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On Mistranslated Booktitles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Wilfred Cantwell Smith
Wilfred Cantwell Smith
Affiliation:
Professor of the Comparative History of Religion, Harvard University
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Extract

Of the pungent aphorism traduttori traditori, one of the inherent delights is that the phrase itself cannot be translated into other languages without betrayal; at the least, of its pithy charm. All language is imperfect, a reader (or hearer) always understanding what is said in a way that leaves out something of what the writer (or speaker) means, and a way that adds something of what the reader (or hearer) supposes, or imposes, Ortega y Gasset has thoughtfully argued. I agree with this, yet hold that this characteristic of the human situation need not dishearten. We do better to marvel at how much the written or spoken word succeeds in communicating among persons – succeeds in building community between and among persons – than to bemoan that it does not succeed flawlessly.

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Articles
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Religious Studies , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 27 - 42
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

page 27 note 1 José Ortega y Gasset, posthumously, in Diogenes, number 28, 1959Google Scholar. This UNESCO review appeared simultaneously in four languages: English, French, German, and Spanish. In this particular case, the original was presumably the Spanish version, but despite extensive search this has not proven available in North America. In English: ‘The Difficulty of Reading’ (Parmenter, Clarence E., trans.), pp. 1–17Google Scholar of the English issue.

page 28 note 1 Émile Durkheim. The first edition, bearing this title and with the subtitle Le système totèmique en Australie, was published in Paris: Felix Arcan, 1912Google Scholar, in the series Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine. The English translation by Swain, Joseph Ward, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: a study in religious sociology, London: Allen & Unwin, and New York: Macmillan, no date, appeared in 1915Google Scholar. Both French and English have been several times reprinted since, recent editions being by other publishers in both cases.

page 28 note 2 In both tendencies Durkheim was a full and indeed leading participant. On the former point, he is quite explicit. He defends the view that ‘the primitive religions… can … serve to show the nature of the religious life’ (French, p. 4; Eng., p. 3) – that is, in its essentials. While agreeing that ‘the most recent religions’ (ibid.) – which are admittedly of a ‘ greater complexity and [a] higher ideology’ (Fr., p. 3; Eng., p. 3) might in principle be thought to serve equally well, he characterizes them as in practice so remote from their origins [sic] and so complicated, so transformed by later obscuring interpretations, that in their case ‘it is very difficult to distinguish… the essential [sic]from the accessory’ (Fr., p. 7; Eng., p. 5). Referring to ‘the mark of its origins’ (sc., the origins of ‘the religious fact’) and, therefore, to its/their ‘true nature’, he writes: ‘it would have been well-nigh impossible to infer them from the study of the more developed religions’ (Fr., p. lo; Eng., pp. 7–8).

The second point, that present-day ‘primitive’ societies and their religions and other institutions are primitive in a chronological sense, in being not unlike all human society in its historically earliest forms, Durkheim like others of his time took on the whole for granted. He noticed the problem in passing but dismissed it (cf. Fr., p. I fn., and p. II; Eng., p. I fn., and p. 8). They did not wrestle with the fact that modern‘primitives’ have just as many years of history behind them as do the rest of us to-day.

Both matters, as well as the notion of elements as constitutive, universal, and on-going, are clear in his opening chapter,‘Introduction’, evident throughout, and addressed again in his final chapter,‘Conclusion’.

Both were representative of the then prevalent ideology among intellectuals (and both crystallized in the term élémentaire) which viewed ‘knowledge as the reduction of complex wholes to simple elements’ (Wm. Sullivan), and rejected final causes.

page 30 note 1 I have used the following edition: S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidel contra errores Infidelium, qui dicitur Summa Contra Gentiles, edd. Cesla[us] Pera, Marc, D. Petr[us] et al. , Augustae Taurinorum: Marietti, 3 voll., 1961–1967Google Scholar. (The title-pages of voll. 2 and 3, which were published first, vary slightly in wording.)

page 30 note 2 Aquinas, St. Thomas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles, translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Anton C. Pegis et al., Garden City, New York: Doubleday (Image Books), 5 voll., 1955–1957Google Scholar. (There is occasion just below – in our next note – to refer to an impressive version earlier in the century: Joseph Rickaby, S. J., Of God and His Creatures: an annotated translation (with some abridgement) of the Summa contra Gentiles of Saint Thos Aquinas, St. Louis: Herder, and London: Burns & Oates, MCMV.)Google Scholar

page 30 note 3 S. Thomas Aquinatis…Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. I: Veritate, De, ed. Raymund[us] Spiazzi, Taurini, Romae: Marietti, 1964Google Scholar. So far as I am aware, recent English versions of this always render it as ‘on truth’, never ‘on reality’: an example, Aquinas, St. Thomas, Truth, McGlynn, James B., trans., Chicago: Henry Refiner, 3 voll., 1952–1954Google Scholar. How would those who might balk at rendering the word here as ‘reality’ respond to a suggestion of calling in both: On Truth and Reality? The problem stems from what ‘truth’ means to most academic intellectuals in the late twentieth century. (I find engaging the title and Preface [pp. vii–viii] of the Rickaby translation of Thomas's other work cited in our immediately preceding note just above.

page 31 note 1 Belief and History, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977Google Scholar; Faith and Belief, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979Google Scholar. (Cf. also my Meaning and End of Religion, [New York: Macmillan, 1963] London: SPCK, and San Francisco etc.: Harper & Row, 1978 – not least, the material summarized on its p. 77.)Google Scholar

page 31 note 2 Aquinas, Thomas, Utrum fides sit unaGoogle Scholar. In his Summa Theologise, 2: 2: 4: 6. In the Caramello edn., Turin and Rome: Marietti, vol. 2, p. 32.Google Scholar

page 32 note 1 Let not this sentence seem to suggest that Raymond was more appreciative than was Thomas of the Muslims and their religious life; far from it. He is known as a zealous supporter of the Inquisition, and of a crusade (1299) against ‘the Moors’. He was simply more appreciative than was Thomas of the fact of the Muslims' existence: a fact that otherwise hardly impinged on Thomas's consciousness, who of course also knew nothing of Hindus, Buddhists, and China. It was at Raymond's instigation that Thomas took time off to write contra Gentiles at all; the question would not have occurred to him on his own.

page 32 note 2 He does indeed occasionally use that phrase in his writings; yet if I may quote from a recent observation: ‘In my Belief and History …I made the following statement: “in Catholic thought, it is my impression that throughout the Middle Ages the dominant custom was for the concept fides to be used without specification”… Through the sumptuous new computerized concordance it is now possible to specify this more precisely. In the Thomas corpus the ratio of fides alone to fides christiana (or christiana fides) is 132 to I.’ This is from my Faith and Belief, p. 299Google Scholar, where supporting refl. will be found for the data used in the statistical calculation.

page 33 note 1 More explicitly: ‘false faith’ for him is a contradiction in terms:

ei [sc. fidel] non potest subesse falsum.

…fidei non potest subesse aliquod falsum.

…prod cadit sub fide, non palest esse falsum.

(Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologise, 2: 2: I: 3 – in the Caramello edition, vol. 2, pp. 5–6.)Google Scholar Furthermore, for him faith differs from all intellectual activities that have to do with the true–false alternative: distinguitur iste actus qui est credere ab omnibus actibus intellectus qui sunt circa verum sel falsum – ibid., 2: 2: 2: I (Caramello, vol. 2, p. 16).

page 33 note 2 Generic nouns in English may be preceded by a definite article when followed at once by a qualifying clause or epithet (examples: ‘the courage that she showed’, ‘the piety of those Muslims’).

page 33 note 3 Faith and Belief, pp. 297–99.Google Scholar

page 33 note 4 propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides catholicae profitetur.. manifestare: book 1, chap. 2; in the Pera edn. (n. 1, p. 30, above), vol. 2, page 3, §9. The matter is elaborated and richly corroborated in the subsequent few introductory chapters. Cf. also our next note just below.Google Scholar

page 33 note 5 See for example chapp. 6–9 of Book I; esp. chap. 7. There is a further point: that one could – of course – contend that to translate ratio by ‘reason’ here is itself a betrayal, given the gulf between the Latin term's thirteenth-century resonance, cosmic as well as human, and the much reduced meaning that the English one has for most twentieth-century academics. See, for instance, G.-M. Demers, ‘Les divers sens du mot “ratio” au moyen âge’, in Études d' histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIIe siècle, Première Série, Paris: Vrin, and Ottawa: Inst. d'Études Médiévales, 1932 (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales d'Ottawa), pp. [105]-139.

page 34 note 1 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Der christliche Glaube: nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, zweite umbearbeitete Ausgabe, Berlin: G. Reimer, 2 voll., 1830Google Scholar (and many times reprinted. I have used the Martin Redeker edition, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2 voll., 1960).

page 34 note 2 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, English Translation of the Second German Edition, Mackintosh, H. R. and Stewart, J. S., edd., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928Google Scholar (and many times reprinted). The translation ‘has been executed by various hands’ (p. vi): the Introduction, with which we are here primarily concerned, by D. B. Baillie, but other parts by W. R. Matthews, Edith Sandbach-Marshall, A. B. Macauley, Alexander Grieve, J. Y. Campbell, and the two editors; Professor Mackintosh having ‘exercised a general supervision over the work as a whole’ (ibid.).

page 34 note 3 Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächten, Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1799Google Scholar. There was a second edition, with significant modifications, Berlin: Reimer, 1806; and a final third edition substantially unchanged from the second except for the addition of short Erläuterungen at the end of each of the five Speeches. The English translation by Oman (see next note) is of the third edn., but discusses the differences among the three with some care. The tendency to specify religion as a generic something was crystallizing in Germany at this time. In a title it had been adumbrated five years earlier in Kant, , Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1793Google Scholar; and was carried forward by Hegel. On this development in general see chapter 2, ‘“Religion” in the West’ of my Meaning and End …(above, n. 1, p. 31), and esp. its §vii, pp. 44–8Google Scholar; and a later more elaborate study of the matter in Despland, Michel, La Religion en occident: évolution des idées et du vécu, Montréal: Fides, 1979Google Scholar. Schleiermacher comments in passing on the newness of the term, in his Der christliche Glaube, §6: 47/31 (for this form of reference for this work, see below, n. 1, p. 38).Google Scholar

page 35 note 1 The issue here is that members of a new movement, seeing the world in a new way, think of other or older ways of seeing it as particular (peculiar), limited, and to some degree at least, wrong; that their own way of seeing it is also particular, limited, and to some degree at least inadequate they themselves are hardly the ones to articulate. To them it is the way, not a way. The modern West's secular ideology which conceptualizes religion as an addendum to the human and to society or culture has even yet hardly been widely recognized as idiosyncratic, by being given a prevalent and self-accepted name. Even the concept ‘secularism’ was launched some decades after Schleiermacher. (The silly term ‘post-modern’ is a move in this direction made nowadays by grouping would-be outsiders. It builds on the fact that the ideology had dubbed itself ‘modern’ though not as a proper name but a laudatory adjective, in the sense of newer and better; or in the outsider-disparaging sense of not obsolete. Recently a philosopher, who shall be nameless, has compounded the amusing confusion by propounding, in a title, the charming phrase ‘beyond the post-modern…'.)

The terms ‘Christian’, ‘Hindu’, ‘Buddhist', ‘Mohammedan’, ‘Quaker’, ‘Wahhabi’, ‘Confucian’, and many another are instances of originally external naming. (Muslims have been relatively successful in recent decades in resisting the ‘Mohammedan’ name by substituting an honorific Arabic term–Islam – whose meaning the West did not understand, and therefore has hesitated about only out of inertia.)

page 35 note 2 Schleiermacher, Friedrich. On Religion: speeches to its cultured despisers. Translated, with introduction, by Oman, John. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1893Google Scholar. (Several times reprinted; also in abridged editions, e.g., by E. Graham Waring.)

page 35 note 3 This was greatly developed presently; later in the century, books and articles with this specific title, generic singular and particularist plural, appear. This question, too, goes back to Kant; he does not seem to use the plural Religionen, but does call it a ‘practical religious illusion’ (p. 255 of the work cited in our n. 3, p. 34, above)Google Scholar to confuse what he calls Religion with the historical organized institutions; each of these he tends to call a statutarische Religion or Pfaffentum. Schleiermacher, also, addresses the issue in the Reden: Speech Five is entitled Die Religionen/ ‘The Religions’. For him, the are various outward manifestations (Erscheinungen – e.g., p. 360Google Scholar of the 3rd edn.; Oman, , p. 214)Google Scholar of, providing opportunity for, the real thing, the generic; in den Religionen sollt Ihr die Religion entdecken (p. 355Google Scholar; ‘I would have you discover religion in the religions’ – p. 211).

It may be noted that during the course of the twentieth century both Getman and, a little later, French, evinced a minor tendency to move – to a quite limited degree – towards the English custom, of dispensing with an article altogether, for both generic and indefinite. One example: Pfleiderer, D. Otto, Religion and Religionen, München: J. F. Lehmann, 1906.Google Scholar

page 36 note 1 My Towards a World Theology, London: Macmillan (Library of Philosophy & Religion, Hick, John, gen. ed.) and Philadelphia: Westminster. 1981.Google Scholar

page 36 note 2 I have used the recent edition in Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica, where his Theologia Christiana is volume II (Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio mediaeualis, no. 12), ed. Buytaert, Eligius M. (Turnholti: Brepols, 1969), pp. 5–372Google Scholar. There is an English analysis in McCallum, J. Ransom, Abelard's Christian Theology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948.Google Scholar

page 37 note 1 The polarity has been set forth especially in German, where der christliche Glaube and die nichtchristlichen Religionen or the like (e.g., in various titles) might almost be thought standard. Sometimes one finds das Evangelium or die Botschaft in place of der christliche Glaube in the contrast; Botschaft representing the Greek kērygma. (The title of Kraemer's, Hendrik influential work, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World [London: Edinburgh House, 1938]Google Scholar, was much flatter in English than it would be in German.) In English, the Christian complex is more likely to be called also a religion, or the others more likely to be called faiths (World Council of Churches publications, for example, and various titles; although even so liberal a thinker as A. C. Bouquet adopts the other pattern: cf. his The Christian Faith and non-Christian Religions, [London:] Nisbet and New York: Harper, 1958.)Google Scholar

In pluralism as such, Barth himself was not interested. The term would have seemed to him far too drastic a concession: he acknowledged a plurality of religions, but never became aware of plurality of forms of, incidence of, faith. The issue is one to which nothing impinged on his attention in such a way as to induce him to pay he. Some among his followers more caught up in to-day's global situation, however, adopted his concepts and categories. (Their books and articles use Botschaft and Evangelium, as well as Glaube, in setting Christians' involvement in sharp contrast with other communities' Religionen.)

A polarity between faith, or the relation to God that Christians are vouchsafed, and religion, is developed systematically by Barth, in his Kirkliche Dogmatik (see esp. vol. I, Part 2, § 17)Google Scholar; but is adumbrated already in 1921 in his Römerbrief, where he resorts to the term Religion sparingly but when he does so presenting it as something historical (in almost every instance some form of the word Geschichte appears on the same line or even in the same compound or anyway nearby) and evidently therefore as merely (sic) human, in his almost pejorative sense. Later, his attack on it is direct and a whit explosive.

In the course of my work preparing this present study a new hypothesis was generated in my mind as seemingly a contribution to making coherent sense of quite a considerable array of data. It involves a refinement on my study ofseveral years ago (in my Meaning and End…, above, n. 1, p. 31)Google Scholar of the ambiguous development in Western civilization, over the centuries, of the concept ‘religion’ – an ambiguity that prompted that study's proposal to discriminate intellectually between what it calls ‘cumulative tradition’, and faith. Confusing the two can prove serious, doubly so when diverse traditions (including other peoples' or other centuries' ununderstood traditions) are involved. The new hypothesis suggests and would explain a further discrimination: between the use historically of the Latin word religio and its cognates in other modern European languages, on the one hand, and in German, on the other, to name one, or the other, or both (or now one, now the other) of these two intersecting dimensions of humankind's religious life. I have not yet tested the hypothesis rigorously; but in a preliminary way have come upon many supporting data, and a few predictions based on it have proven fruitful.

It would help to make more understandable both Barth's above section on Religion (and his and his school's position on the matter generally), and the impression of startling uncouthness made by its English version (‘The Abolition of Religion’, ‘Religion as Unbelief’, and so on), plus a number of other matters that appear to be illuminated by it. (Cf. ‘religionless Christianity’.) It helps to corroborate also and to clarify our general thesis here that translating may make visible serious differences in the presuppositions and worldviews of divergent cultures or ages.

The suggestion is that there tends to be a significant difference between the meaning of Religion in German and ‘religion’ in English and the Romance languages (– even to the point where at times a straight translation may inescapably be misleading) because of the Latinate term's having come into German late (cf. p. 35, above, end of the final n. from the preceding p., for Schleiermacher's 1821 noting it as recent), as an elitist Enlightenment import carrying intellectualist disparagement, tending to connote – even to denote – of what the rest of us call the religious, only those aspects that were under Enlightenment attack at the time.

The Enlightenment disparagement of religion has certainly deeply coloured the term in cultures further West also, of course. There too there are many for whom the word connotes the outsider observer's apprehension, only, of other people's often disappointing religious affairs. Yet alongside this persists for some at least a memory or echo of the use of the word positively, for what is valuable, even precious, in one's own or one's own group's spiritual life. The German language seems to have preserved no indigenous memory for this term for those aspects of personal elevation to which rather it has traditionally referred by Glaube, Frömmigkeit, and the like. Recognizing that the word effectively entered an only after the Enlightenment, and as a foreign term, would explain perhaps much of the singularity of German views on the matter?

Admittedly the word plays but a small role in the Vulgate, and even smaller in most later versions of the Bible in Christian use; yet least of all in Luther's, where it occurs not at all (in recent versions, once, and that of the Religion of non-Christians: Acts 26:5). It was used as virtually interchangeable with ‘piety’ by Aquinas and other Schoolmen, by Zwingli, and the most influentially by Calvin in his magnum opus (see The Meaning and End … pp. 35–7 and 224–8Google Scholar, for comments on the stark modern mistranslations of that work's title!). Thus in the other languages it has come to refer more than in German to what both participants and critics see and feel; to both inner and outer, personal and institutional, valued and disparaged, transcendent and positivist. A careful reading of Barth shows that the word names for him, as we have said, only the historical, the outer manifestations of the life of faith.

(It is curious that his discrimination between faith and religion is in some ways parallel to my discrimination here between the generic and the reified particular. The English language uses the definite article to mark a downgrading of faith into its mundane appearances much as the German language uses a late, foreign, word to express that difference. The use of ‘faith’ as a concrete noun (‘the faith, ‘a faith’, ‘faiths’, and so on) is also a post-Enlightenment emergence in English.)

On scrutiny I find, encouragingly, that when Zwingli's, De Vera et Falsa Religion CommentariesGoogle Scholar was translated into German, in the sixteenth century, it appeared as Von warem undfalschemglouben… Zuerich: Froschouer, 1526Google Scholar (the same publisher as had brought out the original in Zürich the preceding year), trans. by Leo…Jud. (I have not managed to see an actual copy of this work: the information, with spelling, is from Finsler, Georg, Zwingli-Bibliographie, Zürich: Orell Fükli, 1897, p. 35.)Google Scholar

(For incipient indications of the issue to which the present suggestion offers a solution, see The Meaning and End… p. 35 at reff. 78–80 and pp. 221f. for those refl.Google Scholar; cf p. 125 and pp. 302f. for reff. 4–10 thereon.)

page 38 note 1 Der christliche Glaube, §8: 57/38Google Scholar. (Note: here and elsewhere in what follows, I observe the usual custom of citing a passage of this work by giving its section or paragraph number; then, after a colon, my references separated by a virgule indicate the page number of the Redeker edition 1960–n. 1, p. 34 – of the German, followed by the page number of the English. Unless otherwise specified, the German page number refers to the first volume, from which virtually all our citations here are taken. This order, giving preference to the original German, with the English translation following, is maintained in all cases, even when – as in this present instance – the English is presented first in our text.)

The entire Zusatz/Postscript 1, from which our quotation here is taken, and indeed the entire section §8) to which it is attached (51 ff./34 ff.), are highly pertinent; it is they to which the first part of our sentence in the text refers.

page 38 note 2 Von den Verschiedenheiten der frommen Gemeinschaften überhaupt/ ‘The Diversities of Religious Communions in General’ (§7–10: 47–74/31–52)Google Scholar. See esp. §7 and, as in our preceding note just above, §8 (pp. 47–58/31–9).

page 39 note 2 To give one illustrative example, on p. 483 of the English, the word generically is used as a running title, and in addition it occurs eight times on the page so (never with an article). (The corresponding German passage, volume 2, pp. 155–6, of course uses the definite article throughout, as the generic demands.) (This page was chosen not altogether at random: rather, it is the only reference in the English index to faith, outside the Introduction, yet specifically to faith ‘in Jesus’, so that particularity would be more probable here than on average.) I have checked other pages somewhat at random, and find the same pattern. I cannot vouch beyond a limited degree for the impression that outside the Introduction the expression ‘the faith’ as a translation of der Glaube does not occur in the book. Of course, the matter is complicated by the fact that the translation has been ‘executed by various hands’. Yet I have checked sample pages from a part rendered by each of the seven translators. I find one instance (§137: English, page 633) where the word ‘faith’ occurs generically, without an article, twice, but also once with the article, in the construction where it is followed by a descriptive characterization: ‘the faith evoked in the candidate for baptism’ /von dem in dem Taufkandidaten bewirkten Glauben (volume 2, page 335)Google Scholar – where in English it could be dubbed ambiguous whether it be generic or particular: as we have remarked, the one instance where the generic suffers an article is in a construction of this kind, just as, on this same page in the English, the translators write, ‘God is not a God of disorder’, not ‘God is not a god of disorder’ with the lower-case initial for the latter. The article in this particular syntactical pattern does not make it into a common noun, as otherwise ‘a god’ does. (Even in the baptism case here, it may be noted, the particular faith is not ‘the Christian faith’ as one of the faiths of the world, distinct from the Jewish or Islamic or Hindu, but the faith of one particular Christian person, as distinct from that of his Christian brother.)

page 39 note 2 My spot-checking has unearthed, for instance, ‘the Christian faith’ which proves to be a rendering once again (sc., as in the Introduction – cf the parenthesis two sentences further on, and the next paragraph, in my text) of die christliche Glaubensweise (§ 32: 172/132); and der christliche Glaube, which comm out as ‘that Christian belief which …’ (§32: 172/131); der wahre Glaube, rendered as ‘true faith’ (§109: vol. II, p. 172/496)Google Scholar; and so on.

page 40 note 1 By ‘Introduction’ I designate §§ 1–31: [8]–167/3–128. (There is a brief subsection at the beginning of this, also called Einleitung/ ’Introduction’, three pages in German, two in English: §1: [8]–10/1–2.) This, and esp. its long First Chapter (§§2–19: 10–125/3–93), is the one part of the book where Christian particularity is set in the context of faith in general throughout history and the world, the plural context of Christian faith is addressed, and where one might suppose that, if anywhere, particularizing wording would occur. Thus, if there were ever an occasion for him to use a plural such as ‘faiths’, it would presumably be here. And indeed, this seems to be the case for the English. This is the one part of the book where my scrutiny of the wording, and collation of the translation with the original, have been more or less thorough; cf. the preceding note.

page 40 note 2 §12: 84/61. The one other occasion where this phrase occurs in the Introduction (§3: 18/7), they render it as ‘Christian belief – not ‘the Christian belief’ – in a passage where it is parallel to die christliche Frömmigkeit and das christliche Tun (‘Christian piety … Christian belief… and Christian action’). We may note also that der Glaube an Christum appears as ‘belief in Christ’ (§ to: 66/46, tris) and der Glaube an Jesum as ‘faith in Jesus’ (§ 14: 94/68); though der Glaube an einen Gott as ‘the [sic] belief in one God’ (§ to: 66/46). In n. 1, p. 39 above attention was called to the use once again later in the book of the phrase der christliche Glaube, rendered as ‘that Christian belief which …’.

page 40 note 3 The observations of n. 1, p. 39 above (cf. n. 1, this page, just above) apply equally here, so far as completeness of scrutiny is concerned.

page 40 note 4 (Wording such as ‘the piety’, or ‘pieties’, or ‘the Christian piety’, would indeed be strained, would even for twentieth-century thought constitute uncouth English.) ‘Christian piety’ – die christliche Frömmigkeit (§3: 18/7Google Scholar – cf our n. 2, this p. – and Part IV title, immediately preceding §15: 105/76). ‘Forms of piety’: see n. 1, p. 41.

page 40 note 5 §10: 67/46. Cf. ‘(the two) other monotheistic faiths’ for (die beiden) andern monotheistischen Glaubensweisen, , §9: 63/43, §10: 67/46Google Scholar. Further, ‘all developed faiths’, jede ausgebildete Glaubensweise, §10: 64/44Google Scholar; ‘other such faiths’, von andern solchen, §11: 74/52Google Scholar. It should also be noted that this wording was followed a century later by Martin Buber, who chose this form for a plural for his striking work Zwei Glaubensweisen, Zürich: Manesse, 1950Google Scholar – perhaps the first genuine study ever of more than one ‘mode’ of faith, taking each seriously and considering them comparatively. Noteworthy too is that the English version of this a year later chose a rather more rigid term: Two Types of Faith, Goldhawk, Norman P., trans., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, and New York: Macmillan, 1951Google Scholar. Cf. also our next note.

page 40 note 6 §11: 74/52; §10: 68/47. On the former, cf. our note 5 just above. On the latter, cf. ‘(not…) a distinctive way of faith’ – (keine) eigene Glaubensweise; ‘each faith’ – jede Glaubensweise; ‘one faith’ – eine Glaubensweise (all three: §10: 67/46); ‘any particular faith’ – eine einzelne Glaubensweise, again (§11: 75/52). We have already seen that ‘the faith’ is die Glaubensweise (§10: 68/47). Cf. also p. 41 below, at n. 3.

page 41 note 1 §7: 48/32. More fully: es gibt …Gestaltungen gemeinsamer Frömmigkeit. As indicated, however, this is unusual; regularly, this phrase emerges rather as ‘forms of piety’, §7: 50/33 – §8: 51/34 – §9: 59/39 – § 9: 60/41. Also: Gattungen der Frömmigkeit, ‘kinds of piety’ (§7: 50/35). Cf. also p. 40 above, at n. 4.Google Scholar

page 41 note 2 §7: 50/33. The phrase occurs twice more in the Introduction, but in both cases comes out as ‘Christian piety’ – see n. 4, p. 40 above. Sometimes (and on this, one might reflectively compare n. I, pp. 37–38 above) the noun without the qualifying adjective (christliche) is rendered as ‘religion’ without an article: die Froüimigkeit becomes simply ‘religion’ (§3: 15/6) – occasionally with the alternative explicit: ‘religion or piety’ (§3: 15/5). Eine…Richtung der Frömmigkeit appears as ‘a type of religion’ (§11: 74/52); Gestalt der Frömmigkeit, ‘form of religion’ (§8: 55/37).

page 41 note 3 §10: 68/47.

page 41 note 4 See p. 38 above, at nn. I, 2. He is quite explicit about lower and higher, and fairly so about ‘forms’; using for instance, such a phrase as eine höhere Religionsform (§ 7: 48/32; and cf. our next note just below). On the next page, however, ‘forms of faith’ is once again Glaubensweisen. ‘The purest form of Monotheism’ is die reinste…Gestaltung des Monotheismus (§8: 56/38).

page 41 note 5 … das Christentum in der Tat die vollkommenste unter den am meisten entwickelten Religionsformen ist/ ‘… Christianity is, in fact, the most perfect of the most highly developed forms of religion’ (§8: 56/38). See in general Part II of that First Chapter (cf. n. 2, p. 38 above). (Rendering the ‘most’ developed here as ‘the most highly developed’ is presumably legitimate enough, since the author has indeed set forth an historically progressivist thesis, equating lower with earlier and higher with later – except that Christianity is higher than Islam).

page 41 note 6 … mit der bei jedem Christen vorauszusetzenden Überzeugung von der ausschliessenden Vortrefflichkeit des Christentums/ ‘… the conviction, which we assume every Christian to possess, of the exclusive superiority of Christianity’ (§ 7: 50/33).