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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Religious piety and proofs of God's existence have not in modern times invariably sat so happily beside one another as the attempted euphony of my title may at first appear to suggest.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the existence and nature of God came to be conceived as a purely philosophical question that could be answered, if at all, without recourse to ‘narrowly religious’ considerations. Philosophers and sympathetic theologians agreed that a religiously independent philosophy is itself competent to demonstrate the deity's existence and nature by means of formally valid and generally convincing rational proofs.
2 For a detailed attempt to retrace the steps of this modern transposition, see Buckley, Michael J., At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, 1987).Google Scholar
3 In Religious Studies, XXIII (1987), 1–17.Google Scholar
4 For my understanding of law and legal education in eleventh-century Islam, I am greatly dependent upon the work of George Makdisi, especially his book The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh, 1981).Google Scholar See also Schacht's, Joseph two books, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964)Google Scholar and The Origins of Muhammadan [sic] jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950).Google Scholar
5 Ibid. p. 8.
6 Ibid. pp. 105ff.
7 Ibid. pp. 6ff.
8 Ghazālī's own explanation is given in his al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl, translated by McCarthy, R. J. as Freedom and Fulfillment (Boston, 1980). Cf. pp. 89ff.Google Scholar
9 Ibid. pp. 90f.
10 Cf. Ghazālī's main late work, the Ihyā', a key section of which (Kitāb Sharḥ ‘Ajāib’ al-Qalb) has been translated by McCarthy and included in Ibid. See especially pp. 363ff. See also Burrell, David, ‘The Unknowability of God in al-Ghazali’, Religious Studies, XXIII (1987), 171–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11 This remarkable consistency has also been stressed by Iysa A. Bello in the only recently published study of The Medieval Islamic Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy (Leiden, 1989).Google Scholar
12 ‘The Jerusalem Tract’, translated and edited by Tibawi, A. L., in The Islamic Quarterly, IX (1965), 97–8.Google Scholar
13 Qur'ān, sura 2; translated by Arberry, A. J., The Koran (Oxford, 3 1983), p. 21.Google Scholar
14 ‘The Jerusalem Tract’, p. 98.Google Scholar For a discussion of this proof, based on the version included in Ghazālī's Ihyā', and a comparison with Thomas's viae, see Beaurecueil, S. de L. de and Anawati, G. C., ‘Une preuve de l'existence de dieu chez Ghazzali et S. Thomas’, Mélanges de l'institut dominicain des études orientales, III (1956), 207–58.Google Scholar
15 Cf. Craig, William Lane, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London, 1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
16 CE, e.g., Fayṣal al-Tafriga bayn al-Islām wa l-Zandaqa (‘The Clear Criterion for Distinguishing between Islam and Godlessness’) in McCarthy, , Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 150Google Scholar, and regarding Christians as ‘unbelievers’, see esp. pp. 170ff.
17 One possible explanation for this welcome has been proposed by Fakhry, Majid: ‘… since throughout Muslim history the Shi'ites had been forced into the position of a disgruntled minority whose political ambitions were repeatedly thwarted, it was natural that they should rebel intellectually against the facts of religio-political reality and seek in the realm of abstract constructions a spiritual haven to which they could turn in adversity. This tendency would probably account not only for the revolutionary spirit that fired many Shi'ite leaders throughout Muslim history and the occultism characterizing Shi'ite thought and attitude, but also for their association with the leading school of rationalist theologians in Islam, i.e. the Mu'tazilah, their recognition of the validity of the independent judgment (ijtihād) of qualified jurists in matters of jurisprudence, even to the present day, and their readiness to assimilate Greek philosophy without any hesitation.’ A History of Islamic Philosophy (London and New York, 2 1983), p. 41.Google Scholar
18 Ibid. pp. 217f.
19 Translated by Kamali, S. A. (Lahore, 1958).Google Scholar
20 Fayṣal, pp. 149–50, 164.Google Scholar
21 Ibid. pp. 150ff.
22 Ibid. p. 166.
23 The full list of charges appears in Kamali's edition of the Tahāfut on pp. 11f.Google Scholar Cf. also Freedom and Fulfillment, pp. 76f.Google Scholar
24 For a balanced discussion of these three issues as disputed between Ghazālī and the philosophers, see Leaman, Oliver, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 25–120.Google Scholar Among older works, see Gardet's, Louis study of La pensée religieuse d'avicenne (Paris, 1951)Google Scholar, which was published to commemorate the one thousandth anniversary of the birth of Ibn Sīnā.
25 Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 77.Google Scholar
26 Qur'ān, sura 10; Arberry translation, p. 196.Google Scholar
27 Fayṣal, pp. 164–6.Google Scholar
28 Davidson, Herbert A., Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford, 1987), pp. 1f.Google Scholar
29 For a discussion of Ghazālī's concept of ‘consensus’, see Bello, , Medieval Islamic Controversy, pp. 29–43.Google Scholar
30 In addition to Islamic ‘sectarians’ and other ‘heretics’, the pious Muslims of Jerusalem had also to contend with the First [Christian] Crusade to ‘liberate’ the Holy City. Support for the Crusade was incited by Pope Urban in an address at Clermont in Auvergne on 25 November 1095, and Jerusalem finally capitulated to the invaders on 15 July 1099. George Hourani reckons that ‘The Jerusalem Tract’ cannot have been written before 1098. See ‘The Chronology of Ghazālī's Writings’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXIX (1959), 229.Google Scholar
31 ‘The Jerusalem Tract’, p. 96.Google Scholar
32 Ibid. p. 98. Cf. also Tahāfut, trans. Kamali, , pp. 1–10.Google Scholar
33 Qur'ān, sura 10.
34 Legends about Udayana derive mainly from chapter 30 of the Bhavisyatpurāéiṣṭa, though Dineshachandra Bhattacharya reports that anecdotes are still narrated with great delight by Mithilā scholars. History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā (Darbhanga, 1958), p. 6.Google Scholar For variant tellings of the legends recounted here, see – in addition to Amma, Bhattacharya Visweswari, Udayana and His Philosophy (Delhi, 1985)Google Scholar; Potter, Karl (ed.), Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa, volume 2Google Scholar of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Princeton, 1977), p. 522Google Scholar and the additional sources mentioned by Potter, (cf p. 706).Google Scholar
35 On the origins, character and spread of the Jagannātha cult, see Donaldson, Thomas E., Hindu Temple Art of Orissa (3 vols.; Leiden, 1985–1987)Google Scholar; Eschmann, Anncharlott et al. (eds.), The Cult of Jagannath and the Regional Tradition of Orissa (New Delhi, 1978)Google Scholar; and Schneider, Ulrich, Der Holzgott und die Brahmanen (2 vols.; Wiesbaden, 1984).Google Scholar
36 That is, he burned himself to death over a slow fire.
37 It is a pity that John Wisdom evidently did not know this story, because it would have served his purposes in ‘Gods’ much better than the Elijah legend he cited to show that ‘the existence of God is not an experimental issue in the way it was’ [Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (Oxford, 1953), p. 149].Google Scholar For one forceful account of the point of the ‘experiment’ on Mount Carmel, and of its abuse in the writings of Wisdom and others, see Fackenheim, Emil, Encounters between Judaism and Modern Philosophy (New York, 2 1980), pp. 9–29.Google Scholar
38 ‘Brahmanic culture is essentially textual, for the entire way of life – personal, social and ritual – of a Brahman is basically guided by scriptures … To a Brahman, there is hardly anything in his life and ways of living which escapes the body of scriptures. The brahmanic scriptural text has thus built up an autonomous culture which is coherent, self-consistent, and distinctive.’ Saraswati, Baidyanath, Brahman Ritual Traditions in the Crucible of Time (Simla, 1977), p. ix.Google Scholar Cf. Sharma, Rajendra Nath, Brahmanas of India: Their Social, Religious, Cultural, Political and Economic Life (Delhi, 1977).Google Scholar
39 The Pariśuddhi – or, to give it its full title, the Tātparyapariśuddhi – is the final link in the five-member chain, beginning with Gautama'as Nyāyasūtra, which together constitutes ‘orthodox’ Nyāya-doctrine. According to Dineschachandra Bhattacharya, who cites the above ‘pen-picture’ of Udayana, , ‘it was probably written by an admirer who actually saw him alive’. Op. cit. p. 37.Google Scholar (For his assistance with the translation of the Sanskrit verse on which this paragraph is based, I am grateful to Uni.-Doz. Dr Roque Mesquita.)
40 Ibid.
41 Cf. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, vol. 6 2Google Scholar of A History of Indian Literature, edited by Gonda, Jan (Wiesbaden, 1977), p. 96.Google Scholar See also Potter, Karl, op. cit.Google Scholar
42 For a philosophically brilliant analysis of Udayana's defence of the doctrine of the ‘soul’ (ātman) and of his critique of the Buddhist's ‘no-soul’ (anātman) doctrine, see Oetke, Claus, ‘Ich’ and das Ich: Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse (Stuttgart, 1988).Google Scholar
43 See, e.g., the end of the Ātmatattvaviveka, where Udayana ranks the various systems of salvation as steps leading to the Nyāya-Vaisesika system, which he cheekily calls – no doubt to the chagrin of the Vedāntins – ‘the final Vedānta’.
44 Nyāyakusumānjali, stabaka 1, kārikā 3. See Bronkhorst, Johannes, ‘God in Sāṃmkhya’, Wiener Zeitschrift für the Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, XXVII (1983), pp. 159f.Google Scholar
45 Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad, III, 1–2 (translated Zaehner, R. C., Hindu Scriptures, London, 2 1966, p. 207).Google Scholar
46 This account is based largely on Udayana's Kiraṇnāvalī, a commentary on the Vaiśeṣika text Padārthadharmasamgraha by Praśastapada. For a summary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cosmology, see Türstig, Hans-Georg, Über Entstehungsprozesse in der Philosophie des Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-Systems (Wiesbaden, 1982).Google Scholar
47 Chemparathy, George, An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali (Vienna. 1972), p. 145, n. 309.Google Scholar
48 Stabaka 2, kārikā 4 (translated by Cowell, E. B., Calcutta, 1864, p. 31).Google Scholar
49 Translated by Kher, Chitrarekha V. and Kumar, Shiv (Delhi, 1987).Google Scholar Contrast what Udayana says here in praise of his God with what al-Ghazālī says in praise of his God in the laudatory preface (khuṭba) to the Faḍā'iḥ al-Bāṭiniyya wa Faḍā'il al-Mustaẓhiriyya ( Freedom and Fuyllment, pp. 175fGoogle Scholar).
50 They appear principally in the Nyāyakusumājali, but also in the Ātmatattvaviveka and in the Kiraṇāvalī The best summary of Udayana's proofs is found in Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, to which the reader is referred.
51 Nyāyakusumāājali, stabaka 5, kārikās 6–14 (Cowell, translation, pp. 71–82Google Scholar). See Chemparathy, , pp. 122–5.Google Scholar
52 See his Śrī-Bhāsya, I, i, 3Google Scholar.
53 See Oberhammer, Gerhard, ‘Zum Problem des Gottesbeweises in der Indischen Philosophie’, Numen, XII (1965), 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a sensitive comparison of the doctrinal schemes and styles of spirituality which characterized non-theistic and radically theistic expressions of early Nyāya philosophy, see the same author's Wahrheit and Transzendenz: Ein Beitrag zur Spiritualität des Nyāya (Vienna, 1985).Google Scholar
54 See Verpoorten, Jean-Marie, Mīmāṃmsā Literature, vol. 6Google Scholar of A History of Indian Literature (Wiesbaden, 1987).Google Scholar
55 Cf. Heesterman, J. C., ‘On the Origins of the Nāstika’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, XII–XIII (1968–1969), 171–85Google Scholar, and Witzel, Michael, ‘The Case of the Shattered Head’, Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik, XIII–XIV (1987), 363–415.Google Scholar
56 See Heesterman, , op. cit., pp. 171f.Google Scholar
57 See Oberhammer, Gerhard, ‘Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, XII (1963), 63–103.Google Scholar
58 Cf., e.g., Much, Michael Torsten, Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ (Diss. phil.; University of Vienna, 1983).Google Scholar
59 See Chatterjee, Satischandra, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics (Calcutta, 3 1965), pp. 1ffGoogle Scholar; van Bijlert, V. A., Epistemology and Spiritual Authority: The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology (Vienna, 1989).Google Scholar
60 See, e.g., Much, Michael Torsten, ‘Dharmakīrti's Definition of “Points of Defeat” (Nigrahasthāna)’, in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, edited by Matilal, B. K. and Evans, R. D. (Dordrecht, 1986), pp. 133–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
61 So Bhattacharya, , History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.Google Scholar
62 Nyāyakusumānjali, stabaka t, kārikā IGoogle Scholar.
63 See Chemparathy, , An Indian Rational Theology, pp. 109ff.Google Scholar
64 Stabaka 5, kārikās 17–19 (Cowell, translation, p. 85Google Scholar).
65 IX.22, 26, 28–9 ( Hindu Scriptures, p. 288Google Scholar).
66 Despite Satischandra Vidyabhusana's having asserted in his influential History of Indian Logic (Delhi, 2 1971Google Scholar [1920]) that the Indian syllogism was ‘greatly influenced by, if not based on’ Aristotle (p. 511; cf pp. 497–513), scholars today are inclined to stress their independent origins and their distinctive features, whilst allowing some affinities. Cf, e.g., Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Logic, Language and Reality (Delhi, 1985), pp. 1–8.Google Scholar
67 Faḍa'iḥ al-Bāṭiniyya, §§ 166–9Google Scholar (Freedom and Fulfillment, pp. 224–5Google Scholar). Cf. Goodman, Lenn E., ‘Ghazālī's Argument from Creation’, International journal of Middle Eastern Studies, II (1971), 75f., 187.Google Scholar
68 Udayana's Buddhist opponents – being ‘heterodox’ – would not be inclined to accept an appeal to brāhmanic scripture as a reason for granting the truth of any doctrine. In order to establish the reasonableness of his appeal to Vedic scripture, therefore, Udayana offered arguments for their authoritativeness. One such argument was built on their having been ‘spoken’ by a trustworthy person, namely God, whose existence can be inferred by means of theistic proofs. In other words, the existence of God is demonstrated in the Āimatattvaviveka in order to show that the Vedas are authoritative, so that they can be cited as evidence for the existence of the soul. But, since none of these arguments would count as reasons amongst the Buddhists, one might be better advised to regard them as Udayana's attempt to show the reasonableness of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine (in this case, of the soul) than to treat them as apodictic proofs which any rational person, including a Buddhist, would be expected to accept.
69 The verse is cited in – and is, therefore, older than – Vyāsa's Yogabhāsya on Patañjali's Yogasūtra, I.48. Even though he would have known Vyāsa's Bhāsya, Udayana more likely adopted the interpretation given that verse by his fellow Naiyāyika Vācaspati Miśra, who in his gloss on Vyasa transposed the possibly Yogic verse into a Nyāyan key. See Prasada, Rāma (trans.), Patañjali's Yoga Sutras (New Delhi, 3 1982).Google Scholar
70 See Makdisi, , The Rise of Colleges, p. 100.Google Scholar