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Recent Work by J. N. Findlay

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

John E. Smith
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, Yale University

Abstract

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Type
Review Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

page 279 note 1 Bolder than most official philosophers of science, Findlay asks the good question as to why the entire universe must be interpreted in such a way as to keep constant one contingent measurement—the velocity of light—when the infinite variety of chance encounters between things might have been explained by the invariant character of their natures; see I, 140; cf. 144.

page 281 note 1 It is curious indeed that Tillich's thought is described in this way. Tillich would not allow that ‘ultimate concern’ is a merely ‘human attitude’ any more than Findlay would accept the reduction of his eidetic phenomenology to the ‘merely psychological.’