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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
A number of writers have recently taken fresh looks at the many centuries-old ontological proof of Anselm.1 Three of these writers seem to agree with me that traditional ways of treating this topic have been inadequate and that the proof, whether or not it is a sufficient reason for belief, is not without important bearings for philosophy of religion. These writers are Malcolm, Findlay, and Plantinga. With each of these I find considerable common ground, and they have all indicated to me that they are aware of this. In the present article on the topic, however, I wish to discuss a fourth writer, who differs rather sharply from the other three and particularly from me. Since Hick's views are shared in certain respects by what I take to be a main stream of contemporary thought, particularly in Britain, it seems worth while to accept the challenge he offers.
1 For the literature see The Many-faced Argument. Ed. by Hick, John and McGill, A. C. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 366 ff.Google Scholar My page references will be to Hick's essay in this book, pp. 341 ff. To Hick's list of my writings bearing on the argument, I wish to add only my Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: SCM; LaSalle: Open Court, 1970), chs. xi–xiv.Google Scholar Only in this book do I formally state my reasons for belief in God. Hick's empiricism is expounded in his Faith and Knowledge (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1957).Google Scholar For Findlay's more recent discussions see his Transcendence of the Cave (London and New York: George Allen & Unwin, Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 84, 86–90.Google Scholar Also his ‘Reflections on necessity’ in Process and Divinity (LaSalle: Open Court, 1964)Google Scholar and his Language, Mind, and Value (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 8 f., 96 ff.Google Scholar For Alvin Plantinga's view see The Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974; Humanities Press, 1975).Google Scholar