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The elusive explanation: balance of power ‘theory’ and the origins of World War I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Peter Gellman
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Extract

Martin Wight once asked why the balance of power ‘has inspired no great political writer to analysis and reflection’?

Looking back in 1923, Winston Churchill wrote:

One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon world fortunes. It has been well said, ‘there is always more error than design in human affairs’. The limited minds even of the ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspect—all this must surely be considered before the complete condemnation of the vanquished or the complete acquittal of the victors can be pronounced.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 15 , Special Issue 2 , April 1989 , pp. 155 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1989

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References

1. ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ in Butterfield, H. and Wight, M. (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London, 1966), p. 21.Google Scholar

2. The World Crisis: 1911–1914 (London, 1923), vol. one, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

3. Ibid., p. 23; Lippmann, W., U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943Google Scholar); Osgood, R. E., Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), p. 288.Google Scholar

4. Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), xix–xxxviGoogle Scholar; Dehio, L., The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe 1494–1945 (London, 1963), pp. 3–15, 224–246Google Scholar; Butterfield, H., ‘The Balance of Power’ in Butterfield, and Wight, , op. cit., p. 174Google Scholar; Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict, 1500–2000 (London, 1988), pp. 256–274.Google Scholar

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6. Good contemporary discussions of the balance of power include Bull, H., The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Claude, I., Power and International Relations (New York, 1962Google Scholar); Gulick, E. V., Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955Google Scholar); Haas, E. B., ‘The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?’ World Politics (1953), pp. 442–477Google Scholar; and Vagts, A., ‘The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea’, World Politics (1948), pp. 82–101Google Scholar. Edited collections which usefully introduce the history of thinking about the balance of power include Seabury, P. (ed.), Balance of Power (San Francisco, 1965Google Scholar); Wolfers, A. and Martin, L. W. (eds.), The Anglo-American Tradition in World Affairs (New Haven, 1956Google Scholar); and Wright, M. (ed.), Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power 1486–1914 (London, 1975).Google Scholar

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13. Wilson cited in Seabury, op. cit., at p. 142.

14. Wight, , ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ in Butterfield and Wight, op. cit., p. 21.Google Scholar

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16. Vattel, The Law of Nations (Fenwick Translation), (Washington, 1916), vol. one, p. 251.

17. Ibid.

18. Claude, op. cit., pp. 43–51.

19. Ibid., p. 50 (emphasis in original).

20. The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), pp. 162–3. Claude's partial quotation can be found in Claude, op. cit., pp. 47–8.

21. K. Waltz has discussed the difficulty of incorporating propositions about a holder into balance of power theory. See his Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., 1979), pp. 163–4.

22. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md., 1962), p. 123.

23. New York, 1959, pp. 159–223.

24. Ibid., p. 208.

25. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 57 and pp. 40–3.

26. Jervis, R., ‘Systems Theories and Diplomatic History’ in Lauren, P. G. (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York, 1979), p. 213.Google Scholar

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28. Ibid., pp. 164–70; R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), p. 110, 326; S. Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’ (here-after ‘The Cult of the Offensive’), in Miller, op. cit., pp. 96–101.

29. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., pp. 169–70. See also Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus, xciii (1964), pp. 881–909.

30. Van Evera, ‘Why Cooperation Failed in 1914’, World Politics, xxxviii (1985), p. 82.

31. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, op. cit., p. 110.

32. Quoted in Albertini, L., The Origins of the War of 1914 (Oxford, 1957), vol. i, p. 398.Google Scholar

33. See F. Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (henceforth War of Illusions), (London, 1975), pp. 394–403, and 160–74; Kennedy, P., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (London, 1980), p. 456Google Scholar; Rohl, G. C. G., ‘Admiral von Muller and the Approach of War’, Historical Journal, xii (1969), pp. 651–673.Google Scholar

34. Albertini, op. cit., vol. i, p. 424.

35. Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 481–4.

36. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911–1914, op. cit., p. 205.

37. See Jarausch, K. H., ‘The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914’, Journal of Central European History, ii (1969), pp. 48–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaiser, D. E., ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War’, Journal of Modern History (1983), pp. 442–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar. S. Lynn-Jones has argued that the different conceptions of detente held by the two powers, as distinct from the conflict of interests, contributed to the outbreak of war. See his ‘Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911–1914’, International Security, xi (1986), pp. 121–50.

38. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 167; Sagan, ‘1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability’, International Security, xi (1986), pp. 163–6.

39. See Fischer, War of Illusions, op. cit., pp. 205–9.

40. Jervis, ‘Systems Theories and Diplomatic History’, op. cit., p. 232.

41. Lafore, L., The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War One (Westport, 1981), pp. 238–239Google Scholar; and Albertini, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 158–9.

42. Evera, Van, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, op. cit., pp. 97–101Google Scholar; Van Evera, ‘Why Cooperation Failed in 1914’, op. cit., pp. 100–1; Lieven, D. C. B., Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1983), pp. 139–151CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Taylor, A. J. P., Europe: Grandeur and Decline (New York, 1967), pp. 186–189Google Scholar; Albertini, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 402–26; and vol. ii, pp. 574–81.

43. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 61.

44. Ibid., pp. 102–28; Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, ii (1950), pp. 157–80.

45. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 80.

46. Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, xxx (1978), p. 183. On the Schlieffen Plan, see Ritter, G., The Schlieffen Plan (New York, 1958)Google Scholar; Snyder, J. L., The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 107–156Google Scholar; Fischer, War of Illusions, op. cit., pp. 389–420.

47. Bethmann-Hollweg cited in Thompson, W. C., ‘Winston S. Churchill: Statesman as Strategist’ in Jaffa, H. V. (ed.), Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Spencer Churchill (Durham, N.C., 1981), p. 120Google Scholar; Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 189.

48. Jervis, ‘Systems Theory and Diplomatic Theory’, op. cit., pp. 234–5.

49. Snyder, op. cit., passim.

50. Ibid., pp. 121–2.

51. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., pp. 110—11 (emphasis in original).

52. Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 170; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 93.

53. Quoted in Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, op. cit., pp. 226 and 430.

54. Ibid., pp. 448–9.

55. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, op. cit., p. 176.

56. Kennedy, P., ‘Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race’ in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (London, 1983), pp. 129–160.Google Scholar

57. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., pp. 75–6, 127–8; see also Posen, B. R., The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 16–20.Google Scholar

58. Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, p. 187; see also Snyder, J. L., ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 119.Google Scholar

59. ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, op. cit., p. 58.

60. Ibid., p. 65. They were:

German an d Austrian expansionism; the belief that the side which mobilized or struck first would have the advantage; the German and Austrian belief that they faced ‘windows of vulnerability’ the nature and inflexibility of the Russian and German war plans and the tight nature of the European alliance system, both of which spread the war from the Balkans to the rest of Europe; the imperative that ‘mobilization meant war’ for Germany; the failure of Britain to take effective measures to deter Germany; the uncommon number of blunders and mistakes committed by statesmen during the July crisis; and the ability of the Central powers to evade blame for the war. Without the cult of the offensive these problems would have been less acute, and their effects would have posed smaller risks.

In his Causes of War (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984), Van Evera writes that ‘causing peace is more a matter of improving national perceptions than reforming national or international systems’ (p. 15) and spends much of his study subjecting these misperceptions to a number of arguments drawn from organization theory. Still, his third chapter (pp. 77–171) as well as the articles cited above (see note 42) accept the premise that the system is an important cause of war and it is the arguments which he makes in this context which are the focus of my discussion.

61. ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 66.

62. See Chickering, R., We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan German League 1886–1914 (London, 1984)Google Scholar, passim; Fletcher, R., Revisionism and Empire: Socialist Imperialism in Germany 1897–1914 (London, 1984), pp. 34–41Google Scholar; Jarausch, K., Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, 1982), pp. 345–366Google Scholar; Mommsen, W. J., Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920 (Chicago, 1984), pp. 68–90Google Scholar; Dorpalen, A., ‘Heinrich von Treitschke’ in Laqueur, Walter and Mosse, George L. (eds.), Historians in Politics (London, 1974), pp. 21–35.Google Scholar

63. History of the Peloponnesian War (Crawley translation) (New York, 1950), p. 419 (VI. 24), (emphasis mine).

64. Quoted in Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918, op. cit., p. 524.

65. ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 70.

66. The debate sparked by Fritz Fischer has become voluminous. In addition to War of Illusions, Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War (London, 1966) and World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1974) form the heart of his preventive war interpretation. Good introductions to the controversy include H. W. Koch, The Origins of the First World War, second edition (London, 1984) and J. A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London, 1975). See also Lebow, R. N., ‘Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them’ in Miller, op. cit., pp. 147–186.Google Scholar

67. For a different view see Levy, J. S., ‘Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War’, World Politics, xl (1987), pp. 98–99.Google Scholar

68. Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 95.

69. Ibid., p. 96.

70. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911–1914, op. cit., p. 494.

71. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 175.

72. Evera, Van, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 92Google Scholar; and Evera, Van, ‘Why Cooperation Failed in 1914’, op. cit., p. 100 (fn. 70).Google Scholar

73. Jervis, et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md., 1985), pp. 16–17.

74. It is worthwhile t o note Jack Snyder's notion of an ‘imperialist's dilemma’, a modification of Jervis’ analysis which he argues better explains the patterns of pre-1914 international politics:

Theorists of German expansion like Alfred Tirpitz and Kurt Riezler argued that brinkmanship and competitive armament could serve as a substitute for war, a way to measure power and will without actually fighting, as long as German aims were limited. They did not reckon, however, on the dynamics of the imperialist's dilemma. Recurrent crises and arms races led characteristically to tightening alliances, inferences that war was inevitable, power fluctuations producing windows of opportunity, and finally war. In this interpretation, what started as limited competition over economic, imperial, and prestige issues evolved into a tight security dilemma because the instruments and tactics of limited, controlled expansion were indistinguishable from the means to achieve a decisive hegemony.

Snyder himself argues that th e necessary ingredient for the imperialist's dilemma ‘type’ of security dilemma is an expansionist or imperialist state which ‘develops offensive military forces for the purpose of conquest or intimidation.’ Hence, the structure of multipolar balance of power cannot account for the causes of World War 1—a conclusion, along with his emphasis on subsystemic factors, which takes his analysis outside the sphere of balance of power theory. However, Snyder's distinction between an imperialist's dilemma and imperialism rests on the slenderest of reeds: a preference on both sides for ‘some compromise’ over an d against the uncertain dangers of war. Such absences of war, unaccompanied by an abandonment of the imperialist purpose or the resistance to it, are merely pauses in a conflict chosen by the expansionist state or states—not as Snyder argues, a ‘dynamic’ framed by both sides to achieve their aims through methods short of war and from which a ‘conflict spiral’ ensued. The focus on changing diplomatic tactics while depreciating continuities in the basic intentions of states recalls Thucydides' commentary on the Peace of Nicias:

After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians an d Athenians, concluded after the ten years’ war, in the Ephorate of Pleistola at Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the states which had accepted them were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty mad e after ten years’ war and to have recourse to open hostilities.

Snyder, ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, in Jervis, et al., op. cit., pp. 175, 165, 153–79; Thucydides, op. cit., p. 352 (V. 26).

75. Quoted in Strong's, R. excellent study, Bureaucracy and Statesmanship: Henry Kissinger and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Lanham, Md., 1986), p. 38.Google Scholar

76. Jervis, ‘From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation’, World Politics, xxxviii (1985), p. 68.

77. Advocates of inadvertence include Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive’, in Miller, op. cit., p. 94; and J. S. Levy, ‘The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World War One’, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1–4 September 1988, pp. 7–15.

78. Bull, op. cit., p. 110.

79. A model of consistency is Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics, op. cit. For my own transgressions see ‘Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism’, Review of International Studies, xiv (1988), pp. 247–66.