Hostname: page-component-cc8bf7c57-l9twb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-11T22:09:06.708Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Revealed Propositions and Timeless Truths

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Paul Helm
Paul Helm
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Liverpool
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

‘The formulas of advanced English politicians are as stiff and arrogant as the formulas of theology. Truth itself becomes distasteful to me when it comes in the shape of a proposition. Half the life of it is struck out of it in the process.’

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 1972 , pp. 127 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 127 note 1 The Semantics of Biblical Language (1961), p. 271.Google Scholar

page 127 note 2 Systematic and Philosophical Theology, Nicholls, W.. (1969), p. 95.Google Scholar

page 127 note 3 The Bible in the Age of Science, Richardson, A.. (1961), p. 139.Google Scholar

page 127 note 4 Artide ‘Revelation’, A Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Richardson, A. (1969), p. 295.Google Scholar

page 128 note 1 ‘Sentences, Statements and Proposition’, in British Analytical Philosophy, ed. Williams, and Montefiore, .Google Scholar

page 129 note 1 op. Cit. p. 97–8.

page 129 note 2 Word and Object, (1961), pp. 193–4.Google Scholar

page 129 note 3 Geach's view is expounded in ‘Assertion’ Philosophical Review (October 1965), and more briefly in Reference and Generality (Emended edition, 1968), pp. 24–5.Google Scholar

page 130 note 1 For an account of this see Kenny, Anthony ‘Necessary Being’ in Sophia, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1962).CrossRefGoogle Scholar A similar view is defended by Williamson, Colwyn in ‘Propositions and Abstract Propositions’, Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Rescher, Nicholas (1968).Google Scholar

page 130 note 2 Prior, A. N., Time and Morality (1957), p. 8Google Scholar; Past, Present and Future (1967), pp. 15 ff.Google Scholar

page 131 note 1 Searle, J. R., Speech Acts (1969), p. 29.Google Scholar

page 131 note 2 The extent to which the meaning of a statement is to be equated with its illocutionary force is a matter of active philosophical controversy. See e.g. Geach ‘Assertion’, Searle, J. R., Speech Acts (1969)Google Scholar; Hare, R. M. ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’, Philosophical Review (January 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 132 note 1 Nature, Man and God (1934), P. 317.Google Scholar

page 133 note 1 Faith and Understanding (1969), p. 241.Google Scholar

page 133 note 2 op. cit., p. 148.

page 134 note 1 op. cit. p. 189.

page 134 note 2 Kneale, M., ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’ (PAS 1968–1969).Google Scholar

page 135 note 1 On this point see Mackay, Donald M., ‘What Makes a Question?’ in Information, Mechanism and Meaning (1969), p. 32.Google Scholar

page 136 note 1 Philosophy of Logic (1970), p. II.Google Scholar Quire's remarks on ‘Truth and semantic assent’ illuminate the falsity of the dichotomy between believing truths and believing persons very nicely.