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Theistic consubstantialism and omniscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2017

ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF
ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same stuff. If theistic consubstantialism is correct, then God possesses the essential power to have knowledge de se of the contents of the mind of every conscious being internal to God. If theistic consubstantialism is false, then God lacks this essential property. So either God is essentially corporeal and possesses greater essential epistemic powers than God would have otherwise or God is essentially incorporeal and has a diminished range of essential epistemic powers. In light of this dilemma, I argue that theists should accept theistic consubstantialism.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , June 2018 , pp. 233 - 245
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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