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Compliance among weak states: Africa and the counter-terrorism regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2010

BETH ELISE WHITAKER
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Abstract

This article examines levels of compliance with the counter-terrorism regime in Africa, where weak states might have been expected to conform. Instead, even under American pressure, some governments have seized the anti-terrorism rhetoric while others have been more reluctant. A comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda demonstrates that domestic political factors largely explain this variation; compliance is highest in countries with the least democratic institutions and minimal mobilisation of domestic constituencies. Aid dependence and the perception of a terrorist threat also play a role. To the extent that popular pressures in transitional democracies reduce compliance, the article raises questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the counter-terrorism regime.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , July 2010 , pp. 639 - 662
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

1 At the time this article was accepted for publication in November 2008, the counter-terrorism policies of the Bush administration were collectively known as the ‘War on Terror’. Since then, the Obama administration has stopped using that term, choosing instead the label ‘overseas contingency operations’. The counter-terrorism strategies pursued by the Obama administration are not significantly different from those of its predecessor, however, particularly in the region under consideration here (Africa).

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51 There is some question as to whether this heightened American attention to Muslims in East Africa is warranted. There is little evidence that Islamic radicalism has gained much support in the region, and the recent mobilisation of the Muslim communities in Kenya and Tanzania is motivated primarily by local concerns (political inclusion, economic development, etc.), not by global ideologies. See Haynes, Jeffrey, ‘Islamic Militancy in East Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 26:8 (2005), pp. 1321–1339CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Rosenau, William, ‘Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28 (2005), pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Ousman, Abdelkérim, ‘The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 18:1 (2004), pp. 65–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Rüdiger Seesemann, ‘East African Muslims after 9/11’, Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers, no. 3 (2005); Becker, Felicitas, ‘Rural Islamism during the ‘War on Terror’: A Tanzanian Case Study’, African Affairs, 105:421 (2006), pp. 583–603CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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53 Stiles and Thayne, ‘Compliance with International Law’.

54 See Uganda's 2002 report to the CTC found via the committee's website at: {http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/}.

55 The Monitor (28 March 2007).

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58 This list is distinct from but issued along with the list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which are identified through a more complex process involving the US Treasury Department.

59 Per the terms of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, US immigration authorities can block entrance to the country and/or deport people with known connections to groups on the Terrorist Exclusion List.

60 LRA leaders argued that they should be removed from the US list of terrorist groups so that their supporters could travel freely to peace negotiations. Daily Monitor (27 April 2007).

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63 Scores range from −10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).

64 On a scale from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (most authoritarian), countries with an average political rights/civil liberties score of 3.0 to 5.0 are considered partly free. Countries with a lower average score are free, and those with a higher average score are not free.

65 In 2005, Museveni pushed through a constitutional amendment that allowed him to run for a third term the following year.

66 Piombo raises doubts about the political will of African leaders to pass AML/CTF legislation when their basis for power often involves illicit financial activities. See Piombo, Jessica, ‘Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in East Africa’, in Giraldo, Jeanne K. and Trinkunas, Harold A. (eds), Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007)Google Scholar .

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68 Uganda received US $1.5 billion and Kenya got about US $943 million in 2006. These numbers are from OECD statistics available online at: {www.oecd.org}.

69 Each president basically serves two five-year terms and then steps down in favour of the next CCM candidate.

70 Even with irregularities in recent elections in Zanzibar, there is little doubt that the CCM won overall.

71 The law's nickname was a direct reference to then US Attorney General John Ashcroft.

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