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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
I'm very grateful for the opportunity to reply to Paul Helm's perceptive remarks on my paper about divine impeccability, for, in dealing with his criticism, I can further clarify some points in my paper, and in discussing his alternative solution to the problems I raised, I can as yet deal with some important aspects I had ignored. Helm's paper is divided into three sections. The first two contain his criticism of my position, and the third his alternative solution. I will deal with these in turn.
page 224 note 1 For a useful discussion of this distinction as well as an analogous distinction between ‘the can of capacity’ and ‘the can of relative likelihood’, see Gibbs, Benjamin,‘Can God do evil?’, Philosophy L (1975).Google Scholar See also the interesting discussion between Harrison, Jonathan and Geach, Peter in Philosophy LI (1976) and LII (1977).Google Scholar
page 225 note 2 A similar solution is put forward by Pailin, David in ‘The humanity of the theologian and the personal nature of God’, Religious Studies XII (1976)Google Scholar, and criticized by Mason, David R. in ‘Can God be both perfect and free?’, Religious Studies XVIII (1982).Google Scholar Eleonore Stump also considers and rejects this solution in ‘Petitionary prayer’, American Philosophical Quarterly XVI (1976).