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The evolution of international law in light of the ‘global War on Terror’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2010

ERIC A. HEINZE
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Abstract

This article explores how various aspects of the ‘global War on Terror’ may be affecting the future development of international law on the use of force. I examine these effects within three areas of international law – the law of anticipatory self-defence, the law of self-defence against non-state actors, and the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-state armed groups. Only in the latter two areas do I find evidence that international law is evolving to accommodate the new realities of global terror. While such developments in the law reflect the supposed need by states to use military means to combat terrorism, they also seem to confer at least a limited international legal personality upon terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This not only indicates a shift in the basis for legal personality, but also potentially undermines the legitimacy of international law and frustrates states' efforts at combating terrorism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , July 2011 , pp. 1069 - 1094
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

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