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Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 September 2002

DAVID SILVER
DAVID SILVER
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark DE 19716
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Abstract

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , September 2002 , pp. 339 - 353
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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