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Wagering Belief: Examining Two Objections to Pascal's Wager

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

D. Groothuis
D. Groothuis
Affiliation:
Denver Conservative Baptist Seminary, Post Box 10000, Denver, Colorado 80230
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Abstract

This paper concerns two objections to Pascal's wager. The first claims that Pascal's recommendation to habituate oneself to believe in God is tantamount to religious brainwashing. I argue that this construal misses important aspects of what Pascal had in mind, which may render the habituation process a legitimate means to acquire new understanding. The second objection is based on the idea that a key assumption of the wager – that theistic belief is required for eternal felicity – is morally absurd. I argue that theistic belief, as Pascal understands it, is a necessary aspect for spiritual restoration, not merely an isolated belief in an imperious deity.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 1994 , pp. 479 - 486
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Penelhum, Terence, God and Skepticism (Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), p. 69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Pascal does not explicitly mention the dangers of hell in the wager. He emphasizes, rather, the possibility of infinite happiness. Nevertheless, the possibility of hell (or infinite unhappiness) seems assumed and important in his argument; and we know from other sources that hell was one of his religious beliefs.

3 For Pascal, belief in theism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for heaven, as will be discussed below.

4 Pascal, Blaise, Pensées (New York: Penguin, 1985), 418/233. This edition uses the Lafuma enumeration of fragments, which are listed first in the reference. The second number is the older Brunschvg system.Google Scholar

5 Mackie, John L., The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1980), pp. 200–3.Google Scholar

6 Ibid. 816/240; emphasis added.

7 John, 5: 44.Google Scholar

8 Pascal, , 418/233.Google Scholar

10 Hick, John, Faith and Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 34.Google Scholar

11 James, William, The Will to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), p. 6.Google Scholar

12 Penelhum, Terence, Religion and Rationality (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 211–19. In his later volume, God and Skepticism, Penelhum does give some favourable comments on the wager: see pages 69–74.Google Scholar

13 Pascal, , 418/233.Google Scholar

14 Ibid. 357/541

15 Ibid. 449/1556

16 Ibid. 418/233.

17 Ibid. 189/543.

18 Ibid. 192/527.

19 The Protestant reader may dissent and advise less specifically Roman Catholic practices, but the point still stands.

20 My thanks go to R. Douglas Geivett for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.