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Newman and the ‘Ethics of Belief’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

M. Jamie Ferreira
M. Jamie Ferreira
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, University of Virginia
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The last thirty years have seen a number of major contributions to the philosophical discussion of the possibility and character of an ‘ethics of belief’. In so far as the concern was focused on the problem of what constitutes ‘sufficient’ or ‘insufficient evidence’, the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ has turned into the current philosophical preoccupation with the question of the character of ‘rationality’ and the possibility of criteria of rationality which are either universal or at least cross-contextual. On the other hand, in so far as the concern was focused on the debated thesis that ‘believing is subject to moral appraisal (including the determination of “duties” to believe)’ the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ is with us today as the double inquiry into the question of the ‘will to believe’ and the relation of belief to action. Though the two concerns are not entirely separable, I will pay more explicit attention in this paper to the latter one in assessing some recent claims concerning the position held by John Henry Newman on these matters. After addressing some of the main points in the modern philosophical discussion of the ‘ethics of belief’, I will attempt to clarify Newman's place in the ‘ethics of belief’ discussion and argue that recent evaluations of Newman misrepresent his position in crucial ways and obscure his contributions to that discussion.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 361 - 373
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

References

page 361 note 1 The following are some of the most useful explicit discussions: Price, H. H., ‘Belief and Will’, PASS (1954)Google Scholar; Grant, C. K., ‘Belief and Action’ (Durham, 1960)Google Scholar; Ammerman, Robert, ‘Ethics and Belief’, PAS (1965)Google Scholar; Harvey, Van, ‘Is There an Ethics of Belief?’, JR (1969)Google Scholar; Williams, Bernard, ‘Deciding to Believe’, Problems of the Self (Cambridge, 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kauber, Peter and Hare, Peter, ‘The Right and Duty to Will to Believe’, Can. Jour. Phil. (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Passmore, J. A., ‘Hume and the Ethics of Belief’, David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, ed. Morice, G. P. (Edinburgh, 1977)Google Scholar; Pojman, Louis, ‘Belief and Will’, Rel. Stud. (1978; unpubl. revis. 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Swinburne, Richard, Faith and Reason (Oxford, 1981).Google Scholar Page citations in the body of the text concerning any of these authors will refer to these particular articles.

page 362 note 1 Locke's, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, xvi, 1Google Scholar; Russell's, A History of Western Philosophy (N.Y., 1945), p. 816Google Scholar; Hume's, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ‘On Miracles’.Google Scholar

page 362 note 2 Clifford, W. K., ‘The Ethics of Belief’, Contemporary Review (1877).Google Scholar

page 363 note 1 The outstanding exception is H. H. Price, who sees the obligation as ‘prudential’ rather than ‘moral’.

page 363 note 2 Cf. Ammerman, Kauber and Hare; Pojman and Swinburne (e.g. 100) (and perhaps Grant) in special cases.

page 363 note 3 Ammerman and Grant.

page 363 note 4 Harvey, Pojman and Swinburne (e.g. 73 ff.).

page 364 note 1 The reference is to Newman's, Grammar of Assent, p. 232 (standard edition), and is found on p. 2 of the 1978 article and p. 1 of the unpublished revised version (1980).Google Scholar In what follows references followed by an asterisk will be to the revised version.

page 364 note 2 Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought (Oxford, 1980), pp. 480–3Google Scholar and passim.

page 365 note 1 The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty (1846–86), ed. Achaval, and Holmes, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 14–15 (1853).Google Scholar Further references to this collection in the text will take the form: T.P.,—.

page 367 note 1 Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, 1981), p. 125.Google Scholar

page 368 note 1 Cf. Grammar, 229 and Doubt and Religious Commitment (note 9), pp. 44, 54–7, 72.Google Scholar

page 369 note 1 Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. Dessain, C. S. et al. (London, 1961–1968), XVIII, 334 (24 04, 1858).Google Scholar

page 370 note 1 Swinburne, , Faith and Reason, p. 97Google Scholar, cites this from Mitchell's, The justification of Religious Belief (N.Y., 1973), p. 130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 371 note 1 Most notably work by Michael Polanyi, Gilbert Harman and Putnam (note 11).

page 373 note 1 Especially in the Grammar of Assent and Theological Papers.