Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
Much has been written about the deep fear of aerial bombardment in inter-war Britain. Particular attention has been paid to the Government awareness of that danger during the late 1930s, when the threat of war advanced from the realm of military and academic speculation to the sphere of an immediate political concern. “Air power” and the concomitant possibility of aerial bombardment, to quote Correlli Barnett, then became an “obsession”; it pervaded Cabinet debates and dominated all discussions of rearmament at every level of the British decision-making process.2 Why this should have been so, is not always made clear. The Government's sensitivity to the air danger is more often assumed than explained, and comparatively few attempts have been made to analyse the root causes which were responsible for this fear in official circles. Particularly neglected, in this context, is the impact of public opinion. Broadly speaking, public opinion is considered to have played a generally negative role, retarding the process of rearmament when not obstructing it altogether. The interplay between the public's view of the “air peril” and that of the Government is thereby minimized. This article is designed to redress that balance. It aims to examine the degree to which the British public was itself sensitive to the air danger and the extent to which its fears were communicated to the men who formulated the country's defence policy. In so doing, it will argue that public opinion acted as a catalyst, affecting official views on defence policy and — in general terms — influencing the choice of the form which rearmament was to take.
page 32 note 1 See inter alia the first parts of O'Brien, T., Civil Defence (London, 1955)Google Scholar; Collier, B., The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957)Google Scholar, and Webster, C. and Frankland, N., The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, i (London, 1961)Google Scholar; for a more recent research, see Wood, J. E, The Luftwaffe as a Factor in British Policy 1935–1939 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Tulane University, 1965)Google Scholar; Cameron, F., Some Aspects of Diplomacy and Strategy (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1973)Google Scholar; Bialer, U., Some Aspects of the Fear of Bombardment from the Air and the Making of British Defence and Foreign Policy 1932–1939 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1974)Google Scholar, on which this article is partly based, and Smith, M. S., The Development of a Theory of Strategic Airpower in Great Britain 1934–1939 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Lancaster University, 1975).Google Scholar
page 32 note 2 The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), p. 494Google Scholar.
page 33 note 1 D.C. (P) 50, CAB. 16/102.
page 33 note 2 The most comprehensive account of British rearmament in the inter-war period is Gibbs, N., Grand Strategy, i, Rearmament Policy (London, 1976)Google Scholar. For recent analysis of the subject see Meyers, R., Britische Sicherheitspolitik 1934–1938 (Dusseldorf, 1976)Google Scholar, Shay, R. P., British Rearmament in the 1930s (Princeton, 1978)Google Scholar and Peden, G., British Rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh, 1979)Google Scholar. Very useful are Dennis, P., Decision by Default (London, 1972)Google Scholar; Howard, M., The Continental Commitment (London, 1972)Google Scholar; Roskill, S., Naval Policy Between Wars, ii, 1930–1939 (London, 1976)Google Scholar, and Hankey, Man of Secrets, iii (London, 1974)Google Scholar. See also Dunbabin, J., ‘British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review’, in Historical Journal, xviii (1975), pp. 581–609Google Scholar; Parker, R., ‘Economic Rearmament and Foreign Policy Before 1939: A Preliminary Study’, Journal of Contemporary History, (1975) pp. 637–647CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coghlan, F., ‘Armament, Economic Policy and Appeasement, Background to British Policy’ History, 57 (1972), pp. 205–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Malamet, B., ‘Baldwin Re-Restored?’ Journal of Modern History, 44 (1972), pp. 87–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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page 34 note 2 See Dennis, op. cit.
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page 35 note 1 See Madge, C. and Harrison, T., Britain by Mass Observation (London, 1939).Google Scholar
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page 36 note 1 Moon, H., The Invasion ofthe United Kingdom (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London city, 1968), p. 652Google Scholar.
page 36 note 2 Colonel Wedgwood, 8 March 1934, 286, H.O.G. DEB.CCL.2079.
page 36 note 3 See G. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, i, op and M. S. Smith, op. cit.
page 36 note 4 See Smith, E. S., R.A.F. Plans and British Foreign Policy 1935–1940 (unpublished Ph. thesis, M.I.T., 1966)Google Scholar and John, A., The Debate on British Military Air Policy 1933–1939, (unpublished Ph.d. thesis, University of Kentucky, 1969).Google Scholar
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page 37 note 2 7 July, 1936, GAB. 16/147.
page 37 note 3 Winds of Change (London, 1966), p. 522Google Scholar.
page 37 note 4 ‘The Coming of Air War’, 8 January, 1934.
page 38 note 1 See, for example, L. E. O. Charlton's Evidence before a G.I.D. Sub-Committee on 22 June, 1936, CAB. 16/147.
page 38 note 2 Norman MacMillan, 22 June, 1936, CAB. 16/147. Italics added.
page 39 note 1 C. H. Gibbs-Smith, The Story of the Air League, 1900–1939 (London, n.d.). I am to Mr. John Motum, the former Director of the British Air League, for allowing me access to this study.
page 39 note 2 To W. Smith, 19 March 1926, (Groves Papers, deposited with the Liddell Hart Papers).
page 39 note 3 Gibbs-Smith, op. cit. In this campaign, Groves, who then held the influential position of Air Correspondent for The Times, played a leading role. The subsequent agitation was characterized by much debate and eventually resulted in Parliamentary legislation which confirmed the independence of the R.A.F. See Higham, R., The Military Intellectuals in 1918–1940 (New Brunswick, 1966), pp. 171–174Google Scholar and Powers, B. D., Strategy Without Rule (London, 1976), pp. 129–130Google Scholar.
page 40 note 1 Gibbs-Smith, op. cit. The records of the Air League, to which the writer was kindly allowed access by its Secretary, Air Vice Marshal Hoad, contains some further information on its various activities during the 1930s.
page 40 note 2 Ibid. For general analysis of the Organisations of British Ex-Servicemen in a post World War I Era see Wootton, G., The Politics of Influence (London, 1963).Google Scholar
page 40 note 3 For a lengthy review of these writings, see Higham, The Military Intellectuals, op. cit.
page 40 note 4 Gharlton, L. E. O., An Autobiography (London, 1938), p. 172Google Scholar.
page 41 note 1 War From the Air, p. 7.
page 41 note 2 Powers, op. cit. pp. 131–132.
page 41 note 3 A large collection of his private papers is now at the R.A.F. Museum in London,, For his early career see his Words and Music for a Mechanical Man (London, 1968).Google Scholar
page 41 note 4 His writings included, inter alia, Aerial Navigation of Today (London, 1910)Google Scholar; The Aeroplane (London, 1911)Google Scholar; The Romance of Aeronautics (London, 1912)Google Scholar; Flying (London, 1914)Google Scholar; The Struggle in the Air (London, 1919)Google Scholar; The Old Flying Days (London, 1927)Google Scholar, and Air Qiiestions and Answers (London, 1930)Google Scholar.
page 41 note 5 Lady Houston was much noted for shaming the MacDonald Government in 1931, by supplying £100,000 so that Britain could enter the last Schneider Trophy Race and a year later by offering £200,000 to the Air Defence of London.
page 41 note 6 The Brabazon (Lord Brabazon of Tara) papers which are at the R.A.F. Museum contain a prolonged correspondence with G. Grey during the inter-war period.
page 42 note 1 Among other writers were Harry Arper of the Daily Mail, Edward Bowyer of the Daily News, Ronald Walker ofthe Chronicle, Harold Pemberton of the Express and Charles Colebrook of The Times. For a revealing personal account of aviation writing in this period which shed important light on the general issue see O. Stewart, ‘Forty Years of Aviation Writing’, Lecture delivered to the Aero Club in London on 9 November i960 in Stewart Papers.
page 42 note 2 The Broken Wing (London, 1966), p. 199Google Scholar.
page 42 note 3 In a private letter to Inskip, 8 May 1937, Liddell-Hart Papers, n/1937/383. For a recent analysis of his work and influence, see Bond, B., Liddell-Hart, A Study of his Military Thought (London, 1977).Google Scholar
page 42 note 4 Barnett, op. cit. p. 497.
page 42 note 5 From a description of a meeting with Chamberlain in the spring of 1937, in a letter to B. Collier, 24 March 1959, Liddell-Hart Papers.
page 43 note 1 Cowling, M., The Impact of Hitler (London, 1975), p. 122CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on his views, see also Gannon, F. R., The British Press and Germany, 1936–1939 (London, 1971), pp. 51–53Google Scholar, 210–211.
page 43 note 2 26 February 1933.
page 43 note 3 28 January 1934. On 3 September 1935, he wrote to Churchill that “three months earlier, I gave Baldwin a terse memorandum urging him to make you the creator of air parity which by a grand effort… could be done in a year”. Quoted in Gilbert, M., Winston S. Churchill, v, 1922–1939 (London, 1976), pp. 664–665Google Scholar.
page 43 note 4 Cowling, op. cit., p. 118.
page 43 note 5 2 April 1936, CAB. 16/147.
page 43 note 6 See his My Fight to Rearm Britain (London, 1939), pp. 110–115Google Scholar.
page 43 note 7 It should be noted that Rothermere had been campaigning in his newspapers in 1921 for a bigger Air Force, thus anticipating his more resolute attacks of a few years later. See Marquess of Londonderry, Wings of Change (London, 1943), p. 25Google Scholar and Powers, op. cit. pp. 101–102.
page 44 note 1 Londonderry, op. cit. p. 128.
page 44 note 2 16 May 1935, FO 800/290.
page 44 note 3 22 May 1935, 302 H.O.C. DEB. COL. 397.
page 44 note 4 See Taylor, A. J. P., English History 1914–1945 (London, 1965), pp. 44Google Scholar, 95, Powers, op. cit. pp. 22–27 and Kettle, M., Salome's Last Veil (London, 1977)Google Scholar.
page 44 note 5 For an analysis of British air rearmament as reflected in Parliament, in the 1930s see A. John, op. cit.
page 44 note 6 The Brabazon papers which are now being catalogued at the R.A.F. Museum shed much light on his activities as an eminent air power protagonist.
page 44 note 7 Middlemas, R. and Barnes, J., Baldwin (London, 1969), p. 753Google Scholar.
page 44 note 8 Roskill, op. cit. p. 52.
page 45 note 1 He gave more than a thousand lectures on a future of civil aviation from 1922 to 1935 and was jointly responsible for the design of supermarine S5 (the Schneider Trophy winner, 1926, from which the Spitfire was subsequently developed). He formed Simmonds Aircraft Ltd in 1928 and became the founder-president of the Air Raid Precautions Institute ten years later.
page 45 note 2 In May 1938 he became Under-Secretary of State for Air. In his memoirs he wrote that he “made avaiation service and civil my subject”. Balfour, H., Wings Over Westminster (London, 1973) p. 86Google Scholar.
page 45 note 3 Thus, for example, while admitting that “it is a horrible thing for a pacifist to have to advocate…,” he urged Parliament early in 1935 for a loan for the building up of national factories to provide aeroplanes and taking the question of “our deficiency in this supreme arm as one of the crises which this country has to pass”. 22 May 1935, 302, H.O.G. DEB. COLS. 445–446.
page 45 note 4 In an article entitled ‘War in the Air’ he claimed late in 1933 that “Our Children will be children of the air and it is time for their sake that our Government realized it”. The Saturday Review, 9 December 1933Google Scholar.
page 45 note 5 For a detailed account, see M. Gilbert, op, cit. parts 3 and 4. See also We Churchill, The Second World War, i, The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), p. 178Google Scholar.
page 46 note 1 283, H.O.C. DEB.
page 46 note 2 For a typical example see the debate in the Commons on 27 January 1937 surrounding O. Simmonds’ motion urging for hastening air rearmament which was designed to warn the Government that interested M.P.'s were keeping a sharp eye on the Air progress. 319 H.O.C. DEB. See also Jones, T., A Diary With Letters 1931–1950 (London, 1954), p. 236Google Scholar.
page 46 note 3 See CAB. 21/438 and J. Barnes and K. Middlemas, op. cit. pp. 946–948, 969–970. 4. See the report of the German Military Attache in London of 30 July 1934, in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1941, C, III, No. 138, p. 276 and Schweppenburg, G., Critical Tears (London, 1952), p. 46Google Scholar.
page 47 note 1 In a private letter to Sir Raymond Beazley, 27 October 1934, MacDonald Papers, 2/8.
page 47 note 2 30 April 1935, GAB. 27/508.
page 47 note 3 342, G.O.S. GAB. 53/24.
page 47 note 4 Sir Henry Pownall, Military Assistant Secretary of the C.I.D. referred in his diary to “A tremendous pressure of the press which is continually clamouring for greater air forces”. Entry in Diary, 28 February 1934, in Bond, B. (ed.), Chief of Staff, i (London, 1972), p. 38Google Scholar.
page 47 note 5 2 July 1934, GAB. 16.110.
page 47 note 6 21 June 1934. ADM. 116/3436. In an entry in his Diary of 30 July 1934, Pownall explained this decision as the “extraordinary” and “inevitable” effect of public opinion, the press and the Lord Lloyd-Churchill group on the minds of ministers. Bond, op. cit. pp. 49–50.
page 47 note 7 From Hoare's letter to Baldwin, 19 November 1934. Baldwin Papers, Vol. I.
page 48 note 1 27 May 1935, GAB. 27/508.
page 48 note 2 Ibid.
page 48 note 3 CAB. 16/147.
page 48 note 4 Ibid. The attacks on the Admiralty followed the Abyssinian crisis in 1935 when it was greatly disturbed about the danger of an air attack on the Mediterranean Fleet.
page 49 note 1 Ibid. On this Committee, see Roskill, S., Naval Policy Between the Wars (London, 1968), pp. 221Google Scholar, 329, 478.
page 49 note 2 C.P. 39 (36) GAB. 24/260.
page 49 note 3 13 January 1935, CAB. 16/123.
page 49 note 4 For a fuller elaboration of this issue see U. Bialer, op. cit
page 50 note 1 Ibid. Ch. 1.
page 50 note 2 Rose, N., Vansittart (London, 1978), pp. 122–156Google Scholar, and Smith, M., ‘The Royal Air Force Air Power and British Foreign Policy 1932–34’, Journal of Contemporary History, xii, (1974), pp 153–175Google Scholar
page 50 note 3 See Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, op. cit. pp. 234, 263 and 664–665. For a rather amusing anecdote illustrating this fact, see Deutsch, H., The Conspiracy Against Hitler in Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1968), pp. 103–104Google Scholar.
page 50 note 4 Kyba, J., British Attitudes Towards Disarmament and Rearmament 1932–35 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1966).Google Scholar
page 51 note 1 Bialer, op. cit. Ch. 2.
page 51 note 2 For an analysis of the League of Nations Union, an important pressure group in the disarmament movement see Bramstead, E., ‘Apostles of Collective Security’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, xiii (1967).Google Scholar