Chamberlain to Oliver, 17 Jan. 1927, AC.54/1/408. The Council normally met at Geneva, but in December 1924 the session was held at Rome. Chamberlain's ‘conversion’ is confirmed both by Noel-Baker, op. cit. and Cecil, Viscount, A Great Experiment(London 1941), p. 163Google Scholar. Noel-Baker's view is ofinterest, since he is normally very critical of Conservative Party attitudes towards the League.

page 54 note 4 Amery, L. S., My Political Life, (London, 1953), p. 332Google Scholar; Earl of Avon, The Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), p. 10Google Scholar.

page 55 note 1 Glasgow Herald, 3 Nov. 1926. The speech was intended for a wide audience, and of the speech were widely distributed e.g. to Mussolini and to British diplomats in South America.

page 55 note 2 Chamberlain to Oliver, 3 Aug. 1933, AC.40/5/84.

page 55 note 3 A large number of departmental objections were advanced (e.g. by the Admiralty against sanctions), while the opposition of such countries as Italy and the United States was also significant: Medlicott, W. N., British Foreign Policy Since Versailles 1919–1963 (2nd ed., London, 1968), pp. 72–74Google Scholar; Jacobson, J., Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West; 1925–1929 (Princeton, 1972), pp. 12–21Google Scholar.

page 56 note 1 Noel-Baker, op. cit. Parmoor, Lord, A Retrospect (London, 1936)Google Scholar - this includes a large amount of information on the Protocol negotiations. For alternative perspectives, see Chamberlain to Cecil, 19 June 1925, AC.52/1/133; Marquand, D., Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), p. 356Google Scholar.

page 56 note 2 Chamberlain to P. Kerr (later Lord Lothian), 6 June 1925, AC.24/8/33. Chamberlain, who had just read a recently published account on Castlereagh — Webster, C., The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822 (London, 1925)Google Scholar - ensured that a portrait of Castlereagh looked down upon the formal signature of the Locarno Treaties in London on 1 December

page 57 note 1 R. Ogley and M. Smith, ‘Insiders and Outsiders’, Yearbook of World Affairs pp. 232–249.

page 57 note 2 Cecil to G. Murray, 25 Sept. 1924, Add. 51134/20 (the Cecil Papers, which are located at the British Museum); Drummond to Chamberlain, 27 Jan. 1927, FO.800/260; Rovine, A. W., The First Fifty Tears. The Secretary-General in World Politics 1920–1970 (Leyden, 1970), pp. 46–47Google Scholar

page 58 note 1 Barros, J., The League of Nations and the Great Powers. The Greek-Bulgarian Incident (London, 1970), p. 119Google Scholar; Beck, P. J., Britain and the Peacekeeping Role of the League of Nations 1924–1929 (London Ph.D.Thesis 1971), p. 199Google Scholar.

page 58 note 2 Chamberlain's speech to the Council, 14 Dec. 1925, League of Nations Official Journal, viii (1926), p. 179Google Scholar.

page 58 note 3 Jacobson, op. cit. pp. 69–76; P. Edwards, , ‘The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings’, The Historical Journal, xiv (1971), pp. 153–164CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 59 note 1 For a full account of this dispute: Barros, op. cit.; Beck, op. cit. pp. 173–214; Gilbert, M., Rumbold Portrait of a Diplomatist (London, 1973), pp. 306–310Google Scholar.

page 60 note 1 Griin, G. A., ‘Locarno: Idea and Reality’, Journal of International Affairs, xxxi (1955), pp. 477–485Google Scholar; Marks, S., The Illusion of Peace. International Relations in Europe 1918–1933 (London, 1976), pp. 70–72Google Scholar.

page 60 note 2 Chamberlain to W. Tyrrell, 8 June 1925, FQ.371/10733. C.7862/459/18(25); Memo., Chamberlain, 17 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10743. C. 13128/459/18(25); Edwards, op. cit. p. 156.

page 61 note 1 Italian Reply, 24 Oct. 1925, FO.421/309. 0.13838/251/62(25).

page 61 note 2 Conwell-Evans, T. P., The League Council in Action (Oxford, 1929), pp. 36–38Google Scholar

page 62 note 1 Chamberlain to Rumbold, 2 Nov. 1925, AC.52/1/701; Cabinet Minutes, 23 Oct. 1925, CAB.23/51, Meeting no.50(25). The urgency and importance of the occasion was also indicated by Unden's use of a plane to reach Paris from Sweden.

page 62 note 2 A rapporteur was appointed to deal with a dispute and negotiations on behalf of the Council: Conwell-Evans, op. cit. p. 128, footnote 1.

page 62 note 3 Lord Crewe, British Ambassador in Paris, to Foreign Office, 27 Oct. 1925, FO.371/ 10762. 0.13705/13309/7(25).

page 62 note 4 Cabinet Minutes, 28 Oct. 1925, CAB.23/51, Meeting no. 51(25). Plans were prepared by the Admiralty for a naval demonstration against Greece: Admiralty Case no. 2737, Adm. 116, 50–4, Mediterranean Squadron. The plans have since been destroyed, but an outline can be found in Index 24550. Studies by the League Secretariat on sanctions are included in: Barros, op. cit. pp. 126—138.

page 63 note 1 Foreign Office to Rumbold, 31 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10763. 0.13907/13309/7(25); Gilbert, op. cit. p. 307.

page 63 note 2 A brief survey of the work of the commission is in: Gilbert, op. cit. pp. 307–308, p. 310.

page 64 note 1 W. A. Erskine, British Minister in Sofia, to Chamberlain, 23 Dec. 1925, FO.371/10763. C.16583/13309/7(25); Barros, op. cit. p. 52.

page 64 note 2 Memo., Chamberlain, undated (1926?), AC.38/4/2. A cartoon in Punch on 11 Nov 1925 is of interest; it is entitled ‘Balkandum and Balkandee’. Greece and Bulgaria are depicted as the two characters, while the League appears, of course, as a dove, which makes them forget their quarrel.

page 65 note 1 The episode appears to justify Taylor's claim that collective security was merely a “fifth wheel” for British policy, employed for appearances rather than for utility or conviction: Taylor, A. J. P., English History 1914–1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 379Google Scholar.

page 65 note 2 Chamberlain to Grewe, 19 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10852. £7143/357/89(25). It is difficult to regard Chamberlain's actions during this dispute as being out of step with his previous policy towards the League, especially if one refers, for instance, to his policy during the Mosul dispute: Beck, op. cit. pp. 289—310; cf. Barros, op. cit. p. 119.

page 65 note 3 For one example in the Conservative party: Macmillan, H., The Winds of Change 1914–39 (London, 1966), p. 200Google Scholar. Note also Pugh, M. C., British Public Opinion and Collective Security 1926–1936 (University of East Anglia Ph.D.Thesis, 1975).Google Scholar

page 66 note 1 Chamberlain to E. Howard, British Ambassador in Washington, 4 June 1925, FO.800/ 258; Chamberlain to P. Cunliffe-Lister, 14 July 1927, AC.54/1/50.

page 66 note 2 The League's achievements in the sphere of non-political activities were considerable, although often ignored: e.g. see V-Y. Ghebali, ‘The League of Nations and Functionalism’ in Groom, A. J. R. and Taylor, P. (eds.), Functionalism. Theory and Practice in International Relations (London, 1975), pp. 141–161Google Scholar.

page 66 note 3 Beck, op. cit. pp. 273–283.

page 67 note 1 G. Murray to Cecil, 17 Nov. 1925, Add.51132/45; Macmillan, op. cit. p. 242; Dalton, H., Call Back Yesterday I (London, 1953), pp. 169–170Google Scholar.

page 67 note 2 On France, see: Albrecht-Carrie, R., Britain and France. Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power (New York, 1970), p. 441Google Scholar; on France and Corfu: Lowe, C. J. and Marzari, F., Italian Foreign Policy 1910—1940 (London, 1975), p. 200Google Scholar.

page 67 note 3 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 Dec. 1926, A.C. 5/1/403.

page 67 note 4 Amery to Baldwin, 18 Sept. 1926 (the Baldwin Papers, which are located at Cambridge University), file 115/120.

page 68 note 1 Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit. p. 441; Kimmich, C. M., Germany and the League of Nations (Chicago, 1976), p. 133Google Scholar, p. 198; Sutton, E., Gustav Stresemann. Diaries, Letters and Papers, II (London, 1937), pp. 503–505Google Scholar

page 68 note 2 Lowe and Marzari, op, cit. p. 198, p. 208; Marks, op. cit. pp. 30–31. It is of interest to note that this utilitarian attitude towards the League has been established for other powers: e.g. Veatch, R., Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto, 1975), p. 186Google Scholar; Nish, I., Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942. Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London, 1977), p. 5Google Scholar, pp. 150–151.