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Luck and miracles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2003

STEVE CLARKE
STEVE CLARKE
Affiliation:
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, LPO Box A260, ANU, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia
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Abstract

In another paper published here, I criticized Stephen Mumford's causation-based analysis of miracles on the grounds of its failure to produce results that are consistent with ordinary intuitions. In a response to me, intended as a defence of Mumford's position, Morgan Luck finds fault with my rival approach to miracles on three grounds. In this response to Luck I argue that all three of his criticisms miss their mark. My response to Luck's final line of criticism helps shed light on the difference between my approach to the definition of miracles and that due to Mumford. While my approach is driven by both metaphysical and epistemological considerations, Mumford's approach appears to be driven exclusively by metaphysical considerations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 2003 , pp. 471 - 474
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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